The pre-1956 Hungarian Events Re-examined:
the Fascist Card.
v. Sandor Balogh, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus
To the superficial observer and historian it seems that the book on the 1956 Hungarian "Uprising," one of the many names used to identify the bloody rebellion against the Hungarian Communist regime that shook the Kremlin's iron rule over its satellite empire, is closed. According to traditional wisdom, “It was a popular uprising against an oppressive regime that, in desperation, had to call in the Russian troops to put down the rebellion staged by students and workers.”
But during the last fifteen years more and more has become known about the background maneuvering that actually provoked a people's ire and swept the Communist regime of Ernő Gerő from power, so the term "uprising" might not be that accurate.
Yet, now that the Communist Empire has collapsed, it seems like Monday morning quarterbacking, without any real benefit, to re-hash those events that happened almost a half century ago. But we must consider that, in addition to Russia, the dominant power of the former Soviet Empire, in several former satellite countries in East Central Europe Communists or former Communists are still in power, and even where they are out of power no real purges were made. Consequently, the government and the military is still full of Communists and former "political officers" who once were the lackeys of the Soviet regime.
This author wrote his dissertation in the 80's about the Soviet-Hungarian relations from 1948 to 1956. The main thesis of the dissertation was that the events of 1956, including the Polish Solidarity strike at Poznan and the events in Budapest, as well as the East German dissent in 1953 and the Prague Spring under Alexander Dubcek, were not nationalist uprisings. Those nations, having long affiliation with Western culture, rebelled against the more primitive, more Soviet despotic rule and the forced imposition of Byzantine culture. The thesis was proven by arguing that the more nationalist but Byzantine Orthodox Bulgarians, Serbs and Rumanians have never rebelled against the Soviet rule.
This topic is still very timely, since the West, including the US foreign policy establishment still does not realize the importance of political culture, especially the role that the Orthodox Byzantine culture plays in politics. The imperialistic expansionary tendencies of Russia are based on the Byzantine messianic zeal to conquer and convert more and more peoples. Since the completion of the Dissertation more information strengthening my argument has drawn closer to my attention on this issue, some of which I will include as attachments to this essay.
Concerning the Hungarian events themselves, I had proposed a secondary thesis that the popular version, i.e. that the events were a popular uprising initiated by the students and/or workers, depending on whose interpretation one accepts, is inaccurate. Based on the application of the “theory of revolutions,” and a careful analysis of the UN Report on Hungary this author had argued that the rebellion was prepared and provoked by the government and the Communist Party.
The most authentic evidence for this came from the mouth of Imre Nagy himself. On the morning of October 23, when it was announced, that the university students were planning a demonstration and they demanded the return of Imre Nagy to power, his friends, in a small private meeting, had urged Nagy to attend the demonstration, but Nagy refused. He reminded the group that ten days earlier he had received warning from Imre Mezö, the only member of the top Communist leadership who still had contact with Nagy. According to Mezö, “Gerő was planning a major provocation against Nagy. He let the situation deteriorate to the degree that it was in Poland, and used it as an excuse to eliminate the entire opposition within the Party.” Therefore he had to be very careful, which explains his behavior during the first few days, until it became obvious, that Gerő had lost his game.
If this is true, of course the Hungarian people fell into the trap. But once provoked, they responded splendidly to the challenge and, in spite of the involvement of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, they had succeeded in ousting the much-hated Communist Party from power. The Soviets had to bring in new troops to put down the rebellion of that valiant small nation and restore the Communists to power.
There might seem to be some inconsistency between the two proposals, rebellion against the violent imposition of a foreign culture and the premeditated provocation. But there is a simple explanation. The Hungarian and the Soviet leadership expected the provocation to lead to a minor disturbance in Budapest to be easily cleaned up by the Soviet troops. But it turned into a major rebellion because of the cultural differences, and the Hungarian people’s deep seated desire to be masters of their own fate. Being used to the docile reaction of the Byzantine Orthodox Russian people, they did not expect what actually happened in Budapest, namely that the freedom loving Hungarians would not stop until they had defeated the hated regime. According to General Malasenko’s report, “…the events have exceeded our imagination."
Since 1990 evidence has appeared that not only completely supports the thesis of the dissertation, but gives new insight into the methods used by the Kremlin.
There is also evidence that Eisenhower and Dulles had to reassure the Soviet leaders that the US would not interfere if they reasserted their rule over Hungary.
Thus, if we take into consideration the role the World Government concept might have played in the events, Ambassador Bohlen’s reference to the approval on „legmagasabb szinten” (highest level) might refer to the highest level of the „foreign policy establishment,” which was not necessarily President Eisenhower.
Further analysis shows that up to November 4, when the Soviets attacked the sleeping Budapest, the US did everything it could to protect the Soviet aggressor in the UN. Gordon Gaskill, an American journalist, chronicles the US behavior at the UN in the Virginia Quarterly. Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the UN did everything he could to delay, sidetrack, or hinder the efforts of the so called Cassandra Club, led by Cuban UN Ambassador, Dr. Emilio Nunez-Portuondo, to take effective UN action to save Hungary from the Soviet intervention.
In the following (Part I) first I shall reprint the Preface, Introduction and Chapter VI of my dissertation, which suggests that the events of 1956 were planned and provoked by ErnőGerő, the head of the Hungarian Communists. My thesis was based mainly on political theory and logic.
Based on new revelations it is also possible now to place the events of 1956 into the larger context of the Cold War. On the one hand, the Soviets needed to react to the creation of NATO and the keeping of a huge American contingent in Europe and, on the other hand, the American policymakers did not want to risk alienating the Soviet Union and jeopardizing their goal of creating a World Government, more recently code-named as New World Order, as outlined by Arthur Schlesinger in his book, Vital Center. Schlesinger’s theme is that “the noble concept of World Government” will begin to make contact with reality, when the Soviet Union and the United States meet at the “center” : they will respect human rights more, and we will move toward socialism.
Therefore Schlesinger had cautioned the American foreign policy establishment not to scare the Soviets away from moving toward this center. He even mentioned the Hungarian tyrant, Matyas Rakosi and warned that, no matter how bad he was, the West should treat him with kid gloves, so that they might continue to move toward the “vital center.” It was this spirit that Eisenhower and Dulles supported and there was circumstantial evidence available in the 1980's to suggest it. To get concrete evidence, I even placed a request in the Hungarian newspapers published in the West, asking anyone who might have information about the invitation and planning of the Soviet intervention to contact me. Unfortunately, there was no such information forwarded to be included in my dissertation.
Since 1990 however, articles and memoirs providing factual information and personal interpretations have become available. In Part II., I shall review these articles and in the Conclusion I shall try to present a coherent picture of the pre-1956 planning and preparation, based on this new information. I shall attempt to organize the available information into consistent conceptual units and work out the conflicts, but still more research is needed, especially from still unavailable official secret documents, for the full and accurate understanding of those events. It seems that the so far released documents had been carefully screened, in order not to make public any damaging documents.
Part I. The Dissertation
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PH.D. DISSERTATION
Cultural and political patterns of Communism in Central Europe: A case study of the Soviet-Hungarian relationship, 1948-56.
Balogh, Sandor, Ph.D.
New York University, 1987.
The dissertation seeks to compare and explain the two different patterns of development in Central and Eastern/Southern Europe: while in the Central European countries like in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Sovietization provoked major resistance, in the Eastern-Southern European countries like Russia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet rule has been tolerated for four decades without any serious challenge.
The thesis of the paper is that the Central European nations, with strong western traditions, have rejected Soviet style Communism, since it has the "birthmarks" of the Byzantine Russian Orthodox culture, while the Eastern and Southern European countries that have Orthodox cultures themselves, including the Russian people, do not find the Soviet system too alien to their own culture.
The dissertation is a case study proving that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was more a desperate rejection of Russification than a nationalist uprising. As part of this study, the dissertation also analyzes the relationship between the Kremlin and the Hungarian "puppet" government.
· Chapter One analyzes the Russian Mind, tracing it back to its Byzantine roots, through the Slavophile School, Russian Messianism and Panslavism, and Orthodox Authoritarianism.
· Chapter Two reviews the relevant aspects of Hegel's and Marx's systems, arguing that their system is more compatible with the Russian than the Western Mind.
· Chapter Three argues that the Soviet Union is not only a direct descendant of Orthodox Russia, but is "the political expression of Russian nationalism.”
· Chapter Four reviews Hungary's thousand year old western orientation, up to World War Two.
· Chapter Five details Russification in Hungary from 1948 to 1956.
· Chapter Six shows how the cultural conflict had sharpened in Hungary to the point when Hungarians could not tolerate it anymore.
· The Conclusion shows that Russification even today (as of the 1980’s) is a major burning issue in Hungary.
The author left Hungary in 1956.
Order Number 8801514
Cultural and Political Patterns of Communism in Central Europe: A Case Study of the Soviet-Hungarian Relationship, 1948-56.
Balogh, Sandor, Ph.D.
New York University, October 1987.
It is probably in order to give a brief summary of the long history of this dissertation. I completed my oral examinations in 1969, and my Dissertation Committee directed me
“to shift the focus of your Ph.D. Dissertation plans to a careful and detailed study of the development of Communism in your native Hungary. The Committee believes that your special knowledge in this area may well yield information of considerable and lasting value to the academic community. The Committee also believes that your ready familiarity with this material makes it possible for you to think of completing your dissertation within a relatively short span.”
Unfortunately, the “short span” has turned into eighteen long years.
The story of these years should be told, since it has direct relevance to my study. Not wanting to rely completely on memory and available secondary sources, I immediately applied for a visitor's visa at the Hungarian consulate through my travel agent. The visa was rejected with no explanation. The next summer I applied direct to the Consulate, to be rejected again. Since then I have applied several times, have applied for a research visa under the IREX program even, but it was still refused by the Hungarian authorities. I also wrote to Janos Kadar himself, to no avail. The text of the rejection was always the same:
"Under the current visa regulations your request cannot be processed."
I have not even been able to get an explanation in eighteen years. I have visited the Hungarian Consulate in New York, the Embassy in Washington, and written several letters, to no avail. The last promise I received was in August of this year that when one of the employees of the Consulate returns from his vacation in early September, he will explain what the law or regulation is. Now it is October, and I still have no explanation. I also wrote to the U. S. Embassy in Hungary, asking them to try to find an explanation. They responded on July 7, 1987, that the "Embassy has requested the Hungarian authorities why your repeated visa applications have been refused. As soon as reply is received, I will inform you." I have received no such information yet.
The Hungarian consul in New York city also suggested that I should re-submit my visa application stressing "humanitarian aspects" of the case, like "visiting a sick family member." But this completely misses the point. At this point I just wanted to know what the "current visa regulations" were, and in particular, how did it apply to me. I did not question their right to establish their regulations, but I believe that under the Helsinki Final Act's provisions, they should at least make public the regulation. Was it something that they were ashamed to reveal publicly?
It was also suggested by the Hungarian Consulate in New York that I may appeal the decision by sending them the appeal fee. But what can one appeal if one does not know the applicable rule? If it is purely a personal decision, as it has been suggested by someone familiar with the system, namely, that a party functionary a long time ago has placed your name on a black list, and he is long dead and nobody cares to remove your name, why should it cost you money to have your name removed? These may look like minor or even moot points, but it is relevant to the current state of affairs in Kadar' s Hungary that prides itself of being one of the most liberal satellite governments.
This obstacle prevented me from completing the dissertation within the time limit normally allowed. Growing family responsibilities have also played a role in further delay. Finally, in 1982, I was granted Sabbatical leave that enabled me to re-start the entire project. So, this paper is essentially the result of work done during the years after 1982.
I have to admit, however, that the delay has helped in maturing my thesis and I believe the end-product is much better, more seasoned and mature now than it would have been had it been completed ten years ago. Also, the perspective is much better now. I doubt that I could have gotten the same insight before 1980, when the Polish Solidarity movement was outlawed.
Before 1968 an important perspective to study the Hungarian Revolution was missing: The so called Prague Spring was the first and only uprising that was defeated by Soviet troops. Before 1980, one could only compare the events of 1956 with the Czechoslovakian situation in 1968. But after 1980 the final piece of the puzzle fell in place: there were protests and uprisings in all the Western oriented Communist countries, and there was none, in the forty years since World War II ended, in the countries with Byzantine culture. The pattern was clear, and the thesis of the dissertation was a natural: the countries that have Western cultural traditions have rejected the Soviet rule not because of nationalism, or because of anti-socialism, but because the culture that the Soviets imposed was foreign to these peoples.
I have to admit that at first I was hesitant. So many people, including experts, Neo-Marxists, the media, even statesmen, accept the myth that the Soviet Union is a Marxist and Socialist country, and in spreading Soviet influence, they spread Socialism. My thesis clearly went against the “main-stream” of the relevant literature and the experts. Could I be the only one who sees that the "Emperor has no clothes?" But as I did my research I have discovered that there is a solid body of evidence to support my thesis--it just has not been applied to the Satellite nations.
For the successful completion of the project I owe a great deal of gratitude to a large number of people. First, of course, is my thesis advisor, who also worked with me on my M.A. Thesis, and over the years, has guided me through this much larger project, Professor Mark H. Roelofs of the Department of Politics at NYU. I am also grateful to the Department for re-admitting me to the program after such a long delay. I should also thank the members of my Committee for their suggestions and insights, like suggesting that I review the literature on the Political Culture approach and the recent Theories of Revolution. I believe both suggestions have improved my understanding of the problem and have enabled me to develop further both areas.
I also owe more than just honorable mention to Radio Free Europe in Munich and its Hungarian section for their invaluable help during my three weeks of research there after the Hungarian authorities refused my visa for research in Hungary. The excellent library resources of RFE have almost made up for my inability to do my research in Hungary. Consultation with Dr. Aurel Bereznai, Carlo Kovacs, Istvan Polgar, Laszlo Rasko, and the assistance of Mrs. Szamosi was especially helpful.
Among the institutions that have helped, I should include my own school, Hudson Valley Community College for the two semesters of Sabbatical Leave, for the encouragement of my superiors, and the concrete help given by my colleagues, Joe Marsh and Tony Walsh in proofreading several versions of my raw draft. Special gratitude is earned by the typing pool and those dedicated typists for patiently typing and re-typing, correcting, and printing the several versions of this dissertation.
Among my friends I should thank so many, but the following gave more than friendly encouragement to deserve special mention: Attila Csutkay, Denes Szegedi, and Botond Zahony have helped me from their libraries or other resources.
Last but not least, I should thank members of my family. My wife, Sara, had tremendous patience in not only encouraging me, sticking with me, but also in tolerating the piles and piles of books, manuscripts, typed sheets, in my den, the porch, living-room table, and wherever I found empty space for my material. Exercising tremendous self-control, she did not throw out any of my papers. All my kids were just as patient over the years when they asked me to do something or go somewhere and I excused myself to work on my dissertation. My daughters, Suzanne and Marianne, were especially helpful in checking my references and helping to prepare the footnotes.
Thank you to all. Without you, I would be still working on this project.
Of course, as customary and proper, I will take the blame for all the mistakes that still might be found. I only hope that I succeeded in reducing them to the minimum.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CENTRAL EUROPE:
Central Europe is historically one of the most important geopolitical regions of the Earth. It is part of what the Scottish geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, refers to as East Europe in summarizing his theory about world politics:
who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
One could find numerous examples in history to prove this principle. Unfortunately, the victorious nations of W.W.I. did not take Mackinder's advice and fragmented Central Eastern Europe instead of creating a power base which, allied with the Western democracies, or even alone, would be able to stand up to either German or Russian pressure. Hitler, on the other hand, based on Karl Haushofer's work, who himself was a follower of Mackinder, did recognize the importance of the region, and his first step to carry out his plans was to secure Central Europe.
It might be true that, with ICBMs and assorted space weapons, the military importance of Central Europe has declined, but it could change soon, as the insanity of an all-out nuclear war becomes more obvious. If either nuclear disarmament talks will be successful or the SDI program is deployed, the prospect of traditional warfare will increase. Consequently, Central Europe's military significance as a buffer zone will increase, making Mackinder's theories timely again.
From the American side, Spykman, the renowned expert on geopolitics echoed Mckinder's warnings: better pay attention to Central Europe. During World War II, preparing America for the following peace settlements, Spykman pointed out that “The greatest difficulty will be that of balancing Germany and Russia." Following Mackinder's suggestion that was disregarded by the victors after WW I, namely, "a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia, " whose neutrality would be protected by the rest of the world, Spykman proposes "a great Eastern federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. "
Although American policy makers and our media have not yet realized the importance of Spykman’s and Mackinder's warnings, Western Europe is more concerned than ever. As recently as November 1986, following the breaking of the Iran-Contra controversy in the U.S., a column in Die Zeit suggested that the "silver lining" for Europe in Reagan's difficulties could be that Europe now might be free to "embark on initiatives of its own in the pursuit of political progress for the West.” The three Western interests, according to the article, include "keener attention to Ostpolitik while Washington is lying low.”
In the same issue of Die Zeit, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt talked about possible progress toward making some accommodation regarding what he refers to as Eastern Europe. These statements follow a series of pronouncements by European statesmen concerning Ostpolitik, which is the code name for Western politics toward the rest of Europe including Central Europe.
Cohn S. Gray, a contemporary student of Mackinder and Spykman is even more emphatic in his study. Gray repeats the importance of the Central European region in terms of contemporary power relations: “Geopolitical relations in Central Europe are a matter of major interest to this study, because--unlike the clashes of East-West interest elsewhere (save with respect to the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf in particular)--the achievement by the Soviet Union of hegemony over this region would, in and of itself, mean a decisive and immediate shift in the global balance of power. Even Soviet success in the Persian Gulf area would largely have meaning in terms of its effects upon the policies of European countries (and Japan).
Based on the importance of this region, Gray issued following warning to the U.S. policy makers:
”… looking at the world of the late 1970's, the theories of Mackinder and Spykman yield a common logic for policy. The United States cannot afford to tolerate the effective control of Eurasia-Africa by the Soviet Union. It must serve, in its own vital interests, as the functional successor to Great Britain as an active balancer of power on, and bearing upon, the Rimlands of Eurasia. Such a geopolitical task is as essential as it should--given steadiness of purpose and an appropriate popular understanding of that purpose--be successful.” 
The question that Central Europeans are wondering, and perhaps would like to have some say about, is this: might Spykman's suggestion be realized with a neutral Central European Federation, or might Central Europe be annexed by Western Europe, as opposed to now being annexed by the Soviet Union.
One can only hope that after the world has paid a heavy price, because the statesmen twice failed to consider geopolitical considerations in Central Europe, this time the world leaders will heed the advice of the experts and the leaders of Western Europe.
But Central Europe has another important rote: it is there that Eastern style Communism clashes most directly with Western culture and crucial Western interests.
The significance of understanding the people and culture of a country, especially as important as the Soviet Union and the Central European nations including Poland should be obvious. During W.W. II, US marines and other troops were provided with detailed information on the native cultures in the South Pacific. This material, collected from the Human Relations Area File, "is said (to have) prevented many costly mistakes and saved many lives.” Yet, influential policy makers and opinion molders seem not to take into consideration the basic cultural feature of the Soviet Union, namely that it is an Orthodox, Byzantine empire with a non-Western mindset, and that the people in Central Europe have an old, established Western culture. Their failure to realize this has led to many costly mistakes, like the Yalta agreement, to name only the most significant. The average GI participating in W.W. II knew more about the culture of a small tribe in the South Pacific than Churchill, or U.S. Presidents, including Roosevelt, Eisenhower or Reagan know about the USSR, Poland, or Hungary.
It is not only that the world leaders are ignorant of the cultures of peoples whose fate they hold in their hands, but they are not even interested. Cultural conditions are completely neglected in favor of military and/or economic considerations. Yet, genuine peace cannot come about until more interest is directed to peoples' minds, their values, ways of life, traditions, etc.
As a result of the total disregard for cultural and historic factors, after World War I., the victorious Allied Powers accepted a peace plan that resulted in a number of national and millions of individual and family tragedies, greatly contributed to the development of the Cold War and helped to destabilize an already fragile continent.
The difference between Eastern and Western culture is so vast that only the blind cannot see it. Stjepan Buc, having had experience in the pre-communist Croatia in Communist Yugoslavia, and now living in South America, sees the difference as follows:
Striving for power is generally characteristic of human beings. But if two do the same, it is yet not the same. As the eastern individual is quite different in his nature and character, so will he act and react differently. . . The historians, e.g. have proved that the term "democracy" in Byzantium meant something quite different from what it means to us. "Democracy" means for them what "anarchy" means for the Westerners. What in the West is generally termed "democracy", that is dictatorship in the East; what is "peace" for them, that is "a peace of cemetery"; their "coexistence translated for us means that burglary is to be voluntarily acknowledged by the legitimate owner as a just action of the burglar. Different logic, different moral conceptions; hence, a different philosophy and different ethics.
THE POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH
During the last three decades the role of cultural factors in politics has been re-discovered, reinforcing the unique cultural position of Central Europe. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss the political culture movement in detail, but a brief analysis is in order.
The first major step was to use the political culture concept to understand, analyze, and compare political systems on a basis other than the state institutions. Next, Brown and Gray used political culture as the basic concept to study change in the Communist states, creating, as it were, an almost separate branch of the political culture approach.
While Brown and Gray used a country by country approach to analyze the Communist states, White, Gardner, and Schopflin published a volume, based on a conceptual analysis of the same Communist systems, from a political culture perspective. Following these and other studies of the different Communist states, a second volume by Brown analyzed the studies of political culture and Communism.
The progress in these three decades has been tremendous. While at first there was little agreement even concerning the definition of political culture, and the concept was used mainly as a descriptive tool, by 1979 political culture studies became more developmental.
In 1979 White presented a study of Soviet politics emphasizing “important elements of continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary systems." But White's study failed to go back to analyze the roots of the pre-revolutionary Tsarist system.
While White's approach was a step in the right direction for the political culture school, it was not that new. As White himself admits, "there are brief accounts of Soviet political culture in two recent texts, referring to Barghoorn's Politics in the USSR4 and Reshetar's The Soviet Polity. Actually, there are several other works doing the same thing.
Further, White's approach is quite inadequate. While he correctly anchored the Soviet system in Tsarist Russia, he failed to similarly anchor the Russian political culture in something solid. Mary McAuley took White to task for his undocumented and seemingly unfounded though quite correct assertions about Tsarist Russia. McAuley expects political culturalists to provide the entire chain of explanations, from the present to as far back as necessary, to explain contemporary political culture.
”(I)f today's political culture has its origins in yesterday's political culture, we would expect our authors to seek the source of the traditional political culture--not in the yesterday's politics and society--but in the belief system of an even earlier stage of that society.”
But White missed the point in his response. Instead of following McAuley’s suggestion, White backtracked into what he considers a more tenable position. Instead of boldly answering the challenge and tracing the Russian character back to its Byzantine origins White responded by limiting the scope of political culture:
”(I)t should be pointed out, that a political culture approach does not provide--and as far as I know has never been presented as providing--a satisfactory explanation for all aspects of the politics of a nation or a social group.”
But McAuley had, of course, just issued that challenge to White, and White failed to respond to it. In his conclusion, White reasserts a limited concept of the political culture approach:
”(T)he task of the political culturalist, as I understand it, is a relatively modest one. In the case of a Communist state, ...first identify the main features of the pre-revolutionary political culture.... The second task...is to identify the main features of the contemporary political culture... These two tasks, as I see them, are largely, if not entirely descriptive in character...
The third and more difficult task is to compare the pre-revolutionary and contemporary political cultures to see to what extent, if at all, the former appears to have made a continuing contribution to the later... The fourth task...is to examine the extent to which the political culture...is likely to influence future patterns of political development and change.”
It is beyond the scope of this Introduction to argue the merits or demerits of White's understanding/definition of the political culture approach, yet, in order to argue for an open-ended time frame for the study of political culture, an inconsistency in White's approach must be discussed.
In his explanation of the first three tasks of the political culture approach, White seems to take the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the central event, and analyzes the relationship between the immediately preceding and the contemporary political systems. First, in doing this, he skips several decades of development, the entire Stalin era, seeming to suggest that nothing important happened during those decades.
But even more important, how is the "central event" around which the analysis is focused, determined? While the Russian Revolution is obviously the great event in the life of the Soviet Union, there are other important events, and some political culturalists might focus their study on the pre- and post 1953 era, making Stalin's death the central event. Or World War II. If this line is followed, the political culture approach will deteriorate into a study of social and political change!
The only adequate way to explain the political culture of a given nation is to forget about central events, and go back as far as necessary in the past of the nation to explain the present. Do what McAuley suggested!
It is helpful at this point to illustrate the inadequacy of White's approach with two relevant cases.
George Schopflin's essay, "Hungary: An Uneasy Stability," applies the political culture approach to Hungary. Schopflin explicitly limits his inquiry to the post 1867 (the "Compromise") period in his very first sentence: "the modern history of Hungary can be said to have begun with the Ausgleich (“compromise” - [sic]) between the Hungarian gentry and Vienna, whereby the Hungarians were granted complete self-government."
Aside from the fact that the statement is erroneous, since even after the compromise of 1867, "Ties to Austria remained, not only through a common monarch, but also through joint ministers of foreign policy, defense, and finance and a commercial and customs union renewable every ten years," hardly a case of "complete self-government", picking 1876 as the beginning of "modern Hungary" is arbitrary. Any single date is quite arbitrary, but if one is desirable, the liberation of Hungary from the Turkish occupation during the last decade of the 17th Century, or the revolutionary era of 1848, or Trianon at the end of World War One, when Hungary lost 2/3 of her territory, but regained national independence, are all more appropriate starting points.
But even more important, selecting any starting point is arbitrary. There are many features of the Hungarian political culture that go back far beyond 1867. But even setting 1867 as the beginning is completely superfluous for Schopflin, since in his analysis he restricts himself to the comparison of the Horthy regime (1920-1945) and the Kadar regime (1956 to the present). Curiously, Schopflin skips the 1945-1956 period. Thus, the unmentioned "central event" in this study seems to be the 11 year period, dominated by the Stalinist rule of Matyas Rakosi. In his eagerness to find a contrast between the Kadar and the Horthy regimes, relying almost exclusively on reports published in Hungary after 1956, Schopflin emphasizes two aspects of Hungarian political culture before 1945: strong nationalism and "insecurity, fear of extinction." These two features seem to be important for Schopflin because he thinks that they were used as excuses for the leaders of Hungary before 1945 to overlook and/or violate Hungary's democratic traditions (he never explains where those traditions came from as McAuley would demand). Using (or abusing?) the political culture approach Schopflin succeeds in producing one of the most one-sided and inadequate descriptions of the twenty year period between the two World Wars, leaving his readers worse than ignorant about that period of Hungarian history.
The second relevant case to illustrate the inadequacy of White's approach concerns Central Europe, and just by coincidence, is based on a work that White coauthored.
In Communist Political Systems the authors discuss "Democracy and Human Rights" in the Communist countries. The chapter begins with a distinction between "Western liberal democracy" and Marxist and other theories of Democracy. Next, they point out that the human rights record of the several Communist states is quite diverse: some do better than others. So far so good. But because their approach focuses on individual countries and is limited to the immediate past before the Communist takeover, they fail to see the deeper pattern that should be obvious.
Concerning the demand for human rights, they contrast Bulgaria, where "there appears to be very little demand for the extension of individual rights," with Poland, where such demand is high and constant. The liberal idea of "the independence of the courts from the political system" is demanded in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and even in Romania." As far as the press is concerned, "(l)n Hungary there is at the present no formal censorship," just like in Poland and Czechoslovakia. But in Romania and Albania, it seems, there is no need for censorship since the press there has a purely propagandistic role. Also, there is extensive "samizdat" activity in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and in Romania by the Hungarian minority and the Fundamentalists (but not by the Orthodox Romanians). But "in Bulgaria...there has been little evidence so far of significant (samizdat) activity."
Further, the rights to free association and assembly have been claimed and used again in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and little Croatia. The official ritual of mass demonstrations on May 1 has been abandoned with the onset of de-Stalinization, "except in Albania and Romania." Concerning religious freedom, "religion is formally banned and individuals are punished for religious observance" in Albania. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary the churches struggle for their independence. "In Eastern Orthodox societies such as Bulgaria the churches have never claimed the same degree of autonomy and by and large they have been integrated into the framework of the state."
It is quite obvious that on every issue the line up is the same: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the side of Western liberal ideas, while the ethnic Romanians, Bulgaria, and Albania always on the side of "Marxist or other" theories of Democracy. Is this pattern a coincidence or is there an explanation? It is impossible to explain this without going to the roots of political culture, much deeper than White et al. are willing to go. McAuley has every right to be puzzled about the political culture approach when even "Gray himself suggests that Hungary and Poland show (today) the same commitment to democratic values as does Czechoslovakia and that there is nothing in their past political culture to suggest that they should." To find the democratic traditions in Hungary and Poland it is necessary to go back much farther than White of Schopflin do.
Therefore this dissertation proposes to go back sufficiently not only to find the roots of democratic traditions in Central Europe, but hopefully, find what is the common denominator, the common cultural heritage of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
THE WESTERN AND EASTERN CULTURES
The thesis of this dissertation is that Central Europe belongs to the Western civilization, while Russia has an Eastern, Byzantine civilization. It is in order at this point to explain and clarify the difference between the two cultures, the two minds: the Eastern and the Western.
Vice President Bush, upon completing his trip through Rumania and Hungary, addressed this issue in a speech he gave in Vienna. He described how, on an earlier occasion, he stood before the Iron Curtain, "a high concrete wall topped with densely packed barbed wire." Then, he added: "As I looked out to the East, I had the momentary impression that I was standing in a lonely outpost on the edge of Western civilization... Historically, of course, it could not have been more false."
Then the Vice President went on to talk about "Mitteleuropa-Central Europe," quoting Czeslaw Milosz, dissident Polish intellectual. Milosz wrote about his fellow intellectuals in Central Europe and their "extinguishment" seeing their countries, which "are rightfully part of an ancient civilization, one that is derived from Rome rather than Byzantium 'surrender to a hegemony of nation'," which has such a different, a Byzantine, civilization.
"It has often been remarked – continued the Vice President - that of the three great events--the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment--Russia took part in none. But Mitteleuropa...took part in all." Thus, it is these three
events that are the touchstones, the identifying marks of Western culture.
While one may elaborate the significance of these events somewhat, culture, even the more limited aspect, political culture, is a very complex phenomena, and it requires a great deal of oversimplification to fit it into just two categories: East and West. These two categories, of necessity, will be quite broad, will require a high level of abstraction, and may, at times overlap.
Also, a fourth great historical fact may be added to the Vice President’s list that distinguishes the East and West: in the West there was a long struggle between the Church and the State, that ended with the separation of the two. This did not happen in Russia. In the West there existed a struggle between the Church and State, from the time Christianity became the state religion in Rome. The relationship between the two entities posed a great dilemma:
”Should the Church, already a developed social institution, continue in the Hebrew tradition and become a ghetto church? Or should Christians return to the concept of Seneca and conceive of the Church as the "greater commonwealth"?
The dilemma became so great that even many bishops disagreed...”
It took many centuries for the West to come up with its solution: complete separation of the two. The East had its own solution: subservience to the temporal authority. The outcome in the West set the stage not only for the Reformation (only in a secular society can more than one religion flourish), but created two authorities, two sources of truth, in fact, two truths for the West (e.g. creation as the religious truth and evolution the secular truth).
Reformation implied the acceptance of two truths: a subjective (religious) and an objective (secular) truth, in effect, creating religiously a pluralist society. Renaissance marked the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modernity. While it did go back to the secular classical ideas and philosophies, the major result of the Renaissance was the introduction of industrialization, urbanization, the scientific concepts and the positivist method. Finally, the Enlightenment meant a complete break with religion and revelation, enthroning reason as the only source of truth.
As the result of all these changes, the individual emerged as the measure of all things. Russia has missed all this. She has never experienced separation of Church and State, religious (or other) pluralism, industrial and scientific revolution, and rationalism. And in Russia, the individual was never allowed to challenge the authority.
The consequences of Reformation, Renaissance, and Enlightenment in the West were devastating for its traditional Christian culture. The discussion of the differences between the current Eastern and Western cultures would not be adequate without reviewing some aspects of this development.
First, as part of the scientific revolution, Deism challenged some religious notions and explanations concerning nature. Thomas Paine, in his classic statement on Deism, professes:
“ I believe in one God, and no more: and I hope for happiness beyond this Life...
”I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant church, nor by any other church that I know of. My own mind is my own church...
”The existence of an Almighty power is sufficiently demonstrated to us, though we cannot conceive, as it is impossible we should, the nature and manner of its existence...
”Deism then teaches us, without the possibility of being deceived, all that is necessary or proper to be known. The creation is the Bible of the Deist.”
Paine still finds science and belief in God consistent, through the "demonstrable fact" of Creation. SCIENCE carved out an independent niche for itself in the intellectual sphere. A milestone in this development was the “Humanist Manifesto,” a document signed in 1933 by some thirty four intellectuals, including John Dewey. While this Manifesto obviously follows the Deist tradition in its negative attitude towards organized religion, in many aspects it goes beyond Paine's position.
First, the Manifesto, instead of fighting religion, proposes to create a new revolution of secular Humanists, re-defining the traditional concept of religion: "Religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method," and "Religion consists of those actions, purposes and experiences which are humanly significant.” Second, the signers of the Manifesto do not believe in Creation. Its very first point states clearly:
"Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created .”
It seems, indeed, that Supreme Court has given secular Humanism the advantages (without the burdens) of religion, at least as far as tax exemption and conscientious objector status is concerned.
The first Manifesto was followed forty years later by "Humanist Manifesto II," signed by almost two hundred intellectuals from countries as diverse as the United States, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
This Manifesto continues the attack on religion announcing that we affirm a set of principles that can serve as the basis for united action--positive principles relevant to the present human condition. They are a design for a secular society on a planetary scale.
The document includes a section on ethics like how the "preciousness and dignity of the individual person is a central humanist value," on the "Democratic Society," on the "World Community," and on "Humanity as a Whole."
There are many indications that not only the Supreme Court but Congress, along with the news media and the educational establishment is influenced by this secularist trend. It has become so influential that the Associated Press story, "Neo-paganism seen entrenched in West" made page one of the religion section of the daily paper.
The critic, the Rev. Carl F. H. Henry, a Baptist scholar, lecturer and author, reminding one of Solzhenitsyn's charges, claims that “the West has lost its moral compass, and sinks in neo-pagan naturalism that says nature alone is real, that man is essentially a complex animal, that distinctions of truth and good are temporary and changing."
While it took several centuries for the West to become an officially secular society, in the USSR it came suddenly, with one blow in the Great October Revolution. In any case, however, while secular Humanists in the West and Communists in the East disagree about human rights, they have a common denominator in anti-religious naturalism which leads to an anti-Church attitude in both cultures.
Thus, many Humanists in the West may have divided loyalties when it comes to the Christian heritage of the West: since they do not believe in it, should they defend it against a potential attack by fellow atheists or naturalists? Some find it difficult to take sides, while others find it not difficult at all to support the Soviet side. One factor that makes this choice easier is the professed belief in Science (as opposed to Faith) by both the secular Humanists and the Communists. Thus, Science serves as another common denominator.
But there is even more common ground between the secular Humanists and the Communists, who prefer to call the Soviet system "Socialism," rather than Russian Imperialism. The first Humanist Manifesto not only condemns the Capitalist system but states that a "socialized and cooperative economic order must be established." The Manifesto II backtracks a little, and states only that "the door is open to alternative economic systems," yet leaves the door open to Socialism. Also, Manifesto II lumps various kinds of Humanism together:
"The varieties and emphases of naturalistic humanism include ‘scientific,’ 'ethical,' 'democratic,' 'religious,' and 'Marxist' humanism. Free thought, atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, deism, rationalism, the humanist traditions. Humanism traces its roots from ancient China, classical Greece and Rome, through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, to the scientific revolution of the modern world.” 
So, without themselves being Communist, many in the West see in the Soviet Union more a potential ally ("if only...") rather than an enemy, let alone enemy #1. For many, including some in the "liberal" (i.e. "mainstream”) religion, the Papacy is much more dangerous than the Soviet Union. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., for example, proposes to treat the Soviet Union as a potential ally. He recommends that we should move toward Socialism, the Soviets should move toward us a little in the area of human rights, so that the two shall meet at The Vital Center, as the title suggests. Schlesinger's conclusion may frighten some: "When Russia loosens the totalitarian grip, then the noble dream of world government will begin to make some contact with reality.” It is hardly necessary to point out that such optimism completely disregards the hard facts of political culture that is based on hundreds of years of tradition in the West, and an even older tradition in the East. Schlesinger wants the Russians and the Americans live under one World Government! It will happen only when the lion and the sheep sleep together.
Before leaving this topic, it should be pointed out that this secularization process was somewhat slower in Central Europe, (in fact, it is practically non-existent in Poland), creating another dilemma for some in the West: should they support, in the name of human rights, pre-modern, Christian societies in Central Europe against the Soviet "liberators," who have views much more in harmony with the Humanists in the West? Thus, the more-or-less Christian Central Europe is, in a sense, caught between the Neo-Pagan West, and the atheist East.
But this is not all the difference between the two cultures. In the West, the practice of pluralism and the use of reason led to the introduction of a new yardstick. Instead of: "Is it true?", the question became: "Does it work?". If a theory or solution does not work, try another. Thus, a willingness to experiment, along with a toleration of other people's ideas became the basic characteristic of the Western mind. This difference is perhaps best summarized again by Milosz: to be sure, "in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform--to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of mortal sin."
THE WEST: THREE ALTERNATE APPROACHES
But this is only the attitude toward "ideas" ("truth" in the East!). To better appreciate the relationship between the Eastern and the Western mind, it is important to examine the ideas, or "truth" itself, as perceived in the two worlds. The political ideas in the West can be grouped into three basic categories that are referred to by various names. One set of terminology is suggested in this author's study of "Saint Augustine and Modern Democratic Ideals": Christian, Liberal, and Social Democracies.
Christian Democracy, as defined there,  is based on the assumption that there is a universal human nature and man is, by nature, a social being. The isolated individual is insufficient, and could not successfully find out through trial and error the norms necessary for survival. Successful norms are learned from revelation, or from social experience: the successful patterns of behavior become the norms. These norms, once found, are transmitted through tradition. Therefore, the secular contemporary term for this approach is "Traditionalism." This approach includes individuals as diverse as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Burke, William Buckley, or President Reagan.
The Liberal Democrat believes in the complete independence of the individual. This idea first appeared in Calvin's writings: no humans, no society can save man, except God's mercy. From this religious beginning, through secular writers like Hobbes, Thomas Paine, or Ayn Rand and the "Libertarian" school, the secular concept evolved in a reversal of the Calvinist notion, that man is so perfect, he can do anything he wishes. If it can be done, the individual has the right to do it.
The third approach, emphasizing equality of all, is Social Democracy. From its Rousseauian beginnings (Rousseau wanted a society "strong enough to prevent anarchy, yet, at the same time, safeguard liberty") it has deteriorated through Hegel, Marx, T. H. Green, Franklin D. Roosevelt and others into a form of "Statism." Because of these three different approaches, the Western political culture is characterized by a "polarity": a struggle, between the state, society, and the individual. The Russian culture does not have this characteristic of "polarity": a struggle, between the state, society, and the individual. The Russian culture does not have this polarity: there the concept of "authority" includes the obligation to follow.
These three traditions in Western culture can be illustrated with a triangle, where the representatives of the three approaches, Libertarianism, Statism, and Traditionalism, are at one of the three corners, with their followers. The non-ideological masses are in the center constituting the "swing-vote," deciding which ideology is going to rule in a democratic fashion, since none of the three approaches is based on "truth." Eventually, as each approach in its turn will lead to a crisis, the public will turn to the next one, thus producing a sort of a rotation of ideologies.
This can be
illustrated with the current situation in the United States. It seems
that for the past two decades or so the crisis of the statist approach has
been felt, and since the 1968 presidential election in each case the more
traditionalist candidate won. Yet, the public is still ambivalent, and keeps
returning statist (i.e. Liberal and Democrat) candidates to Congress,
creating a deadlock of a sort, like the current three ring circus,
the Iran-Contra Congressional hearing in which liberal Democrats are out to get
the traditionalist Republican president,
in a re-play of the Watergate affair some fifteen years ago. This deadlock will
be broken only when the public makes up its collective mind, and elects
followers of the same ideology to both the Congress and the White House.
THE EAST: THE DISSIDENT IS HERETIC
In contrast, Russia never had such a rotation of ideologies in power. Since the founding of Russia, it has never diverged from its despotic form of government, where the secular ruler also exercised supremacy over religion, therefore, truth.
As students of political culture might point out, due to the rotation of ideologies in power in the West, it seems that different western nations have different dominant ideologies. Unquestionably, the Anglo-Saxon peoples seem to gravitate more toward an individualistic ideology. The peoples of Central Europe, often subjects of foreign domination, have realized the futility of individual efforts to stand up against the foreigners, and never fully trusting the state, often run by foreigners, tend to be more relying on social efforts of the nation, and follow a more traditionalist approach. But, in true Western style, none of the other ideologies are excluded.
In contrast, in the Eastern, (like the Russian) culture the statist approach enjoys a monopoly, with dissidents considered "guilty of mortal sin," according to Milosz.
FIGURE II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANGLOSAXON, CENTRAL EUROPEAN,
AND RUSSIAN~SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURES
There is one more issue that has to be clarified to understand the East-West differences of political culture. There is a degree of overlap: many western Statists are quite sympathetic to the Soviet system. Do they belong to the East or the West? For example, are Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Franklin D. Roosevelt, George McGovern or Ted Kennedy Eastern or Western figures? What is the difference between Stalin and President Roosevelt? Roosevelt never stood his opponents up against the firing squad. Nor did Hegel advocate hanging his critics. Even Marx did not advocate shooting Proudhon, and Senator Kennedy never charged that his opponents "are guilty of mortal sin".
This is so because it is not the views but the attitude or, rather, the context of the ideologies, that makes the difference between Eastern and Western political cultures. Marx, in the hand of a Western interpreter becomes a Western writer, belonging to the Western intellectual tradition, but give him to a Russian, like a Lenin, a Stalin, or even a Khrushchev, and he will look like an Eastern thinker, supporting Despotism.
In all fairness, however, as it will be pointed out in Chapter II, Marx was pretty impatient with opposing views, and it is considered "revisionism" to westernize Marx, as Eduard Bernstein attempted to do. What Bernstein did on the Continent, the Fabianists (the Western answer to Marx) did in England.
Thus, following McAuley's suggestion, the dissertation will not only outline but also document and trace to its origins both the Russian and the Hungarian cultures using the above distinctions.
But, before leaving the topic of political culture, there is one more issue that, although not covered in the dissertation, should be brought to the attention of students of Soviet affairs, in fact, to all political scientists, because of the potential of great ramifications. It shall be briefly identified on the following pages.
POLITICAL CULTURE AND HEREDITY
White points out that there is an extreme position in some of the writings of Soviet emigrés.
”Vladimir Naximov, for instance, has argued that to see a direct connection between the Soviet and pre-revolutionary periods is to imply that the Russian people are in some sense 'born to be slaves, or, at any rate, born without the guts to oppose repression.' The view that autocracy and repression are 'good enough for the Russians because they know no better' is, he quite rightly points out, 'historically and intellectually untenable.' A large section of the Soviet population, admittedly, lacks any experience of democracy--a matter of education and historical background, not of any inborn imperfection.' At the same time, he points out, the Russian people 'have protest in their blood--protest at the injustices of human institutions and the inadequacies of the human condition. Men like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Bukovsky and all the other known and unknown representatives of the feelings of our people could not have arisen had it not been for the tensions generated by the Russian people's innate and perennial protest.”
White, however, fails to point out some obvious problems in Naximov' s argument. For example, there is no empirical evidence offered by White to support the view that the "Russians know no better" argument is "untenable.” Also, the tone of Maximov's argument, very much like Solzhenitsyn's, seemingly blames others for the creation of the Soviet regime in Russia. Just who is responsible, if not the Russians? Maximov's claim that the Russian people "have protest in their blood" is not only undocumented but seems to fly in the face of Russian history. It is either wishful thinking or is based on a very small sample. Furthermore, there seems to be a conflict in arguing that while protest is in the Russian blood, submissiveness "is not the result of any inborn imperfection" but is the result of "lack of experience with democracy." Is biology relevant to political culture or not?
Rosenbaum raises a related issue from the perspective of the collective. He discusses the "national character,” a concept that assumes that the patterned conditions of life within a society create certain distinctive personality types, or social characters."
At first, this theory seems absurd: if personality is shaped by the social milieu, it is not hereditary. If it is hereditary, it cannot be shaped by the environment. But some recent scientific findings seem to support the concept of national character shaped, over several generations, by social factors.
While it is primarily a matter for the natural sciences, biology and population genetics, to decide, it has serious consequences for political culturalists--indeed for all political scientists--so the question cannot be so cavalierly dismissed as White does.
The issue is not new. Adorno et al. studied the Authoritarian Personality during the l940’s, and there were strong suggestions, even at that time, that personality traits are influenced by genetic factors.
More recently a research team at the University of Minnesota, in a still to be published study, found that several politically significant personality traits seem to be biologically determined. In an eight year study of more than 350 twins including 44 pairs of identical twins, they found that "among traits most strongly determined by heredity were leadership, and surprisingly, traditionalism and obedience to authority."
The study used, in
addition to six days of clinical testing, a multidimensional personality
questionnaire developed by Auke Tellegen, a psychologist at the university. The
purpose was to establish the relative importance of nature and nurture, of
genetics and culture in personality structure. A 100 percent score would
mean complete domination of biology, and a zero score would mean no
biological influence whatsoever. In other words, a score of one hundred would
exclude all cultural influence, and a zero score would mean complete cultural
determination of a personality trait. As it was, as shown in Table I, all
eleven traits studied fell into the middle third,, neither the genes
nor culture has accounted for less than one third or more than two thirds of any of the personality traits studied..
If this is true, and personalities are inherited, what does this imply about Maximov's personalities that have "protest in their blood" versus those who have submissiveness in their blood, or individuals who are "born" libertarians and those "born" socialists? Are politically relevant attitudes possibly inherited? This is a very important question that must be studied and answered by appropriate experts in genetics, before writers or political scientists, or even worse, practicing politicians get into the debate.
Biologists have been studying this issue among non-humans for quite a long time. The Hardy-Weinberg law, developed in the early 1900’s, starts out with the assumption that at a given time the different genes are randomly distributed over the entire population, and in the same proportion. According to the H-W law, this proportion will remain the same if four conditions are met, one being that "no natural selection” occurs. Natural selection does not have to be planned. It can be quite spontaneous. For example, assume that a given population starts out with 10% of the individuals having blond hair. If at a certain time it will become illegal to have blond hair, and the blonds will emigrate or will be exiled to Siberia where they will have little chance to reproduce, or their reproductive capacity will be limited in other ways, e.g. no member of the opposite sex will date and mate with them, in several generations there will be few blonds left in that population. This process of change in the genetic pool is a form of micro evolution, often referred to as "genetic drift" or "random drift."  To be sure, the importance of genetic drift is a subject of controversy among population geneticists, yet it should not be dismissed by political scientists as completely irrelevant until it is studied and valid conclusions can be drawn.
The potential significance of the genetic drift can be illustrated with some statistical calculation. First, assume an initial distribution of 10% disfavored (e.g. blond, or individualist personality), and 80% neutral trait in a given population. Next, assume that the reproduction chances of the two groups will change, according to the Malthusian principle of geometric progression in either direction, 10% per generation. After 10 generations (cca 300 years), the favored group's proportion will increase to 26%, the disfavored will decrease to 3.487%, and the neutral group would have the remaining 70.5%. If the same trend continues for 20 generations, the respective figures will be 67.72%, 1.2%, and 31.1%. Even if these figures are exaggerated, as they probably ate, during the 30+ generations under oppressive rule, the distribution of politically significant genetic pool could be quite skewed. The existence of such a genetic drift has been demonstrated in the animal kingdom by H.B.D. Kettlewell, in the peppered moth population. He found that the light moth has all but disappeared in industrial areas, where the birds can easily recognize and devour them, while the black moth is absent in rural areas, where they are immediately eaten up by the preying birds. 
If politically relevant attitudes are influenced by genetics, then comes the next question: have certain attitudes been "bred out" from a given population? Or, conversely, are certain attitudes over-represented in a given population, through a sort of "selective breeding" ?
The Minnesota study does not provide data on the frequency of the different traits in the population at large, which would be necessary in order to make meaningful comparisons between different societies, nor does it establish which particular genes or gene combinations are responsible for certain personality traits. While the study seems to be consistent with earlier studies that have failed to find serious correlation between parent-child personalities, it raises the possibility that through natural selection a given society's gene pool might be altered leading to genetic drift over several generations, possibly producing a kind of "national character."
Thus, it is quite possible, that certain populations will have different political attitudes because of selective breeding. The Anglo-Saxon culture might, for example, make it easier for the enterprising young capitalist with a personality that is willing to take risks to reproduce more freely than to the young revolutionary socialist, producing a genetic drift in a libertarian direction, while in Russia, under the thousand year old authoritarian rule, a genetic drift in the direction of a socialist, submissive personality, is quite a possibility.
In the case of the United States, immigration can also have an effect on the genetic pool. For the most part the ambitious, hard-working people leave their country behind and come to the U. S., the land of opportunity. So while this gene-drain has a negative effect on the countries of origin, it has a positive effect in the receptor country, the US.
In this sense, it is quite possible to talk about “national character." Also, if the assumption about genetic drift is valid, the loss of a huge number of Hungarian émigrés after WW II, and the over 200,000 refugees in 1956, with the continuing flow of defectors, the imprisoned dissidents in their prime reproducing years, and the economic disadvantage many dissidents are subjected to, could produce a tremendous genetic change in Hungary over the next several generations, possibly changing the national character of Hungary forever.
It should be noted, however, that this dissertation is not based on the assumption of genetic drift and/or the existence of a national character, either in Russia and the Soviet Union, or in Central Europe, and the existence or non-existence of a biological base of the national character. At the same time, should the existence of the genetic drift be proven, it would not weaken the thesis.
CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN TWO FORCES
Owing to these cultural differences (and possibly different national characters), and considering the presence of the Soviet Army in the countries of Central Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, Western-style Democracy cannot be practiced at the present time. Yet, Eastern style Dictatorship cannot take hold either, in spite of the presence of the Soviet Army. The existence of Western style, liberal political and religious traditions, including a measure of freedom that has developed and survived in these Central European societies, even under the traditional, aristocratic rule, seems to preclude any compromise with the despotic Soviet rule.
In none of these countries did Communism come to power by winning in a free election or by popular revolution. Rather, it was imposed by the military might of the Soviet Union. The peoples of these countries, in the absence of Western support, and, in fact, in the face of Allied- Soviet cooperation, had no chance to prevent these Communist takeovers.
For the Soviets, Central Europe is more than just a buffer zone: it is a laboratory. If they can make Communism work there, they have hope of exporting it to the rest of the civilized world, without having to resort to war. On the other hand, if the West is to defeat, or at east tame, violent Communism, it has to do it in Central Europe. In this sense, Central Europe is a very important experiment. According to McKinder’s view, for the future of mankind and the survival of democracy, the events in Central Europe (that constitutes the Heartland) are much more important than in the peripheral areas like Cuba, Afghanistan, Korea, or even China.
On the other hand, if a synthesis between the Byzantine Eastern culture and the Roman Western culture is to be made, the best chance for such a synthesis is to let the people of Central Europe, free of pressure from both sides, take the best of both and put it together. They have had a thousand year experience with Western ideas and values, and have been living the past 40 years under Eastern rule, so they have the perfect background for such a synthesis.
The term Central Europe has been used so frequently by politicians, journalists, geographers, and just about everybody else, that it might surprise some that it has no clear definition. Therefore, it is essential to define it in the context of this dissertation.
Geographically, the center of Europe is the Carpathian Mountains that lie between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The Carpathians are about half way between the two extremities of Europe: Portugal to the West and the Ural Mountains to the East.
But Central Europe as a concept has more to do with culture than with geography. In this dissertation Central Europe refers to the peoples in Europe who had been under the influence of the Western, Roman Christianity, but since World War II have been subjected to the rule of the Eastern, Byzantine culture of the Soviet Union. Thus, Central Europe is where the East and the West overlap.
All together there are six nationalities in this situation. But of the six, East Germans present a special case. Not only did East Germany have a different history under Soviet occupation, but in any future realignment in Europe, East Germany is likely to be reunited with West Germany and thus take her rightful place in the family of Western Europe. Because East Germany had been part of the Third Reich, and as such was held responsible for the German role in WW II, the reparation payments to the Soviet Union played a more significant role there than in any other country. Also, because Germany was divided, disaffected Germans from the East had the opportunity to flee to the Western zone. More recently, the prospect of unification also makes East Germany a special case among the Central European Soviet satellites.
As the result, Sovietization started later in East Germany and at a slower pace--yet as the screws were tightened during the early 50's, the East Germans were the first ones to rebel on June 16-17, 1953, following Stalin's death. The rebellion caused the Soviet troops and tanks to interfere which led to numerous deaths and casualties but resulted in no major changes in policy or leadership. Following the events of 1953, the East German policy was characterized by "short term fluctuations in which short term 'liberalization' has alternated with stages of 'toughness"', instead of the more "secular" trends that have characterized the other countries under discussion. While in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Communists could afford to let the tensions rise until the system nearly exploded, in East Germany they were forced to let the steam out at short intervals, so that the regime never was as oppressive, nor was it ever as liberal as the regimes of the other three countries discussed were--on occasion. Consequently, there never were as dramatic changes in East Germany as in the countries of Central Europe.
The problem of defining Central Europe is further complicated by the fact that Croatia, another nation with strong ties to the West, is now part of another, albeit smaller, Eastern Communist empire. This tiny nation has been incorporated in the federal state of Yugoslavia which is under the rule of the Byzantine Serbs. Stjepan Buc, former Member of the Yugoslavian Parliament and now a political scientist in Argentina, argues that Croatia definitely is a Central European nation:
”Because of her origin, development, culture, and entire nature Croatia belongs to the Central European area. Conversely, Croatia does not belong to the East nor to the Balkans. Separated from the Western world by treachery and violence, and thank to the fabricated "Slavic Union" that never really existed, Croatia was handed over to a traditionally aggressive Eastern foreign rule. May we, at the same time, refer to the Hungarian example, because our situation is best illustrated by it. The Croats and the Hungarians are peoples of Western culture; their struggle against the Eastern aggression is reflected in the honorary titles conferred on them by the Popes: "Fortissima propugnacula fidei et antemurale christianitatis."
Professor Buc rejects the notion that the East is inferior, yet he also emphatically rejects being ruled by the East:
”It would not be correct, however, to classify the Eastern man and his world as something generally inferior. That world is simply different from ours. Because of these essential differences we simply do not wish to be under the rule of that world. We just cannot endure its domination. We prefer to enjoy our right of self-determination and we wish to live freely in our own state.”
Thus, Croatia shares with the rest of Central Europe not only a long and fruitful association with the West, but a desperate rejection of the Byzantine rule of the East. So, conceptually, Croatia should, by all means be included in our definition of Central Europe although she has not staged her revolution yet.
Of the remaining four nationalities, two are included in one federal state: the Czechs and the Slovaks make up Czechoslovakia, with a significant number of other minorities, including Hungarians. The Hungarians make up the population of Hungary, with a very insignificant minority. But there are between 2-3 million Hungarians in the Transylvanian part of Rumania, and a significant number in the formerly Hungarian territories now belonging to Yugoslavia. The Poles make up Poland, of course, with many Poles residing in the Eastern part of Poland that was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II.
A COMMON PATTERN IN CENTRAL EUROPE
While my thesis certainly applies to the above two nations, i.e. East Germany and Croatia, it is based on the experience of only three countries. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. While the timing and the details may vary in the different countries, depending on local circumstances and available leadership material, the general pattern that is highlighted in the dissertation is the same in all three. In fact, it was the discovery of this pattern that led to the thesis that the cultural conflict goes much deeper than any nationalistic, anti-Slav or anti-Russian attitude.
The common pattern found in these three countries can be illustrated with an analogy. In light of the East-West conflict it is not easy for a Central European government to maintain political stability. The position of the regimes in these countries is like a tripod: It has to stand firmly on all three legs - knock any one leg out and the tripod falls. The three legs can be identified as (a) ideology, that curious combination of Orthodoxy and Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the Kremlin; (b) the political and national security interest of the Soviet Union (including both defense and foreign policy issues); and (c) satisfaction of the basic economic and cultural needs (including national pride and traditions) of the population.
Violating this rule of stability, each of these Communist regimes went through three stages after they came to power. In the first stage of their rule they disregarded the leg representing popular satisfaction: they not only ruined the economic system of the respective countries, lowered the standard of living below the lowest level during the war, but, they attacked the cultural heritage and violated all human rights that they could violate. As a result, each of these regimes was thrown out by an angry populace. The new regimes of the second stage over-reacted - at least in the eyes of the Kremlin leaders - by rejecting the Byzantinized version of Marxism-Leninism, imposed by the Kremlin, and also endangered Soviet foreign policy objectives, thus provoking Soviet pressure or even direct military intervention. In each of these countries, following the intervention, the Kremlin installed third stage regimes which attempts to balance the three legs by downplaying the role of ideology, hiding the Soviet troops, and making some concessions, real or token. It is almost as if the Soviets were experimenting in three different laboratories each with a different mix of Eastern oppression and Western Democracy.
In Czechoslovakia, the initial Stalinist regimes from Gottwald through Zapotocky and Antonin Novotny all disregarded the domestic leg of the tripod. In 1968, following popular demand, Alexander Dubcek liberalized the system, but he neglected the ideological allegiance to Moscow and was deposed by the Warsaw Pact Armies, which were mobilized by the Soviet Union. The Soviets have subsequently installed Gustav Hussak who is running the country in a somewhat bureaucratic but still Communist fashion.
In Hungary, Matyas Rakosi ruled with an iron fist, in true Stalinist fashion, knocking out in the process the democratic leg of the tripod. Although Imre Nagy first became Premier in 1953, his ascendancy at that time was more from the grace of the Kremlin than the result of any popular demand. But after the Kremlin had reversed itself in 1955 (following the ouster of Malenkov) conditions continued to deteriorate. The Hungarian people, who once again tasted some measure of freedom under Nagy's first premiership, demanded in 1956 the return of Nagy, who was deposed in 1955 as Premier, and was stripped of his Party post.
The inept leadership of Gerő, failing to recognize the danger of the enormous frustration of the people in the Fall of 1956, provoked the most serious insubordination of a satellite within the Soviet system and as the result a full scale confrontation took place between the Hungarian youth, supported by the working class and the military, and the regime, putting Nagy back into power. Seemingly overtaken by the events, Nagy abrogated the Warsaw Pact, announced Hungary's neutrality, and asked the U.N. to protect it. He was also pushed into promising multi-party elections, endangering party monopoly. Thus, he had weakened at once two legs of the tripod: Soviet ideological supremacy and Soviet defense interests. The Soviets retaliated by sending in tanks, destroying the Nagy government, and installing Kadar as Premier and Party Leader under whose leadership Russification has slowed down considerably, or at least became less visible, thus avoiding another open rebellion.
In Poland the "nationalist” Communist, Gomulka, was first replaced as Party Secretary in 1948 by the Stalinist Beirut. Upon Beirut's death in early 1956 Edward Ochab became the new leader. Following Beirut's policies, he continued to neglect the "domestic leg" of the tripod and in six months he was forced to resign in a crisis that saw Gomulka's return to the helm for a second time. While he instituted some reforms to satisfy popular demands for national honor and human rights, in his economic policy Gomulka was almost as rigid as his predecessors were. Following a series of uprisings by the disappointed Poles, Gomulka in turn was forced to resign once more, and was replaced at this time by Edward Gierek.
Poland's economic problems remained unsolved even under Gierek and a series of strikes and uprisings were staged in 1980. He was forced to resign also. Within a month of his resignation, "Solidarity," the first free labor union in a Communist country was born. "Solidarity" endangered stability by provoking the threat of Soviet intervention when the workers refused to accept the superiority of the Kremlin-dictated, bankrupt economic policy that is part of the ideological leg of the tripod. Also, the possibility of economic reforms "spilling over" into the political field complicated the situation.
Eventually, to prevent open military invasion by the Soviet Army, General Jaruzelski declared martial law to disperse the union. After several years of terror, the spirit of “Solidarity" is still not destroyed.
In spite of the obvious differences among the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the "Prague Spring" of 1968, and the "Solidarity" movement of the 1980's, these three events complement each other. They prove, once and for all, that the East-West conflict is so strong in these countries that the mere use of force is insufficient to reconcile the two political cultures, one (the Western) based on freedom and human rights and the other (the Eastern) based on oppression and denial of individual rights and favoring the community. Each of the three events viewed separately could be explained as historical accident. But, viewed together, they will create a strong pattern with a new message.
As can be seen, only in these three countries within the Communist Empire did popular pressure ever lead to meaningful changes in party and/or government leadership - and in all three cases the Soviets intervened to stall meaningful reform.
Hungarians were often accused by critics after their ill fated rebellion of going too far. They were told that if they had only refrained from using force, or from declaring neutrality, they might have gotten away with major economic and social reforms. Then came 1968. The Czechoslovak Communists under Dubcek's leadership, tried to stay within the Warsaw Pact, did not use force, assured Moscow of their loyalty, and yet the Soviet troops deposed Alexander Dubcek. The critics then suggested that Dubcek's error was in instituting "political" reforms--he should have left the Party's political prerogatives alone. Next came "Solidarity". Learning from the two earlier examples, the Poles scrupulously refrained from any political demands. Nonetheless, they were not allowed to challenge the inefficient policies and the Byzantine politics that the "legitimate" government (legitimated by the Kremlin, of course) prescribed. Thus one may conclude that, in the given political atmosphere, the Hungarian or the Czech reforms did not have a chance, no matter how moderate they would have been because of the irreconcilable conflict: the people in these countries wanted the Western style political, social, and economic rights that they were accustomed to, (or at least knew about and desired) while the Soviet Union, an Eastern power, would not allow such rights.
RUMANIA, THE NEGATIVE CASE
It should be noted again, for contrast, that in no Communist country outside Central Europe was there such a demand for reforms. In Rumania, for example, the tripod theory does not apply. President Nicolai Ceausescu parades around in the capitals of the Western world, as the head of a ”liberal" Communist country and he indeed follows a foreign policy line that is more independent of the Kremlin direction than any other satellite. But domestic conditions in Rumania are worse than in any other country behind the Iron Curtain, yet there is no threat of rebellion.
According to an essay in Forbes there is a general shortage of all foodstuffs. "Ordinary Rumanians can go weeks and - even months without any meat, much less a decent cut." Clothes, household appliances, everything is in short supply. The conditions are worse than in Poland before Solidarity was formed. "Ordinary citizens are forbidden to speak with foreigners. Travel abroad is tightly regulated and permitted only if close family members stay behind. Amnesty International reports it has a 'substantial' number of 'prisoner of conscience cases. " The situation is much worse than it was in Czechoslovakia before 1968 or in Hungary before 1956.
"Now, as the economy declines, Ceausescu is coming to resemble more a traditional Balkan despot than the leader of a modern state."Why don't the Rumanian people rebel? The article gives two reasons that are related:
“First, Ceausescu’s "securitate" secret police are omnipresent and trigger-happy (and) . . Ceausescu, unlike Poland's leaders so far, would not shrink from brutal repression. Second, Poland has the Roman Catholic Church, which is by tradition independent of the state . . . The Rumanian Orthodox Church - to which 80% of the population belongs - is subservient to the state, which appoints its bishops just as appoints, say a new labor minister. The result, says a Rumanian intellectual, is that people feel "frustrated, mentally bound and gagged . . . . There is nothing anyone can or wants to do."
Rumanians and Russians are brothers in Byzantine mentality.
THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
Before presenting the thesis, it is important to look at the problem from the Soviets’ point of view. If they want to create a "Soviet" world order that they could rule, they have to create the necessary conditions. Before W. W. II they had a federal system including all the nationalities within the Soviet Union. After W. W. II their immediate aim was to add a string of countries in a quasi confederate arrangement, later perhaps to be upgraded into a federation. They hoped to continue adding new countries to the confederate arrangement as a way station toward an eventual world federation dominated by the Russian Byzantine, "Orthodox" political leadership.
Being realists they must have recognized that for their goals to be realized they needed to create more unity among those nations that they had obtained after the war, than existed at the time. The basic principle of federalism is that it is justified only when there is enough diversity AND at the same time there is enough unity to justify and make possible common government on the federal level. As long as the unity is lacking, the best they could hope for is a forced confederation of nations. If they ever achieve sufficient unity, then they can think about doing away even with the federal system in favor of a new unitary form of world government.
From the Soviet point of view, their long range plans called for a process of “sovietization" or rather "Russification" and "Byzantinization" of the world. Thus, there is tension between the Western oriented countries under Soviet rule, determined to retain their thousand year old Western culture, religion, traditions, and the Soviet Union determined to impose a foreign, Byzantine political culture and Russian political practices.
The history of international Communism definitely indicates that the true aim of the Kremlin leadership is world dominance. Lenin created the Cominform in 1917 to tightly coordinate the Communist movement throughout the world. It was dissolved in 1943 "to placate the Western Allies by showing the Soviet Union was no longer bent on world revolution." In 1947 Stalin organized the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM). One of the assumptions of Cominform was that "Soviet Communist Party that made its revolution first had the historical right to 'guide' the other parties in the building of socialism and that the Soviet 'model' was to be followed elsewhere."
This aim of COMINFORM had been frustrated in several countries. Some local Communist parties either followed an independent line, especially in Western Europe, others have allied themselves with China, like little Albania, or have become fully independent--at the price of being excommunicated from Cominform--like Tito's Yugoslavia.  But in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, with the help of an effective Muscovite leadership and the presence of the Soviet Army, Russification progressed at full speed, little disturbed by popular opposition until 1956.
THEORIES OF REVOLUTION
The theme of this dissertation is the basic conflict between the two political cultures, the Central European/Hungarian and the Russian/Soviet, and to show how the reform/protest movement led up to and reinforced the events of October 1956. A political analysis of the Revolution of 1956 as "revolution” is outside the scope of the dissertation. Yet, since the currently popular "relative deprivation" theory of revolution, if applied carelessly, could lead to a false interpretation of 1956, a brief comment is necessary.
The popular movement to restore Hungarian political, cultural, and economic independence was much greater than the so called "Revolution of 1956" that lasted from October 23 to the end of the armed opposition sometime in November. This movement had no intention of an armed rebellion, was not organized, and was based on prayer and hope, rather than frustration.
It should be noted that the pattern was the same in Poland both in 1956 when the masses won by getting Gomulka into power, and in 1980 with the formation and legalization of Solidarity, and also in Czechoslovakia in 1968 when Alexander Dubcek came to power. In all these cases the masses were united, and some of the Party leaders, if not organizing, at least were taking the reform demands to the Party leadership, and facilitated some of the demanded changes, but the people did not want, and did not initiate violence.
Yet, Hungary is unique in that only there did the conflict deteriorate into large scale armed fighting. Thus, it is quite important to find an explanation. It has been suggested that it can be explained in terms of the currently popular "relative deprivation" theory of revolution. But the first problem with this approach is to find an adequate definition of what revolution is. A search of recent literature on the relative deprivation approach failed to provide one. Gurr, in one instance, writes about "several forms of civil strife," presumably revolution being one of them. In another paper he uses a stronger but narrower term “civil violence as a ‘genus’,” explaining that revolutions are "the most significant" yet only "one of an extraordinarily numerous variety of interrelated forms of strife." Gurr also suggests in a footnote, using the French and the American Revolutions as examples, that a revolution may consist of an entire series of events. Finally, in Why Men Rebel by Gurr, the index under "Revolution" Gurr refers the reader to "Internal War;"  which is one of three forms of political violence: turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. Internal war, in turn, is defined by Gurr as
“ Highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large scale terrorism and guerilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions.”
While Gurr spends a great deal of time to define the term, James C. Davies, in his essay, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," seems to assume that his readers do not need a definition of revolution. 
Thus, in order to decide if the events of October 1956 in Hungary constituted a revolution or not, one must compose a definition from the elements supplied by Gurr. Accordingly, revolution is a violent form of domestic strife, a form of internal war (to distinguish it from turmoil and conspiracy), that is open (as opposed to terrorism and conspiracy), and is between the people and the regime (to distinguish it from civil war). Finally, since it is "designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state" it must be assumed that revolution is organized and initiated from below, by the enemies of the regime, rather than by the regime or its supporters.
But if this explanation of revolution is accepted, the Hungarian events do not qualify to be called a revolution: it was not organized and the violence was not initiated by the people. There was a peaceful "civil strife" going on, to be sure, but its object was not to "overthrow the state or the regime." The demonstrators demanded only certain changes that were well within the power of the regime to grant. The evidence shows that violence was started by the secret police at the Radio Station, firing at the unarmed masses.
What about the theory of "relative deprivation"? The theory suggests that "it is the dissatisfied state of mind •..which produces the revolution.” According to Gurr, civil violence "occurs primarily as a result of frustration." But as of October 23, 1956, the people in Hungary were in a satisfied, hopeful, almost happy state of mind. There was no sign of public frustration on the morning of the 23rd. During the summer the people succeeded in rehabilitating Laszlo Rajk (a victim of Rakosi's terror), ousted Rakosi himself, opened up the press and the writers had written in tones not heard for years, and most of all, Hungarians learned that in Poland the liberal Gomulka became Prime Minister. If anyone was in a dissatisfied frame of mind and frustrated, it was Party Chief Gerő and his radical comrades. Therefore, either the relative deprivation theory is wrong, or the "Revolution" of 1956 was not a revolution in the ordinary sense, because the violence was initiated from above, and its goal was to preserve, rather than to overthrow the regime.
The key to explaining those events is suggested by a concept used by Morrison discussing social movements and the “perception of blockage." Morrison suggests a correlation between a feeling of relative deprivation and the perceived probability of blockage of one's justifiable expectation: One does not feel deprived as long as one expects satisfaction; one will feel deprived only if one expects or experiences blockage.
While Morrison does not solve the entire problem, he takes Gurr's analysis one step farther. Gurr treats aggression as the dependent variable, and frustration as the independent variable. Morrison in turn takes frustration as his dependent variable, and suggests blockage as the independent variable. Gurr treats frustration, and Morrison treats blockage as an impersonal, inevitable natural or social/political occurrence, a truly independent variable.
But blockage is usually the result of resistance by the authorities, directed against the popular movement demanding change. The process of "civil strife," the "genus" that includes revolution, has to have two parties. Just as "It takes two to tango," one party alone cannot have a "strife."
Thus, to understand the events of 1956, it is necessary to use a "unified theory of civil strife" that considers the role of the regime as well as of the opposition. According to this approach "blockage" could be considered as dependent on frustration by the authorities, just as revolution is dependent on the frustration of the people. Both kinds of frustrations, in turn, are dependent on the expectations for change. The more likely or the stronger the demand for change is, the more frustrated the authorities are likely to be, and the less likely the change, the more frustrated the people will be.
But the concept of "blockage" alone is still not sufficient to explain the events of 1956. Blockage is a passive concept, somewhat on the level of "turmoil." Modern revolutionary theory fails even to consider that the authorities can initiate violence in self defense. In desperation the government may order the troops to open fire to quell the turmoil. In some cases they may succeed, in others they may fail. In extreme desperation the government may even provoke a rebellion, as it seems to have happened in Hungary in 1956. Party Secretary Gerő, frightened by the developments in both Hungary and Poland, might have wanted to settle the score with the reform movement once and for all, and after making arrangements for the Soviet troops to be on hand, provoked a turmoil on the 23rd, and ordered his troops to fire on the crowd. Thus, he might have initiated the violence, expecting to retain control in his hand, while getting rid of his opponents in and outside the Party. But this gambit misfired on him, it seems, probably because the events in Poland pushed up his timing.
This "unified theory of civil strife" applies not only to the Soviet backed counter-revolutionary activities of the Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Polish governments, but it could also help to understand better other classical or even current so called “revolutions." For example, most historians accept the theory, that the American Revolution started in 1776, with the Declaration of Independence. Yet, the truth is that England had designated the resistance of the colonies as rebellion much earlier: as early as February 1774, "The ministry, in overruling the lingering scruples of Dartmouth and Lord North, decided that there existed a rebellion which required coercion." On August 23, 1775, the King himself declared that the colonies were in a state of rebellion and refused to receive the "Olive Branch Petition" in which the colonies "solemnly assure your Majesty" of their desire that "a concord be established between them (the Colonies and England) upon so firm a basis, as to perpetuate its blessings uninterrupted by any future dissensions to succeeding generations in both countries."
England was no less frustrated with the turmoil in the colonies than the colonies were with England’s stubbornness, but ultimately it was the authorities that declared rebellion. So, was the American "Revolution" really a revolution? Probably no more than the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. Yet, to avoid confusion, in the rest of the dissertation, following common usage, the term "Revolution" will be used in referring to the events of 1956.
A GENERAL THEORY OF CULTURAL STRESS
Finally, before presenting the thesis about the "Patterns of Communism in Central Europe," a general "theory of stress," when different cultures clash, is suggested. When a culture is forced upon a people who has another culture, stress results. The stress is proportionate to the degree of difference between the two cultures, the speed that the invading culture is expected to replace the original culture, and the degree of violence used in imposing the culture.
There have been cases in world history when an occupying army was content to leave the culture of the subjugated people undisturbed, and the occupation is accepted much more easily, even if there is economic exploitation or violence applied against the people. From Hungarian history, one might recall the 150 year-old Turkish occupation, when the Turks had left Hungary's culture unchallenged.
Also, there is likely to be less stress in the relationship of the two nations, occupied versus occupying, if the cultural difference is minor or non-existent, as it is between the Russo/Soviet and the Rumanian or the Bulgarian cultures, therefore they had accepted the Soviet dictatorship without rebellion. On the other hand, the stress was so great in the case of the Central European nations, that it led to the Revolution of 1956 in Hungary, the "Prague Spring of 1968" in Czechoslovakia, and the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980’s.
This dissertation on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, as it is commonly called, is a case study to prove this general theory.
THESIS AND "ANTI-THESIS"
Ferenc Vali proposed in 1961; that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a nationalistic uprising. Following a number of descriptive and analytical works published within the first five years of the event, Vali is one of the first political scientists to interpret the events of 1956.
Reviewing the conditions in the countries of Central and Southern Europe under Soviet rule, Vali notices signs of discontent in every one of them. This leads him to conclude that the Hungarian Revolution was an example of nationalist resentment against the Soviet Russian nationalism. Vali illustrates his thesis with a chart and this explanation:
”Resentments in the satellite area are caused in somewhat the manner illustrated in Chart I. As shown by the arrows, both the Soviet Russian nationalism and Marxist-Leninist Communist internationalism act upon local nationalism. They also act upon local aspirations for individual freedom. They act, too, upon the feelings of people who want Communism without foreign control, that is national Communism; the resentment of these people is caused mainly by the impingement of Soviet Russian nationalism, but, to the extent that doctrinal differences occur, by Marxist-Leninist internationalism as well.
”The intensity of the anti-Russian and anti-Communist resentments thus created in the satellite countries, and the strength of the resulting aggressiveness, are determined by a large bundle of conditions and circumstances, among which are: (1) the nature of national consciousness and national temperament: (2) historic precedents strengthening a desire for independence; (3) liberal sentiment and inclinations; (4) strength and traditions of local Communism; (5) pro-Slav and pro-Russian affinities or, contrariwise, anti-Slav and anti- Russian bias; (6) national phobias other than anti-Russian (e.g., anti-German); (7) religious sentiment and religious affiliations; (8) intensity and nature of local terrorism, oppression, or economic exploitation.”
While more than 25 years ago, Vali's thesis seemed plausible, today there is a more complete pattern of satellite behavior to help interpret the events of 1956 in a somewhat different light. Nationalism is certainly a very important factor, but it alone is not sufficient to explain what had happened in East Germany in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland again in the 1980's.
But an equally important part of the pattern is what DID NOT happen in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, or within the Soviet Union. In spite of strong nationalism, none of these countries have produced an uprising as it happened in Hungary in 1956, or a serious reform movement like Alexander Dubcek's in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980's.
Still, Vali was on the right track. In the above summary, he lists 8 factors that influence the intensity of the anti-Russian and anti-Communist feeling in a given country. Among the conditions he includes "nature of the national consciousness,” “liberal sentiment and inclinations," and "religious sentiment and affiliation," all cultural factors.
These factors have to do with social, economic, and most important, political culture and thinking. It is proposed in this thesis that cultural factors like these provide the real key to an understanding of the Soviet-Satellite relationship in Central Europe.
Thus, the thesis of this paper is that the conflict is deeper than Russian versus local nationalism. It goes back to the division between the Roman and the Byzantine Empires and the differences between the two cultures. Considering the West-East, Roman-Byzantine split, the facts are that (a) some satellite nations (and even some nations annexed by the Soviet Union, i.e. the Baltic nations) have Western or Roman culture, and other nations belong to the Byzantine, Orthodox culture; and (b) only the satellites with the Western culture rebelled against the Soviet Union, and the satellites having Byzantine culture did not rebel. Although the Rumanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, or Albanian peoples are just as, if not more, nationalistic than the Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, or Hungarians, they did submit peacefully to the Soviet domination in the Byzantine tradition of the Orthodox Church.
In this dissertation it is proposed that, in the case of Hungary, it was the Western orientation, traditions and values that created the civil strife in 1956, directed not against socialism (not even Marxist version of it) but against violent imposition of the Byzantine culture by the Soviet oppressor. Russians were perceived as dangerous because they have attempted to proselytize the Hungarian people, replacing the Western Christian values and Hungarian heroes with those of the Orthodox Byzantine Russians.
Although this project shall not deal with it, it would be interesting to study how the basic values of the East and South European Byzantine-Orthodox peoples have NOT been replaced by the Soviet oppressor. It will be shown, however, in Chapter Three, that the people at large of the Soviet Union, with the possible exception of the Asian parts, where the population is Muslim, do accept the Soviet dictatorship and no revolution is likely in the Soviet Union.
In order to fully appreciate the conflict that came to a head in Hungary in 1956, the origins of both the Russian mind and the Hungarian mentality shall be developed in some detail.
Thus, although the focal point is the 1956 Revolution, a major portion of the dissertation will be devoted to the Russian culture and intellectual development. As the professed source, but in any case a major influence and justification of Soviet ideology, Marxism shall also be examined, interpreted, and in some cases re-interpreted to show how it was assimilated and/or used (and to some extent falsified) by the Russians in the Soviet Union.
To keep the dissertation manageable and to keep a single focus it shall not be argued that the Revolution of 1956 was or was not a rejection of Socialism or Marxism. The argument that 1956 meant a rejection of Russification certainly implies that Hungarians did reject Soviet style Communism, but it is not necessarily the same as Marxist Communism. In Soviet style Communism, or Bolshevism, the Byzantine-Orthodox mentality, values and methods far overshadow the socialist or Marxist influence.
It would be an interesting study, however, to find out if Hungarians in 1956 did or did not reject Socialism and/or Marxism. On the face of it, looking at the list of demands tabulated by Radio Free Europe there is little evidence that they did so.
SOLZHENITSYN AND THE ORTHODOX MIND
At this point it should be pointed out that this thesis is at a variance with Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s interpretation of Soviet-Russian reality.
While fully supporting his characterization of the West, concerning its "spiritual impotence” and its "total incomprehension of the malevolent and unyielding nature of Communism,” the evidence seems to contradict Solzhenitsyn's analysis of the Russian attitude toward this very same Communism.
Solzhenitsyn makes it appear that the Russians are unwilling victims, blaming the West for their own enslavement and waiting for some unspecified liberation by the West. This might be the feeling and the expectation of a small group of elite Russian intellectuals, including Maximov, but it does not seem to be the position of the Russian masses.
If Russians really feel oppressed, they have had ample time and opportunity to liberate themselves. Yet, there is not the slightest evidence of any attempt to do so. In fact, the neo-Russophile authors included in Solzhenitsyn's volume of samizdat writings, while bemoaning the anti-religious crusade of the atheist Soviet state, counsel submission even to the godless Communist authorities.
Solzhenitsyn attempts to manufacture a case of willful Russian resistance during the early stages of World War II, but it would seem that the routing of the Soviet army and the unprecedented number of POW's were more due to unpreparedness and poor logistics, training and discipline than any large scale political defection. If the Russians truly wanted to defeat the regime, the defections could have continued after the U.S. land-lease aid had arrived in the Soviet Union.
Also, he is only half right in rejecting the diagnosis that Communism is "a hereditary Russian disorder." Communism is not hereditary, but it is a mutation of the Russian political culture, created by Lenin's injection of Marxism into the Russian Mind. Communism in its present form could have taken place and lasted so long unchallenged only in a Byzantine culture. In any non-Byzantine country Marxism would have taken different form, or the Soviet form would not have lasted as long as it has in Russia, without the people rebelling against it, as this thesis suggests.
Solzhenitsyn writes that "Communism stops only when it encounters a wall, even if it is only a wall of resolve." He blames the West for not putting up such a wall, while the boat people of Viet Nam and earlier of China resolved to escape, or the people of Poland, the Hungarian freedom fighters, or East Germany put up such a wall, according to him. But when did the Russians put up such a wall?
Solzhenitsyn might be right that an “unbridgeable abyss and hatred separate the Chinese people and the Chinese regime." Certainly there was such an abyss and hatred in Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia between the regime and the people. But where is the abyss and hatred between the Russians and the Soviet regime?
The internal stability and the general acceptance of the Soviet regime by the Russian people was amply demonstrated in a twelve part PBS series, "Comrades," aired in the summer of 1986. In spite of the economic difficulties and social problems, the masses, even the so-called dissidents have adjusted to, and accept the regime.
Solzhenitsyn is also wrong in claiming that "the idea of an empire is repulsive" to the Russian people. Gray suggests that
“Territorial expansion was "the Russian way," just as it has been "the Soviet way." Richard Pipes reminds us that it is estimated, for example, that between the middle of the 16th century and the end of the 17th, "Russia conquered territory the size of the modern Netherlands every year for 150 years running." Furthermore, unlike the case of most other imperial powers, conquest by Russia became a permanent and nonnegotiable political fact (save under conditions of extreme duress, as with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918). The territorial growth of a state over a 500-year period cannot neatly and simply be ascribed to a single impulse.” 
Gray also points out, using cold logic, that the only possible difference between the Russian way and the Soviet way is that the Soviet Union uses a new excuse for conquest: its own security needs. The Soviet Union wants to be secure so that it can keep the result of earlier conquests. But in doing this, it can effectively play on the naiveté of the West which either sympathizes with the Soviets and gives in, or decides that the Soviet leadership is paranoid and dangerous, so the West better give in. But in any case, Gray concludes that "a quest for absolute security must lead a country on the path of world conquest." Whether born out of an insatiable appetite for territory, or of paranoia, until the Soviet conquers everything in sight, there is no stopping it except by "putting up a wall", as Solzhenitsyn correctly suggests.
An example of such naiveté is the assurance given by Eberhard Diepgen, mayor of West Berlin, to the Soviet concerning West Germany’s Ostpolitic:
”Any politician in the Federal Republic of Germany, including Berlin (West), would be well advised never to attempt a policy towards the East without due consideration for the Soviet Union. There is one thing that must not be forgotten: There are historically deep-rooted apprehensions in the West about excessively close German-German ties; but these apprehensions exist in the Soviet Union as well and are very much stronger there. This superpower still lacks sufficient self-assurance and confidence towards the other Warsaw Pact states. German policy must therefore constantly be explained anew in Moscow. In doing so, our task is to make it clear that it is not the intension of our Berlin policy and Deutschlandpolitik to call the GDR's loyalty to its alliance into question.
But how would the Russians, used to conquering without much opposition throughout their history, react to the wall? If there is any "manifest destiny" in Soviet behavior, it was inherited from Great Russia, and it is rooted in her Orthodox faith. but in any case, if a wall is to be put up, as this writer believes that it must, it has to be a non-threatening wall, located in Central Europe.
In fact, there is nothing in Marxist revolutionary theory to justify "the forcible imposition of communist revolution upon a country from outside." Nor would the "satellization of the regimes. . .be necessarily inherent in this pattern of revolution." Non Russian Marxists find it impossible to understand the Soviet expansionist policy. One of the consequences of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a tremendous loss of membership in the French and Italian Communist Parties. Some of the most famous Socialists of the West protested the Soviet intervention in 1956. Thus, Soviet expansionism can come only from one source: Russian history.
If Solzhenitsyn were a Pole or a Hungarian complaining about the destruction of the national spirit, in fact, the very "national entity" of his nation, he would be right on the mark. This is exactly the way those people feel about Communism and the West. It was imposed upon them by an outside force; they have never condoned or accepted it, and never cooperated with it, although they must live under it. Communism is not, it cannot be, a mutation of the Polish, Hungarian, or German Mind. Only a Byzantine Mind can produce or at least acquiesce in such a proven monstrosity, as Solzhenitsyn correctly describes Communism.
This does not mean that the West should be against the Russian people--Western people should feel great sympathy and sorrow for the peoples of the Soviet Union, including Russians. After a thousand year oppression they deserve more. But Solzhenitsyn is wrong, dangerously wrong in his diagnosis, and also in his attempt to impose a guilt trip on the West for Communism, while he completely and understandably tries to exonerate his mother country, Russia.
His diagnosis is dangerous because it might lead (indeed it has already led) to an unrealistic policy on the part of the West toward the Soviet regime. By reading too much Solzhenitsyn it might be expected that Radio Liberty can influence the Russian people to rebel, or to push the regime at least toward major domestic reforms. There is nothing further from the truth. Also, the much hailed Helsinki Accord means absolutely nothing to the Russian masses. Plastic bags, gin and tonic, Playboy magazine, and other consumer items representing America are much more valued by the average Russian than our ideas of democracy, free press, free elections, open debate, and individual liberties, according to Shipler.
After the loss of faith in Marxism as a viable system, the Russian people, even the dissident intellectuals, are looking back to Orthodoxy, not to the future or to a western style "free" society.
The loss of faith leaves a hollow mood in Russia. A hunger gnaws. A yearning stirs. A search begins but the striving is not forward into a truer Marxist vision of the future. The yearning is not a lurch forward but a reaching back, back into the suffering and glory of World War II to nourish national honor and heroism, back into the tight authoritarianism of Stalinist times, back into the ethnic purity and nobility of what was "Russian," back into the simplicity and mythical honesty of Russia's village life, back into the Church.
Thus, while chasing rainbows in attempting to appeal to the innate need for freedom of the Russians, more important and more meaningful opportunities to force the Soviet regime to undertake practical social and economic reforms, and to allow a return "back into the Russian past," or to slow down the arms race and bring an end to international aggression, what the rest of the world wants, are being ignored and missed. Chasing Solzhenitsyn's rainbow contributes to our failure to take practical, geopolitically justified and strategically necessary, steps toward liberating those nations of Central-Europe, like Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, that really want to be liberated. Instead, it is hoped that the Russians would liberate themselves with help from the West.
NEO-MARXISTS, COMMUNISTS, AND THE SOVIET REGIME.
The interpretation used in this dissertation regarding Soviet Communism is also at variance with much of the Western Marxist views about Communism.
The volume, edited by Taraq Ali, The Stalinist Legacy, proves the point. The problem for Ali is to explain away a series of working-class rebellions from East Germany in 1953 to Poland in the 1980’s. The Czechoslovakian events of 1968 are especially troubling to him, as well as to many of his fellow Marxists in the West. He quotes this "eloquent” passage from Jean-Paul Sartre's “Czechoslovakia: the Socialism That Came In from the Cold:"
”Czechoslovakia could have been the first power to accomplish a successful transition from an advanced capitalist economy to a socialist economy, offering the proletariat of the West, if not a model, at least an embodiment of its own revolutionary future. It lacked nothing, neither the means nor the men; if genuine workers’ control was possible anywhere, it was in Prague and Bratislava.
”To its misfortune, the manipulators in Moscow, manipulated by their own manipulations, could not even understand the idea of such a socialism. They imposed their system instead. This imported, disadapted model, with no real foundations in the country, was sustained from the outside by the solicitude of the 'elder brother'. It was installed as an idol - that is to say, a fixed sort of unconditional demands, indisputable, undisputed, inexplicable, unexplained...
”Let there be no misunderstanding: the men of 1945 were convinced revolutionaries and most of them remained so, but the system forbade them the experience of building socialism themselves. In order to change them, the experience would have to take them as they were; the system took them as they were not. Instead of presenting itself as an open set of problems calling for both a rational transformation of structures and a constant modification of ideas (in other words a reciprocal and dialectical interaction of practice and theory), it posed with incredible complacency as a gracious gift of providence, a socialism without tears-in other words, without revolution or any contestation whatever. The tasks were already defined; it only remained to execute them. All knowledge was already complete; it only remained to memorize it.”
This and the other events in Central Europe are clearly troubling Ali, but he plays it down by presenting it as mere "bureaucratization" instead of as a major ailment, requiring surgery. He also justifies it with arguments like: it was necessary as a "defense" against the Marshall Plan, although it is hard to see how American aid to Western Europe justifies "Stalinization" of Central Europe. But Ali is honest enough to admit that the Soviet conquerors have destroyed, along with capitalism, "any hope of socialist democracy" in Central Europe. Yet, Ali does not seem honest (or brave) enough to critically examine the explanations, some quite popular among Western Marxist intellectuals that are presented by his contributors.
In addition to making the absurd seem routine by calling it "bureaucracy," some of the authors in the volume seem to subscribe to the "great man" theory of history and blame all the problems on Stalin himself. This theory might have been plausible up to 1956, or perhaps, to stretch the argument, to 1968, but over 30 years after the Dictator's death the same “bureaucratic," anti-Socialist measures are still dominating the Soviet system,  so the “bureaucracy” or the “blame Stalin” explanations should have lost their appeal to honest Marxist socialists. They should look for another theory, instead of being apologists for the Soviet Union, and still blaming Stalin for a regime that has destroyed "any hope of socialist democracy," in the name of socialism.
Liebman 's essay, "Was Lenin a Stalinist?", illustrates this hypocrisy. He chronicles the conflict between the "defenders of the Soviet regime" and the anti-Soviet "moderate socialists." Yet, Liebman is satisfied with analyzing Lenin instead of condemning him.
Ali mentions three other theories to explain Soviet bureaucracy, and seems to favor the one by Trotsky: Stalinism stems from the discrepancy between the coexistence of the Soviet model of production and the capitalist model of distribution. But again, this explanation might have been plausible during the 1930's. The oppression of the Czechoslovakian workers in 1968 or of the Polish workers in the 1980's requires a more ingenious excuse. Even some of the events of the 1930's, like the purges or the Ukrainian famine cannot be explained with this theory.
Ali, feeling the weakness of Trotsky's argument perhaps, points out that Ernest Mandel "further developed" this view. But Mandel's essay included in the volume, "What is Bureaucracy," not only continues to understate the nature of the problem by calling it "bureaucracy," but his argument does not give adequate explanation of the known facts, even of the 1930's.
Mandel treats the Soviet Union as a "transitional society," and his answer to the question of the "the origin of bureaucratic degeneration in the workers states" is the fact that the "socialist accumulation" and the "primitive accumulation" took place at the same time.
But this is not all. The Soviet leadership also committed "a whole series of political and institutional errors.” Mandel lists three errors: "the ban on factions inside their party," "the introduction of the single-party practice," and "perhaps the most serious," what Mandel calls the "principle of one-man management" were errors that the theory of the "primitive sociologist accumulation" does not explain. What is the "origin" of these errors? Is it possible that these all originate from the Byzantine culture that does not tolerate pluralism, competition or democracy?
It never occurs to Ali, despite the rather frequent suggestions in the literature about the Soviet Union (as is presented in Chapter III of the Dissertation)) to seek an explanation in the Byzantine character of the Soviet regime or to admit that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country.
Of all the writers in the volume Deutscher comes closest by admitting that “Bolshevism … was absorbing the Russian ‘way of life’ and the somber heritage of the Tsarist past. In that heritage the Greek Orthodoxy was the dominant element.” But then even Deutscher dismisses the importance of this fact. First, degrading the mass basis of a political culture following Plekhanov’s theory of history, he limits Orthodoxy’s impact to Stalin, by continuing: “Stalin had imbibed it in his youth.”
Next, he minimizes this even in Stalin’s case: “but even these political formulae, correct in themselves, have not touched the innermost psychological springs of Stalinism.” Deutscher sees more relevance in the “nomad shepherds and semi-nomads of the Asiatic provinces.” From these nomads and from the tribal way of life in Stalin’s native Georgia with its ‘totems and taboos’,” Deutscher concludes that this “primitive magic,” coupled with scientific Marxism was responsible for Stalin’s abuses and consequently, for the Soviet-style Communism in Russia. Deutscher dismisses the obvious for the obscure (perhaps to make an “original” discovery?) when he concludes that Stalinism “was produced by the impact of a Marxist revolution upon a semi-Asiatic society and by the impact of that society upon Marxist revolution.”
None of the other authors comes as close to acknowledging the Byzantine influence as Deutscher does. The very title of Liebman’s essay, “Was Lenin a Stalinist?” begs the question: isn’t ruthless violence inherent in Bolshevism, and is Stalin’s Georgian past at all relevant?
Liebman rejects as “banal” the Western explanation of Lenin’s behavior as basically “Machiavellian.” Liebman’s tortured logic works like this: Lenin was so terroristic against the Mensheviks only because they had condemned Lenin’s use of terror, “when only ruthless struggle against reaction could save the regime.” But if Lenin were a democrat replacing the violent Tsarist regime and not a ruthless dictator himself to begin with, on the one hand, the people might have supported Lenin instead of ”reacting” to him, and his regime might have survived without violence, and on the other, the Meshevisks could not have objected to and condemned his violence if Lenin was a peaceful democrat.
Liebman’s answer boils down to this: Lenin was “unable to allow the existence alongside his own party of an opposition group that might have checked or prevented the growth of monolithism.” First, excusing this shows the influence of Plekhanov’s theory of history: since Lenin behaved this way, and Lenin was a great man, it had to be the correct way. Second, why single out and excuse Lenin and Stalin, as Liebman does , when the Tsars behaved the same way toward an opposition group! Third, and most important, how was it that the masses, including Lenin’s comrades, except the Mensheviks whom Lenin liquidated, accepted Lenin’s aberrant behavior as the norm? It seems aberrant behavior is the norm in Russia.
Even the poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko overlooks the obvious. In his “Epilogue—The Heirs of Stalin” he blames everything on Stalin. He phrases the question thus: “but Stalin out of Stalin’s heirs how we take?” Pointing out the hypocrisy of removing Stalin’s remains from the Mausoleum, he dejectedly concludes: “As long as Stalin’s heirs on this earth exist, it will seem to me that Stalin is still in the Mausoleum.” But again, the real question is, how do you take the Tsar out of his heirs, out of Lenin, Stalin, and even Gorbachev? The answer is, you can’t, as long as they are Byzantine.
It is ironic indeed that Western Marxists fail to apply to the Soviet Union Marx’s own dictum: “What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from a capitalist society, which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges”
Instead of using contorted logic, these Marxist writers should have examined the birthmark of the Soviet regime. They would have found that that it bears the Byzantine-Russian birthmark all over itself. According to Ali, Deutscher calls Stalinism a “mongrel offspring of Marxism and primitive magic.” But according to Engels, there is no legitimate way to have a successful revolution in Russia without Western Europe going through it first, and of course, it did not happen in the West first. Therefore it would be a more appropriate metaphor to call the Soviet Union “a bastard born of the shotgun marriage of a western tradition, Marxism, and of the eastern culture of Byzantine Russia, thus having the birthmarks of both”.
It is interesting to contrast what is commonly referred to as “Communism” in the Soviet Union with the “generic” communist society without any birthmark as envisioned by Marx and described by the Marxist professor Ollman. In fact, even Marx’s view bears the birthmark of the Paris commune.
While Ollman refuses to call Marxism “utopia,” since nowadays practically anything is possible, it is still an abstract model that real life can only more or less approximate. Ollman never suggests, of course, that it can ever be realized without any birthmarks. It would go completely against Marx’s dictum.
It is interesting how both Solzhenitsyn, in his eagerness to exonerate Russia for the abuses of the Soviet Union, and Western Marxists, for their own reasons, probably to protect Marx, completely disregard the Russo/Byzantine heritage of the Soviet Union.
A brief overview if the thesis is presented in Figure III tracing the roots of the Soviet ideology to both the European Socialist tradition, including the writings of Hegel and Marx and the Russian culture, especially through the Slavophiles, Lenin, and Stalin that had left its “birthmark” on Marxism. It also lists the nations of Central Europe and Eastern Europe/Balkans on opposite sides of the Roman-Byzantine cultural divide. Figure III. also indicates that the nations of the two regions responded differently to the Soviet oppression. Based on that overview, Figure V. gives a brief outline of the dissertation.
Churchill is supposed to have said that “there are no experts on Russia, just varying degrees of ignorance.” Chapter I attempts to reduce some of the ignorance by covering an aspect of Russia that is so little understood in the West, namely, the Byzantine influence on Russian culture and show how the peculiar Russian environment, interacting with Orthodox theology, produced the Russian Mind and soul.
Chapter Four did for Hungary what Chapter One did for Russia, but in reverse. It documented Hungary’s thousand year-old Western orientation to respond to the not uncommon reaction to this thesis "It is OK that Czechoslovakia had a western culture, even Poland, but Hungary?”
When in 1944 Churchill set out for Moscow to '”settle the Balkan issue," he included Hungary on the agenda, (a decision that has been most tragic for Hungary). By this, Churchill proved his own "degree of tremendous ignorance," concerning Hungary. Even a great statesman, who should know better, did not appreciate Hungary's Western orientation and the cultural and religious differences between Hungary and her South-Eastern neighbors in the Balkans.
This chapter presents a detailed account of Hungary's Western orientation ever since the nation was founded over a thousand years ago. It will also show that a brief flirting with the Byzantines ended in even stronger ties to the West, if possible. It will also show the depth of the Western influence, and how it penetrates all aspects of life.
The Dissertation culminates in Chapter Five, detailing the conflict between the two cultures, Hungary's thousand year old Western oriented culture and the Russian culture, based on thousand years of Byzantine influence. The Communist Party, imposed on the nation by the advancing Soviet Army, began immediately to undertake its own Russification, within the very ranks of the Communists, even before the entire country was "liberated" from the German troops.
The elections of 1945 and 1947 were the high points of Hungary's total commitment to the West. In spite of the Soviet presence and wholesale cheating the Communists were soundly beaten. Even the New York Times recognized this achievement and paid its respect in an editorial.
From 1947 on, however, it was all downhill. By 1950 Hungarian politics had returned to the dark Middle Ages. Yet, after being momentarily stunned by such a turn of events, and tremendously frustrated by the Western indifference, in contrast to the docile attitude of the Byzantine bred Russian and other Eastern-European nations, Hungarians started to demand changes.
It was this tug-of-war, this political strife, between the Party and the population that led up to the Revolution of 1956.
In this chapter special attention is paid to Imre Nagy, who, in spite of his naive, at times confused and confusing leadership, clearly believed in, and represented without reservation, the Western tradition in Hungary in contrast to Matyas Rakosi, Nagy’s Soviet backed counterpart, who was pushing the Soviet policy of Russification in Hungary. Nagy did this, in spite of the fact that in 1953 he was handpicked by the Kremlin to become the Prime Minister of Hungary.
An important aspect of the Soviet-Satellite relationship is revealed in Chapter Six as it shows the Byzantine machinations to cover up the true nature of the relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union. Hungary's sovereignty is a fiction at best, yet the appearance must be maintained. This relationship is so complex, it extends to so many aspects of life that the traditional colonial relationship between the colony and the mother country pales in comparison. No colonizer before the Soviet Empire made the subjugated nation follow so slavishly the colonizing master's every whim as the Soviet Union does. Not only is Communism a totalitarian system, but the Soviet-Satellite relationship is fully totalitarian too. Nothing escapes the attention of the proselytizing Soviet despot, from the army uniform to grades in elementary schools, academic degrees, everything.
Permeating all this was an attitude of arrogant and contemptuous superiority by the representatives of the colonizing Master Race, or at least Master Culture. The situation was reminiscent of the supercilious attitude of the Simian creatures in the "Planet of the Apes."
It is important to add to this attitude the level of violence and the most cruel methods applied by the dictator, including torture and psychological annihilation of the victims, not stopping short of actual murders.
The chapter goes into some detail in explaining the depth and the graveness of the conflict and the degree of desperation that a once proud and civilized Hungarian people felt by 1956. But it was the same desperation felt in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68, and almost continuously in Poland, leading to the creation of the now outlawed Solidarity movement.
The nations of Central Europe, bred on Western values and civilization, just could not take the tremendous oppression that the Soviet Union exercises on them.
The Epilogue shows that the same cultural conflict still exists in Hungary (in 1987), and the Western neglect still continues into the 1980's, even under the Reagan administration, threatening the very survival of Western culture in Hungary.
B. THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION
(Chapter VI from the dissertation)
A. CHANGES IN THE KREMLIN
To fully appreciate the events of the summer and fall of 1956 in Hungary we must backtrack briefly and review Soviet leadership changes and other events from Stalin's death to October 1956.
The first leader of the "collective leadership" was Malenkov. In addition to his advocacy of collective leadership, he favored light industry over heavy industry, and the production of consumer goods over capital goods. The fateful meeting between the Soviet and the Hungarian leadership that placed Imre Nagy in the premiership, with a platform resembling in many respects the Malenkov program, took place under Malenkov's rule, and the results showed Malenkov's influence. Unfortunately, however, and perhaps reflecting the caution of the Kremlin leaders in not burning any bridges, following the Soviet pattern, Rakosi was allowed to retain the Party Secretary position.
The next year and a half saw many of the Nagy programs put into practice, with Rakosi's more-or-less open hostility. As Meray describes it:
“(D)uring the summer of 1954, Gerő and Rakosi had prepared a new economic plan with a view to torpedoing the "policy of June" by reducing the standard of living of the workers and by increasing the taxes on the peasants; and a wave of so-called "rationalization" had already been instigated in the various official departments with the result that thousands of employees and intellectuals had lost their jobs. "The country's standard of living is too high," said Gerő and Rakosi, "and rigorous economies must be imposed."
The Hungarian Central Committee had debated the Rakosi-Gerő program. Nagy had vigorously attacked it. "Whose standard of living is too high?" He asked.
"The workers? The peasants? The intellectuals? Neither their incomes, nor their diet, their clothes, or their lodgings indicate this to be so... How can we support a socialism that does not assure the workers bread? What enthusiasm can we expect for a socialism that is not capable of providing meat, milk, and butter for the workers? The old economic policy gave no consideration either to the people or to society, and through it the concept of socialism became a narrow one conceived only in the idea of maximum industrialization. This is not socialism!" 
This time Nagy was able to repel Rakosi's attack. The Central Committee fully supported him, disagreeing with Rakosi that the Hungarian standard of living was too high. "This was in October, 1954, Nagy's star was at its apogee".
But Rakosi did not take the defeat gracefully; he had left the country and, ostensibly, he had spent two months at a health resort in the Soviet Union. Yet, he had more than health in mind. He canvassed one Soviet leader after the other in his quest to obtain the ouster of Nagy. "This was not his first effort in this direction, but it was the first time he had struck a sympathetic response." Thus, this might be one of a possible handful of cases where a satellite leader actually had influence on the Kremlin in-fighting and resulting policy change. The information that Rakosi fed Khruschev through Kaganovics, whether true or not, fitted in well with Khruschev's plans to undermine Malenkov.
The first open break between Malenkov and Khruschev came when, on December 21st, 1954, the 75th anniversary of Stalin's birth, the Soviet newspaper readers were treated to a rare public display of Kremlin in-fighting.
Pravda, speaking for Khruschev's Secretariat, came out strongly in favor of continuing the Stalinist policy of giving preference to the development of heavy industry, which was termed the "very foundation of a socialist economy and a firm basis for the further development of the national economy." Izvestia, representing Malenkov's position, declared that the "principal task ... is the maximum satisfaction of the constantly increasing material and cultural needs of all members of society." Malenkov's policy of increased production of consumers' goods, first announced in August, 1953, and supported at that time by Khruschev, was now under heavy attack.
This in-fighting probably was settled by the 7th of January, 1955, when the Hungarian leaders were summoned to Moscow again. But at this time it was Nagy's policy that was criticized in no uncertain terms--by his old mentor, Malenkov himself. Meray notices in his account of this meeting that it was an "old Bolshevik tradition to have the one nearest to the victim deliver the coup de grace," just as Kadar was assigned the task of liquidating Rajk. Nagy was surprised and shocked, but not awed. His bitterness, his anger, and his resentment reached a peak when he was told by the Soviet leaders that he had not kept before his eyes "the magnificent example of the Soviet Kolkhozy." He burst out: "You made not a few mistakes of your own when you formed your Kolkhozy."
Now it was the turn of the Soviet leaders to be startled. These men had never known a Communist from another country to dare to criticize the Soviet Union. It is possible that this remark did Nagy more harm than all the intrigues of Rakosi.
Yet, he was not dismissed. "He would have to recognize his past errors and be the first to correct them." But Nagy did no such thing. Defying the Kremlin leaders, "he ran the country's affairs as though nothing had happened." But his health could not take it. At the end of January, he suffered a heart attack which forced him to reduce his activities, and emboldened his opponents within the Party. In the meantime, the January 25th, 1955, plenary session of the Soviet Central Committee supported the Khruschev "Leninist-Stalinist line." As a consequence, on February 8th, Malenkov 's resignation was read by a clerk to the Supreme Soviet. Khruschev in his attack even referred to the Malenkov Line as a "Bukharin-Rykov type deviation." Malenkov, unlike Nagy, meekly admitted his guilt and "recognized the correctness of the heavy industry line."
Thus, the expert Kremlinologists shouldn't have been surprised that the March Central Committee meeting of the Hungarian Party followed suit and denounced the Nagy position, and in April they had him removed from all governmental and party posts. Nagy, however, was not a Kremlinologist nor had a Byzantine mind. He had never compromised and practiced self criticism. On the contrary, he had expressed surprise at his removal, blamed it on Rakosi, and unlike Malenkov, prepared to defend his case before the Moscow Comrades. In fact, his work, On Communism, was written in self defense for the Moscow Comrades, and was published with the subtitle: "In Defense of the New Course."
On May 14, 1955, a historic event took place: Hungary was among the signatories of the Warsaw Pact. William Solyom-Fekete points out in a study for the Library of Congress Law Library, that:
“It is significant that the Pact was signed on May 14, 1955, one day before the Austrian State Treaty entered into force. This Pact's military provisions made it possible for Hungary to agree with the government of the Soviet Union to keep Soviet forces in the country, but there is no published proof of such an agreement. Whether such an agreement between the two governments was, indeed, made before October 23, 1956, cannot be corroborated from official Hungarian sources. Such an agreement was never ratified and promulgated as it can be ascertained from official publications available to the public.”
This is significant, because without such an agreement, under the terms of the Peace Treaty that Hungary signed, the Russian troops stationed in Hungary had to be pulled out once the Austrian treaty went into effect. But even with the pact the October '56 invitation, allegedly issued by Gerő and signed by Hegedus, may have been illegal and certainly was treacherous.
In October 1955 the entire Presidium of the Hungarian Writers Association resigned, the writers demanded an end to censorship, and wanted greater freedom of expression. In December 1955 Nagy was expelled even from the Party, and the Party condemns and criticized the writers.
In 1956 things started to happen at a rapid rate. In February, Khruschev delivered his "secret" speech about Stalin's crimes. At the same time, in Hungary Bela Kun, Foreign Commissar during the 1919 Commune and purged in the Soviet Union in 1939, was rehabilitated. Not surprisingly, as the Kremlin's wheels turn,--so do the Hungarian wheels. In March 1956 Rakosi was forced to declare Rajk innocent. The first public call for Rakosi's resignation was made by the Writers' Association. While many of the Communist political prisoners were released, and the Petofi Circle, a university student club, debated the political issues of the day, Rakosi hung on. In June there was a demand to bring Rajk's murderers to justice. Another demand was to change the Party leadership and bring back Nagy. News of Polish demonstrations in Poznan provoked strikes and disturbances in Hungary.
In July 1956, Rakosi finally resigned and was replaced by Gerő as Party Secretary. At the September Writers Association Congress the writers threw out the party slate and elected non-Communist writers into the leadership. A new wave of critical and rebellious articles appeared in papers and journals. On October 6, at the ceremonial reburial of Rajk there were 200.000 people on the streets of Budapest, demonstrating against Rakosi and the regime. On October 14, Nagy was readmitted into the Party, without any leadership position. October 15: Gerő and Kadar led a party and government delegation to meet Tito. October 21: reports arrived in Hungary that in Poland Gomulka had became the new Secretary of the Party, promising reforms. On October 22, mass student meetings were held in Budapest to outline demands and plan a demonstration in support of Polish reforms. Nagy was vacationing in the Lake Balaton region.
Lomax's summary chronology is followed by more interpretative accounts. According to the publisher of the Hungarian translation of his book, Lomax is "an Englishman with leftist, Marxist leanings." Thus it is not surprising that he gives credit for the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution to the working class, not the writers and the intellectuals, or even "deviant" or "revisionist" Communists who, at best might have fueled the "constant discontent" leading up to the Revolution. According to Lomax, the writers and students were followers rather than the leaders of the movement.
But regardless of who led and who followed, Lomax makes a strong case that the mass-opposition that gathered steam all summer long, became unstoppable after the Rajk funeral. The official Party organ, the SZABAD NEP, reported on the preparations for the reburial under the headline: "This Must Never Happen Again." The masses roared as the speakers at the burial proclaimed "We shall not forget." 
In the following days the leadership of the movement of opposition, which had so far passed from the journalists to the writers and on to the organizers of the Petofi Circle, was to fall firmly into the hands of the students. Already at the end of September, a panel of Central Committee members had come to the university to find themselves showered with questions about the Sovietization of Hungarian culture, the Soviet troops in Hungary, the norm- system in the factories, and the privileges of the party elite.
While the students were pushing full steam ahead, the Petofi Circle of young Communist intellectuals, though supporting "orderly reforms," was advocating caution, fearful that the events might lead to a catastrophe. Nobody was talking armed rebellion. The students called a national student conference for October 27 to launch a national debate around their demands. Nagy was on vacation near Lake Balaton and his friends and collaborators were "disconsolate and disunited."
On the face of it, it looks from all available evidence that the armed rebellion was totally unplanned; it grew gradually as events escalated from discussion to demands. Reacting to the Gerő speech that had followed a vacillating government policy concerning the student demonstrations, the demands had escalated to disobedience to the Secret Police, to sporadic armed conflict and finally, to full scale rebellion.
Against this theory, namely, that the Revolution was a spontaneous, unplanned event, three possible alternatives should be mentioned:
Did the opposition leaders plan the revolution? All evidence indicates that they did not. In fact, they had nothing to gain and everything to lose. An armed insurrection would have given an opportunity to the Soviet military to intervene, and, perhaps even to annex the country as another constituent Republic of the Soviet Union, as they had annexed the Baltic countries during the 1940's. The opposition did not need an armed rebellion, the tide was going their way. 
What about a foreign, i.e. Western instigated rebellion? First, there is no evidence that the West had instigated it. On the contrary, the timid, in fact, the negative reaction once the rebellion did start, indicates that the West feared nothing more than an armed revolution that would put them on the spot as far as the Yalta issue was concerned, which they were not ready to reopen. Also, the problem of Suez kept the West preoccupied already and any diversion at that time was undesirable for them.
One factor that seems to favor a theory of Western complicity is the question of arms. In Hungary there had always been strict "gun control." Where did the rebels get their arms, if not from the West?
Although there were suggestions that "imperialist espionage services" had secret arms depots in Hungary these were pure speculative claims on the order of "there must have been...," to answer a question to which there is no easy answer. But there is an answer that seems unpleasant to the Hungarian Communists yet they had to admit it. Meray quotes sources within the Kadar regime that admit that many members of the police and of the "Home Defense Forces", officers and cadets of the Petofi Military Academy, members of the Association of Freedom Fighters of the Csepel Ironworks, and even "a truck loaded with soldiers" distributed weapons to the crowd in sufficient quantity to start the rebellion.
This answer leaves open the door to the final theory: was a rebellion in Gerő's or the Soviet's interest? Did Gerő provoke the rebellion to create an opportunity to settle his account once and for all with the Nagy group? Reading Lomax's account of the movement before October 1956, one gets the distinct impression that the assailed Gerő regime must fight back--yet seemingly it went about its business as usual. Was Gerő setting a trap for his opponents? There did not seem to be any evidence. Seemingly, he was as unprepared as anybody else.
Worse, Gerő seemed to be completely out of touch with the mood of the people, as his speech that "he had apparently written on the train en route (from Belgrad) to Budapest when the news of the afternoon demonstrations reached him would indicate."
This speech is generally regarded as the fuse that set off the explosion. Gerő's words, demonstrating the speaker's harsh inhumanity, his servility toward--and respect for--the Soviet Union, his lack of comprehension, and his aggressiveness would have exasperated the most patient listeners. And the demonstrators before Radio Budapest were not very patient. His obvious hatred of the people and his obstinate rejection of the overtures from the young demonstrators revolted them. Said Gerő:
"We condemn those who seek to instill in our youth the poison of chauvinism and to take advantage of the democratic liberties that our state guarantees to the workers to organize a nationalist demonstration." This was the sole lesson that the Party First Secretary had drawn from the events, and he emphasized it with such reproachful formulas as: "attempts to make trouble," "hostile elements," "provocation," "nationalist subversion," etc. This was how Gerő saw a demonstration that was destined to change the entire country.
Yet, it is difficult to believe that Gerő had been so naive. Imre Nagy might have committed such an elementary political mistake. But not Gerő.
In fact, Vali unearths some evidence in the Columbia University Research Project on Hungary (CURPH), consisting of interviews with 1956 refugees that support his (Vali's) thesis about "Gerő's Master Plan." According to Vali's theory, Gerő had to convince the Kremlin that his opposition (the Nagy group) consists of "counter revolutionaries," and he needed Soviet help in crushing them. Yet, even thus, Gerő had failed to realize the true extent of the dissatisfaction, and the waves of the rebellion that he had unleashed had swept him under too.
One possible explanation for Gerő's failure is that he did not include the Polish events in his plan. He expected to stage his provocation sometime after his Belgrade trip, but not immediately. His hand however, was forced by the events of the 23rd of October. After due consultation, according to Vali, Gerő must have decided to let events take their course, and with a little provocation in his speech, he might have his "intended showdown." Thus, the inadequate preparations would explain the failure of Gerő's plan. To the extent that it ultimately succeeded in destroying Nagy also, Gerő wasn't around to benefit.
Vali had little direct evidence, though, that Gerő did in fact have such a plan,[since the completion of this Dissertation, however, several pieces of information have surfaced documenting the existence of the plan, as will be shown in the next chapter] and Vali's theory sounds much like brilliant speculation. Yet, there is evidence that Gerő was taking no chances, and probably he did plan to provoke an attack on the State. The missing piece of the puzzle is the answer to another question: who called in the Soviet troops and when? Vali quotes Meray that it was during the night of the 23rd that the Hungarian Politburo decided to ask for Soviet help--once the fighting already started. The person of the actual caller is unidentified. "The choice is among Gerő, the First Secretary, Hegedus, the Prime Minister, and Marosan, a Politburo member who boasted later that he called for Soviet military help. " There was even an effort to blame Nagy for the Soviet intervention, and Nagy found it necessary at one point to publicly deny it. Actually, there existed a document with Nagy's name typed on it, but without his signature. Kadar in a November 1 interview with an Italian journalist stated: "I can tell you that Gerő perhaps knew of it and gave his agreement to it, but it is Andras Hegedus who called in the Russians."
But if it is true that Gerö and the Soviets were planning the provocation, it is irrelevant who called in the Soviet troops. And it seems certain Gerö did plan something. After his return from Lake Balaton, in the morning of October 23 Nagy met a small group of supporters in Budapest, who urged him to participate in the demonstrations. According to Alice Gimes, the widow of the executed Miklós Gimes, her husband told her that Nagy refused, “and reminded us of Imre Mezö’s warning, that Gerö is preparing a major confrontation. He will allow things to escalate to a Poznan like rebellion, and then he can destroy the entire opposition within the Party.”
The U.N. Report on Hungary contains some interesting observations and conclusions that help to complete the puzzle. After describing the Soviet movements during the night of October 23, the report notes: "Thus the movement of Soviet forces gives the impression of a military movement planned in advance." The report further notes that:
While the outbreak of fighting has forced attention on the actual entry of Soviet forces into Budapest, the Committee has good reason to believe that steps had been quietly taken during the two preceding days with a view to the use of Soviet forces for the repression of discontent in Hungary. It has been credibly reported that on 21-22 October, in the neighboring areas in Romania, Soviet officers on leave and reserve officers speaking Hungarian or German were recalled.
On 20-21 October, floating bridges were assembled at Zahony on the frontier between the USSR and Hungary; it was over these pontoon bridges that Soviet troops from the USSR crossed on the morning of 24 October. It has also been credibly reported to the Committee that Soviet forces were seen on the march between Szombathely and Szekesfehervar as early as 22 October, moving from the west towards Budapest. During the night of 23-24 October. Soviet forces began to pass through Szeged and continued to move through the town along the road to Budapest for some thirty-six hours.
There is evidence also that, even in the first intervention by the armed forces of the USSR use was made not only of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, but of Soviet troops from the USSR itself and from Romania. It would appear that, of the Soviet forces used in the first intervention, only two divisions had been stationed in Hungary before the uprising, namely, the Second Mechanized Division, and the Seventeenth Mechanized Division. Seemingly, however, Soviet authorities had foreseen the probability that the troops stationed on Hungarian territory would be insufficient to deal with the situation, and had taken steps to call in forces from outside Hungary. The Soviet troops from the USSR who crossed the pontoon bridges at Zahony moved onwards to Miskolc, while those who crossed the border in the vicinity of Beregsurany proceeded towards Nyiregyhaza and Debrecen. The Hungarian political police at Nyirbator reported at 1 AM on 24 October to the Ministry of Defence that Soviet troops had entered Hungary from Romania.
Thus the Soviet troop movements give credence to the theory that there was a "master plan"--whether it was Gerő's, requesting Soviet help, or the Soviet's, to get rid of Nagy once and for all, ordering Gerő to provoke a conflict as a pretext for Soviet intervention is not known. It seems that even the Hungarian Politburo was in the dark as to the true situation. Gerő may have gone through the motions of inviting the Soviets, who were on their way already long before the obvious need arose, either to conceal the plan, or just to give the signal to start firing, or both. The subsequent formal invitation, if any, was issued and signed by Hegedus only as a smoke screen. It is quite likely that Hegedus, the always obedient puppet, did not know of Gerő's plan either. The U.N. Report is confirmed by Oltvanyi who wrote that "the bulk of two Soviet units appeared during the dark of the evening" of the 23rd in Budapest. If this writer may add his own personal experience, he heard evidence that at noon on the 23rd the Soviet troops stationed at Taszar in Trans-Danubia started their entrainment en route to Budapest.
Thus all available evidence suggests that Hungary was treated as a colony, or an occupied territory by the Soviet Union. In spite of all the rhetoric about Hungary being a sovereign nation, the Soviet was not only ready to use troops but it did interfere in her internal affairs at the telephone request of the Hungarian Communist Party. This makes the demands of the Hungarian students about the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and a return of full Hungarian sovereignty, more valid than those students probably realized at the time.
In conclusion, it was not Socialism that was in danger in Hungary as the Soviets claimed. It was rule by a certain clique, abusing the people, using violent means that might have worked in the Soviet Union, but were impractical, counter productive, and foreign in Hungary, that was in danger. The Hungarian students, intellectuals, and even the working class, wanted to be left alone, to be free to develop Socialism according to the specific Hungarian conditions. It was this independence that the Byzantine Orthodox Russian Mind could not tolerate.
E. THE DEMANDS OF THE REVOLUTION
The demands presented at the outbreak and during the Revolution had shown a strong pattern. Free Europe Press tabulated all the demands broadcast between October 23 and November 9 through the several radio stations and came up with these figures:
Between October 25 and November 9 a total of 225 revolutionary major demands were broadcast by the stations and monitored abroad. By category these demands were:
NO. OF PER CENT
DEMAND INSTANCES OF TOTAL
National Independence 78 35 p.c.
Political Reform 69 31 p.c.
EconomicReform 63 28 p.c.
End of Censorship 8 3 p.c.
Religious Freedom 7 3 p.c.
(All percentages rounded)
While the overwhelming majority of the demands had to do with the military, political, or economic oppression by the Soviet Union, there was not a single demand asking for a return to the old order, whether the Hapsburg or the Horthy style. In fact, they were quite explicit in disclaiming such goals. The centrist Radio Gyor near the Austrian border, issued this statement on October 28:
This is not a counter-revolution, but the national movement of the Hungarian people. The Workers And Peasants In Gyor-Sopron Counties Do Not Want the restoration of the power of manufactures and landlords; the national revolution is not aimed at the restoration of the old regime.
It is unnecessary at this point to rehash the history of those 13 days "that shook the Kremlin," as Meray suggests in the title of his book, but it should be established that the crucial issue throughout the period was the presence and the involvement of the Soviet Union.
It was well publicized, for example, that Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest during the Revolution to "assess the damage" and to negotiate with Nagy. Also, it was generally assumed that during the first several days of his premiership, Nagy was under strict guard by the secret police, who were, in turn, under the direction of the Stalinist old guard of the Party, and under the watchful eyes of Soviet tanks outside the building.
Hegedus paints another, also realistic picture of Nagy. As Nagy first appears in Gerő's office at Party Headquarters on the evening of October 23, "he slumps into a deep armchair. Let's not forget: he was a sick and relatively old man facing a completely unexpected turn of events," and he was separated from his own trusted advisors until the 25th, when "Donath, Losonczi and Vasarhelyi were allowed into the Party Headquarters." But even if the story of Hegedus is correct, it was the Soviet tanks that helped to isolate Nagy from his advisors and the people.
At first it seemed that real progress had been made in the Soviet-Hungarian relationship after October 25th: Nagy became free to make his decisions and appoint his own men, including Janos Kadar, who later turned "traitor." The Soviet not only pulled out of Budapest, but issued a declaration in Moscow on October 30, on "Developing and Strengthening the Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation with other Socialist Countries." The declaration not only admits the possibility of Soviet mistakes, but indicates a willingness to respect the sovereignty of other socialist countries, and to negotiate the stationing or withdrawal of Soviet troops under the Warsaw Pact. The catch in the declaration is the ambiguous last paragraph that talks about "safe-guarding peace and the great socialist enterprise," keeping the back door open for further Soviet interference.
One of the most dramatic turns of the Revolution came on November 1st. It seemed that the Soviet was hesitating. The troops, some 75,000 that were hastily moved to the Hungarian border earlier, were kept waiting. The Soviet Presidium was meeting. According to eyewitness testimony, “everyone in the general staff was against 'the Khrushchev adventure' , it was better to lose Hungary than to lose everything ."
At this point one must put the Hungarian-Soviet relationship in world context: in October 1944 Churchill and Stalin had agreed that Hungary would be predominantly in the Soviet sphere. It seems that this deal, along with the Yalta agreements, was the deciding factor during 1956 events. After the Soviet forces withdrew from Budapest, and the Kremlin was ready to negotiate total withdrawal, Eisenhower had sent a telegram to Tito, asking him to relay the message to Moscow that the U.S. would not look with favor upon a government in Hungary that was unfriendly to the Soviet Union.
This was all that the Soviet leadership needed to reverse their policies, bring in fresh troops, summon Kadar to a private meeting to set up an illegal government, and attack, as soon as possible, Hungary and the still passive and peaceful Nagy government.
Imre Nagy's direct appeal to the U.N., his desperate efforts to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, proclaiming Hungary's neutrality, were only fuel for the fire, after the U.S. had made clear though Tito to the Soviets, without also informing Nagy, their intentions of doing nothing. In fact, it would have been much more honest for Tito to tell Nagy, at least privately so he could make his own accommodations with the Soviets, or at least make his own escape, that the West would not give any assistance that would violate the Moscow deal negotiated by Churchill.
In any case the Soviet reversed itself. As new troops entered the country, and the troops already in Hungary moved to occupy all airports and railroad centers, Nagy called Ambassador Andropov. Just before noon Andropov returned Nagy's call with Moscow's answer: The Soviets are still interested in negotiating a settlement, "with special emphasis on the Warsaw Pact, and also the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. When asked by Nagy about new troops entering Hungary, Andropov had no answer." After the Andropov call, Nagy quickly summoned the Executive Committee of the Party which included Kadar and Munnich, the two who later negotiated with the Soviet the formation of the new government and the November 4th Soviet attack. "The Committee, the leading body of the (Hungarian) Communist Party, agreed that Soviet Russia had violated the Warsaw Pact and that the only course was to renounce the pact and declare neutrality." Nagy had summoned Andropov that afternoon to a cabinet meeting to inform him of the decision to withdraw from the Pact and to become neutral. It was at this meeting that the famous pledge, reported by the Hungarian Radio Station was made by Kadar.
Looking Andropov straight in the eyes, Kadar cried, "what happens to me is of little importance, but I am ready as a Hungarian to fight if necessary. If your tanks enter Budapest, I will go into the streets and fight against you with my bare hands."
Little did anyone suspect that Kadar would follow the Soviet tanks back to Budapest in three days.
In retrospect, many students of 1956 suggest that this meeting was the turning point that decided the fate of Hungary. In retrospect, we can also read a warning in Tito's congratulatory cable on October 30, that also included the warning, "this far but not further," or in Gomulka's telegram which told Nagy in effect, "whatever happens, do not abandon the path to Socialism or all will be lost." But the situation was more ambiguous than the critics of Nagy realize. First, there was no danger of abandoning Socialism, if that was Gomulka's true concern.
As for realigning the relationship to the Soviet Union, as a truly sovereign nation would, the October 30 Moscow Declaration, still operative on November 1, according to Andropov recognized the right of any socialist country to sovereignty. Nagy in his decision only took the Kremlin by its word, hoping that the U.N. and the U.S. [the duplicity of the U. S. will be discussed later] would back Hungary. He certainly had the backing of the Hungarian people, his cabinet, and at first even that of the Hungarian Communist Party.
But, during the night, Nagy lost the backing of Janos Kadar who, in less than 12 hours after his theatrical stand, was facing Andropov again, this time at the Soviet embassy, in the company of Munnich, another of Nagy's Minister of State, but an Old Stalinist. This move by Kadar completed the turning point in the Revolution. After November 1, it was only a matter of time. Of all that happened from November 1 to November 4, one point stands out the most. Tito's role seems to be more sinister than just being a messenger boy for Eisenhower, who told the Soviets that the U.S. would be passive in the affair. Several Hungarians who had taken refuge at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest were called by Embassy officials well before the November 4 Soviet attack, letting them know that the Embassy was prepared to grant them asylum. Some were even left urgent messages to call the Embassy back, and were asked in urgent tones to go there.
This might explain why Nagy went there, instead of to the U.S. Embassy, where he had arranged for Mindszenty's asylum, according to a belief the Cardinal had had.
If Tito invited Nagy and his friends and arranged their taking refuge at his embassy instead of the American, he bore direct responsibility for Nagy's arrest and subsequent execution. In fact, based on what Tito knew in advance, he could have saved perhaps even the entire Revolution by specifically warning Nagy of the consequences, not just uttering general warnings like "thus far and no further." This is one area that historians will have to scrutinize much more.
It would be most appropriate to close this part with Imre Nagy's message that he had dictated after the Soviet tanks had attacked Budapest, on November 4, 1956:
“This fight is the fight for freedom by the Hungarian people against the Russian intervention, and it is possible that I shall only be able to stay at my post for one or two hours. The whole world will see how the Russian armed forces, contrary to all treaties and conventions, are crushing the resistance of the Hungarian people. They will also see how they are kidnapping the Prime Minister of a country which is a Member of the United Nations, taking him from the capital, and therefore it cannot be doubted at all that this is the most brutal form of intervention. I should like in these last moments to ask the leaders of the Revolution, if they can, to leave the country. I ask that all that I have said in my broadcast, and what we have agreed on with the revolutionary leaders during meetings in Parliament, should be put in a memorandum, and the leaders should turn to all the peoples of the world for help and explain that today it is Hungary and tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, it will be the turn of other countries because the imperialism of Moscow does not know borders, and is only trying to play for time.”
(I closed the main part of my dissertation with this message from
This following part was written in 2003, updated in 2007
WAS '56 A FASCIST COUP?
PRE-WARNING AND THE "FASCIST CARD"
Dr. Lorand Tamaska was a government pathologist. His first government appointment came in 1944, just after Governor Horthy issued his unsuccessful proclamation ending Hungary's involvement in World War II. On October 17th, 1944 he became the official pathologist of the Budapest County Police forces. He stayed on after the Communist takeover and moved on to be one of the trusted pathologists, witnessing many of the atrocities of the Rakosi regime. From 1958 he became Professor of Pathology and department head at the Medical University of Pecs until he left Hungary in 1961and settled in Germany. He describes his relevant experience just before his death in an article.
Performing an autopsy on a Russian officer who committed suicide brought him into contact with a Soviet pathologist, Lieutenant Colonel Baljakin. It turned out later that Baljakin was not Russian but Tartar who hated the Russians. The relationship became much more than a professional relationship: they became friends. Baljakin had been stationed in Austria with the headquarters of the Soviet occupational forces. So when the Soviets had to pull out from Austria and Baljakin traveled through Budapest, he called Tamaska to meet him at the railroad station. Baljakin, carefully whispered into Tamaska's ears: "Colleague! You should know that as we (the Soviets) leave Austria, there will be some changes in Hungary. Don't believe in those temporary phenomena because later there will be serious consequences!"
At first this did not make much sense. But Tamaska knew that under the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties between Hungary and the Soviet Union, the Soviet troops were to pull out from Hungary within a year of their withdrawal from Austria. But he also learned that they had sneaked a paragraph into the same treaty providing that if, in their estimation, there was a danger of restoring the fascist regime, they might return and intervene without any invitation or permission by the Hungarian government. Another piece was added to the puzzle when, in 1956, while in Moscow, visiting with physician-general Avdejev at the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Avdejev revealed that the Katyn murder of Polish officers in 1940 was committed by the Russians and not the Germans.
A third piece was added during a conversation between Tamaska and Janos Kadar, then a prominent member of the Politburo. At a meeting on July 18, 1956, Tamaska asked Kadar to take care of some personal problem he had had with one of his superiors, and Kadar refused to act at that time and suggested that Tamaska wait until the Fall. "I can reveal to you, said Kadar, that in October there will be many changes through a Revolution." This indicates, of course, that if there indeed was a Gerö Plan, Kadar knew about it well in advance.
So, Tamaska concluded that the Soviets would use a trick. "They will organize a 'counter-revolution' in Hungary so that they can continue to stay there," to protect the regime. The strategy to be used was simple. First open the valves and gradually increase the freedoms, use a few agent provocateurs and suddenly declare that the fascist forces are taking advantage of the liberalization. With this, the stage was set for the Soviet intervention. It is interesting that several other sources, as we shall see, used the "fascist involvement" as the explanation of the 1956 events.
Based on this and other information discussed in the article, it seemed to Dr. Tamaska that "the Russians planned, provoked, sparked, and defeated the October 23, 1956 'counter-revolution,' and stayed" in Hungary as planned.
According to Tamaska the Petofi Circle, a liberal political forum of university students, was also created by the Party to foment dissent and demand more liberalization at an accelerated rate. This kind of behavior had been seriously punished earlier. Also, trusted party members and supporters, who knew the plan, "painted anti-Semitic remarks on the walls, shouted reactionary, fascist slogans, and were pushing the events toward a 'counter-revolution' that would justify (the desired and planned; S.B.) Soviet intervention."
Tamaska also observed that there was a Soviet military build-up in the months prior to October 1956, along with a deliberate effort to make weapons accessible to the population. After all, one "cannot have a putsch without some shooting, and to have shooting, one needs weapons.” But the populace had, at best, a few outdated hunting rifles or shotguns. Therefore "the organizers of the 'counter-revolution' had to provide, in a credible manner, weapons to the 'counter-revolutionary' provocateurs. Therefore Sandor Kopacsi (Commander of Police in Budapest) ordered his men to turn over their weapons to the 'rebels' without any resistance. I even saw on the night of the 23 when police in blue uniforms handed out rifles to the counter-revolutionaries."
Thus, he concludes "the facts, objective evidence shows that the October 23, 1956 "counter-revolution was planned by the Russians in 1955, and was provoked and defeated--and they stayed." Therefore, it was not Hegedus or Marosan who invited the Russian troops but General Tyihonov, a Soviet military "adviser" in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, "without any previous discussion, request, or permission" of the Hungarian government or the Hungarian Party, on the orders of Moscow, sent them in. General Tyihonov took steps as early as between 5 and 6 PM on October 23, before the Gerő speech, to have the Soviet troops involved. 
Therefore, according to Tamaska, "in the fall of 1956 there was no Revolution, and there was no Counter-revolution, but a state putsch." The process, "similar to the Greek tragedies, had three phases: development, peak of activity, and the fall."
It should also be noted that this interpretation is in harmony with the old Leninist principle that when in trouble, take one step backward, re-group, and take two steps forward.
Essentially the same scenario is given by another source, E. I. Malasenko of the General Staff with the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, following the ratification of the treaty with Austria. Excerpts from his book dealing with the events leading up to October 23, 1956, were published in the journal of the Hungarian Military Science Institute. But while Tamaska deals with the political aspect, Malasenko, a military man, covers the events from the military perspective. At the same time both Tamaska and Malasenko based their accounts strictly on their personal experiences.
Malasenko first explains the position of the Soviet Army in Hungary. Once the Soviet Army pulled out from Austria, under the newly ratified Warsaw Pact, some Soviet troops still remained in Hungary. But the Soviet Ministry of Defense rejected the suggestion to call it a "Special Army," with independent Army Headquarters, since there was an Army stationed in Rumania already. Thus they named it Army Corps (hadtest) that included two motorized, and two air divisions. The commander of the Corps was General P.N. Lascenko.
For our purposes the crucial information is that in July of 1956, before(!) the Party's July Central Committee meeting, Juri Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary and the moving force for the behind the scenes preparations for the “counter-revolution,” gave a speech to the leaders of the Soviet Army Corps. In the speech Andropov "outlined the complicated situation in both the Party and the country--the existence of the opposition and the hostile atmosphere. During his report he stated: it can happen that the Hungarian leadership will ask our help.” In retrospect, after several years, now it seems that the initiatives to rescue the Hungarian Communist regime came from Andropov himself."
In July, probably after the Central Committee meeting of the Hungarian Party, they (the Soviet military leadership) received direct order from Moscow to prepare a plan for direct involvement in maintaining order, if it were to become necessary. Tyihonov was given the task of coordinating with the Hungarian military, and Malasenko received three thick volumes with all the necessary information to organize the Soviet side of the plan. He "completed in a few days the necessary paperwork concerning the joint application of the Soviet and Hungarian armies for the restoration of social order on the territory of Hungary… The plan was approved by Gen. Lascsenko, under the code name of 'Kompasz'. All the commanders of the lower units received their assignments and instructions…."
In the meantime, they received regular briefings about the developments like the Rajk re-burial. "The government failed to take precautions and did not apply the necessary controls that the situation required…. Counting on the situation becoming more serious, in the middle of October General Lascsenko interrupted a training course of higher unit commanders and sent them back “so that at their units they can take the necessary steps…. So, I can state, that in those days, in general, we were well informed about the developing situation in Budapest and in Hungary. But the events have exceeded our imagination."
Malasenko informs us that when he finally authorized the demonstration on the afternoon of October 23, the "leadership of the MDP (the Communist Party) ordered the members of the party to participate in the demonstrations…. The demonstration soon turned into a hostile anti-government mob … and started to chant slogans based on demands written by the Petofi Club.”
It seems that the planners of the 'counter-revolution' did get what they wanted: to prove the resurgence of fascism, when "the crowd chanted ‘down with the communists!’ and "the Jews should ‘perish’!" It is not known, of course, if the chant came from the demonstrators or from the provocateurs who were sent by the Party, to create the impression of an anti-regime and Anti-Semite event developing.
With this the stage was set. "Ambassador Andropov called General Lascsenko around 7 PM, asking him if he could order his troops out to liquidate the disorder in Budapest." Lascsenko replied that maintaining order was primarily the task of the Hungarians, and not his. He also pointed out that Soviet intervention at this stage was not desirable, and anyway, any intervention could happen only on the order of the Soviet (and not the Hungarian!) government and the Soviet Ministry of Defense. In any case, within an hour (that is, around 8 PM), the order arrived from the Soviet General Staff to place the Special Corps in Hungary into a state of readiness.
The above information is reinforced from another source. In 1994 the Hungarian Ministry of Justice had published a documentary volume focusing on the killing of innocent Hungarians. The Documentary refers to a Russian source that reported that the Budapest Commander of the Soviet forces received an order in June 1956 to form plans and get ready to quell any rebellion in Budapest. The plan was finalized on October 22, the day before the Revolution was provoked.
The same Documentary reproduced a document outlining emergency provisions taken by the Hungarian military for the defense of strategic objects in Budapest, and ordered that appropriate information be provided to the commanders in the country side, ordering them to make appropriate preparations.. The plan was approved on October 21, 1956, by General Bata, the Minister of Defense.
Finally, an episode was revealed in the video documentary tending to prove again that not only was the conflict provoked, but provisions were made to equip the participants with weapons and ammunition, because, as Dr. Tamaska wrote, one "cannot have a putsch without some shooting, and to have shooting, one needs weapons.”
As we have seen, Kopacsi, the Chief of Police in Budapest, ordered his men to turn over weapons, but to be sure that there would be adequate fireworks, an unexpected thing happened. After the secret police fired on the crowd at the Radio Building, somebody shouted: “Let’s go to the Lamp Factory.” While the general population was unaware, some provocateurs obviously knew that the Lamp Factory was making weapons and ammunition. So a few members of the crowd got on a truck (that just happened to be available near by) and drove to the Lamp Factory. In spite of the October 21 special precautions, which included under 6/c safeguarding arms, ammunition and explosives warehouses, naming five sites, (that did not include the Lamp Factory), when the truck arrived at the Lamp Factory there was only an old worker guarding the gate, and a young cleaning girl in the yard, who just happened to know where the weapons and the ammunition was stored. Other than these two people, the whole site was abandoned, so the young people loaded their truck with guns and ammunition without any difficulty, and drove out the gate.
The interviewer on the video tape made a valiant effort to find an explanation for the incident, but of the several people who should have known, none was able to explain why somebody suggested to go to the Lamp Factory, where the truck came from, why the site was unguarded, and how the cleaning girl knew at once that the arms were behind a closed door that was hidden behind some boxes!
MORE ON THE “FASCIST INVOLVEMENT”
In 1999 a controversial booklet was written by Robert Szalay and published by the World Council of '56 Hungarians, The author was an Army Captain and history professor at the Hunyadi Officer Continuing Education Academy in 1956. The booklet was distributed free of charge to high schools in Hungary by the World Council of ’56 Hungarians to supplement other history course material on 1956.
According to his own biography Szalay participated in the events from the night of the 23rd, and also on November 4, 1956. He organized a National Guard unit, which was disbanded on November 9, and on November 19, he reported to the Ministry of Defense for further military duty. On December 14 he was suspended as unreliable, and after a three month investigation he was "dismissed from the Army as unreliable" without any further punishment. "Later he was sentenced to four years imprisonment by a military court," but allegedly it was for activities unrelated to 1956.
The booklet is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it shows that the Hungarian Army completely sabotaged the revolt. The second reason is that this the only book I have seen in the literature of '56 that claims that 1956 was the logical result of the Hungarista Mozgalom (Hungarist Movement) that under Ferenc Szalasi's leadership took over the struggle against the Soviets after Governor Horthy's resignation on October 15, 1944.
Szalay develops this thesis as a response to the official ‘56 Institute,which had a near monopoly on access to the documents of '56, and which interpreted it by distorting the truth. According to the Institute, the roots of 1956 go back to Stalin's death in 1953, while Szalay argues that it is really the Hungarist Movement from 1944 that had spawned the events of 1956. He illustrates his thesis by mentioning a few conceptual trials where the charge involving the Hungarists was invented or distorted, but the accused, after the obvious mistreatment, admitted the charges.
In an open letter, responding to Matyas Eorsi's published criticism of his booklet, Szalay admits that he is a late convert to Hungarist ideology, and attacks Eorsi as a lackey of the Jews, who have a vested interest in denying the contributions of Szalasi and the Hungarist movement.
But late convert or not, his thesis seems to strengthen the Soviet claim that their intervention was justified under the 1947 Paris treaty, to prevent a Fascist takeover in Hungary.
Szalay's claim received unexpected confirmation from Andras Mink, an investigative journalist, whose full page essay, "Magyar ellenállás ötvenhat elött (Hungarian resistance before '56), was published in the conservative NAPI MAGYARORSZÁG (DAILY HUNGARY), the only pro-government daily at the time.
Mink starts his article by pointing out that the reviews of the Szalay booklet tend to overlook one of Szalay's central themes, that is, that there was opposition to Communism prior to '56. So to correct this situation Mink presents several cases, including trials and confession, to prove that there was considerable opposition. Mink concludes his article by pointing out that Szalay's book was a monument to the memory of those anti-Communist fighters, many of whom had been executed or beaten to death.
There was great rejoicing in the Szalay camp upon reading such a distinguished journalist confirming Szalay's point in a full page article in the government's own daily. It was even published on Bankuty's Internet homepage (http"//www.Hungarian.net) as reported by the Independent Hungarian News Service.
But alas, they joy did not last long! A few days after the first article, Mink published another one, announcing that the first article was a hoax:
“I owe an apology! My article in the Daily Hungary is a hoax. The line of reasoning was based on sources and quotes from the most infamous propaganda pieces of the (post '56) Kadar regime that dirtied and falsified the '56 Revolution.”
Then he explains point by point that each quoted statement or allegation was coerced or falsified, made by communist agents, etc. Mink admitted that his hoax was a serious breech of journalistic ethics, but justified it by writing:
"I wanted to prove that what Szalay and his ideological comrades are stating about 1956 is the same as what Kadar's historians in his Department of Interior [which runs the political police] have lied about the Revolution for decades."
This does not mean that there were no true Hungarian patriots who have rebelled against the Soviet occupation and their puppet government. But this resistance (a) had little if any connection to the Hungarist movement as such, and (b) was not related in any significant way to the events of October 23, 1956, if for no other reason that all those patriots were either in prison, or dead, or escaped to the West by 1956. The events of 1956 were a Fascist take-over effort only according to the Soviet propaganda, necessitated by their desire to (a) stay in Hungary after they had pulled out of Austria, and (b) to intervene in Hungary's internal matters to prop up a puppet government that was loosing the battle for the support of the people.
As for Szalay, one must wonder, who are his "ideological comrades?" Are they the Communists, who have distorted the true history of 1956, or the Hungarists whom Szalay claims to have joined only recently? Mink seems to suggest the first alternative, but reading the rest of Szalay's booklet, it seems more likely that in his zeal, Szalay is claiming some undeserved glory for his new soul-mates, the Hungarists and thus, unwittingly, supports the Soviet inspired charge that 1956 was a fascist attempt to take over the country. And ultimately, if Szalay is right, the Soviet could extend their stay in Hungary under the terms of the peace treaties.
As already suggested, Szalay's booklet was an attack on the officially supported '56 Institute that gives all the glory to the Reform Communists. Szalay not only disputes this claim but lists several examples where Reform Communists and military leaders sabotaged the uprising. Szalay shows the seamy side of the events. This part of his book seems to contain new information and is a significant contribution to the literature of '56. Also, of the authors cited in this section of this report, Szalay is the only one who goes beyond his own personal experiences and does actual research to support his point.
But let us get back to the original question as to who started or provoked the uprising. Was it popular revolt, fascist initiated uprising, or Communist provocation, by Gerő or the Kremlin? Szalay’s argument seems to be most consistent with the theory that the uprising was provoked. The sabotage by the Hungarian military leaders, including distribution of arms that Kadar also admitted (see above) seems to support (without much credible evidence) the Soviet excuse for the intervention, namely, that fascists were trying to take over Hungary.
As for the role of the so called Reform Communists, the truth is somewhere between the views propagated by the ’56 Institute and Szalay’s position. The Reform Communists were being prepared by Gerő, by pushing them to the forefront of the Reform Movement, for the sacrificial role of being the scapegoat for the outbreak of the rebellion and justifying their planned complete and final elimination by the Gerő regime for their role in the events.
Yet, the book cannot be closed on the Soviet role in the Hungarian events of 1956. We have quoted two credible sources, one Hungarian pathologist, and a Soviet general, but there has not been made public any documentation about the Soviet plan to stay in Hungary after the evacuation of Austria.
The only official and relevant document that I found that was published from the Soviet Central Committee’s archives is Mikojan’s secret report to the Central Committee on July 14, 1956. Mikojan analyzed the Hungarian situation, and summarized his discussions with several Hungarian leaders. According to Mikojan, “After debating the situation, the Hungarian comrades were forced to admit that, although the power actually has not yet slipped out of their hands, it is slipping, and the events are leading to the loss of power.”
Yet, in the long telegram that has been published, there is not one word about the military preparations that General Malasenko wrote about. Mikojan mentions only in general terms that “They have to prepare and in the next few days get ready a plan to destroy the hostile, anti-Party groups, and to break up the centers of their activities.” But there is no hint of a potential military action.
Thus there is plenty to be discovered by future historians who will gain access to the Moscow archives, to definitively prove or disprove the above outlined claim, namely, that the Soviets, together with Gerő, provoked the uprising to justify their stay in Hungary. But whatever they will find, so far the thesis of my dissertation has not been contradicted or even weakened by the known events. In fact, my more modest thesis has been fully supported by the evidence un-earthed after 1990.
Link: L. v. Südland: The Southern Slav Question
 It should be noted that in the Communist regimes the "political officer" in the army has nothing to do with the military aspects of the service. They are trusted and highly paid Party activists assigned to military units, and are not only the mouth-piece of the Party, but also its eyes and ears, spying and reporting on others, including their fellow officers.
 Az igazsag a Nagy Imre ügyben (The Truth in the Imre Nagy case), Brussels, 1959; Budapest 1989, p. 55.
 For details see excerpts attached from Geza Radics, 1956 és előzményei
 “Timetable of a Failure,” VIRGINIA QUARTERLY, 34:2, 1958:Spring, pp. 161-191
 p. 169,
 It is quite possible that Cuban president Battista was ousted as punishment for his attempt in defense of Hungary, and his attempts to counter the US efforts to quell any UN action.
 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949)
 From a letter informing me of the Committee's decision, signed by my advisor, Prof. Mark H. Roelofs, dated June 5, 1969.
 The Act provides for the "free movement of persons and ideas."
 The "Twenty-second Semiannual Report" on the of Helsinki Final Act, October 1, 1986-April 1, 1987, Washington, DC: U S. Department of State, 1987) has this to report: "Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the 5-6 such refusals annually of which our embassy is aware but will consider the embassy's request for review, sometimes with favorable results. Favorable reconsideration is often granted to such applicants for demonstrable humanitarian concerns such as the illness of a close relative. Most cases involve people especially prominent in the 1956 uprising." The number of refusals is probably more, since I never before went to the embassy, and probably many people never think of appealing to them. Also, I was not "especially prominent" in 1956. (p. 25) It should further be noted, however, that according to an AP story in July 1987 the U. S. Department of State protested the Israeli practice of denying visas to Arab-Americans, yet no similar protest was lodged to the Hungarian government about Hungarian-Americans.
 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: W.W. Norton, 1942), p. 150.
 2 lbid., p. IX.
 Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1942), p. 466.
 Mackinder, p. 171.
 cf. Spykman, p. 467
 5 Christoph Bertram, "Reagan Decline Leaves Room for Europe to Step in," Die Zeit, Nov. 28, 1986; English translation published in The German Tribune, Dec. 7, 1986, pp. 1, 6.
 lbid., p. 2.
 “European Leadership Changes had Pivotal Role in Changed Relationship with US,", Die Zeit, Nov. 21, 1986; Ibid., pp. 6-7.
 See, among others, the entire issue of Geopolitique (Review of the International Institute of Geopolitics, 1984, No. 6, or the Aspen Talks held in Berlin in November 1984 (cf. The German Tribune, Dec. 16, 1984, pp. 5-8).
 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution. (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1977).
 Ibid., p. 39
 lbid., p. 29.
 Pauline V. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and Research 3rd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1956), pp. 132-33.
 Stjepan Buc, "Croatia and Central Europe", in Francis S. Wagner, ed. Toward a New Central Europe, A Symposium on the Problems of the Danubian Nations, (Astor Park, FL: Danubian Press, 1970), p. 2-63.
 Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed. Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton NJ' Princeton University Press, 1969). First published in 1965.
 Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975).
 Archie Brown & Jack Gray, ed., Political Culture & Political Change in Communist States, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977).
 Stephen White, John Gardner, and George Schopflin, Comunist Political Systems: An Introduction (New York: St. Nartin's Press, 1982).
 Archie Brown, ed., Political Culture and Communist Studies (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Inc., 1984).
 Brown refers to over 30 definitions by 1976; Ibid., p.2.
 Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) p. ix.
 F. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (2nd ed., Boston: 1972).
 J. Reshetar, The Soviet Polity, (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1971).
6e.g. Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Comunism (New York: Random House, Vintage Book, 1962); William Henry Chamberlain, The Russian Enigma, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943); Virginia Cowles, The Russian Dagger--Cold War in the Days of the Czars, New York: Harper and Row, 1969), etc.
 Mary McCauley, “Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, two Steps Back,” in Brown, pp. 13-39.
 lbid., p. 18.
 White is obviously aware of the Russian-Byzantine Connection, as he refers to it in White, Gardner, and Schopflin, p. 35.
 Stephen White, "Soviet Political Culture Reassessed," in Brown, pp. 63-64.
 1lbid., pp. 91-92.
 Brown candidly admits that the purpose of his "present work" was to relate political culture to political change or continuity rather than to the notion of political development” (Brown and Gray, p. 3), as the title indicates. But this seems to imply that there is room, in other studies, to focus on "political development" (his emphasis).
 cf. p. 10, supra.
 In Brown and Gray, pp. 131-158.
 lbid., p. 131.
 Stephen Sisa, The Spirit of Hungary, (Ontario' Rakoczi Foundation, 1983) p. 172.
 lbid., p. 132.
 Chapter 6 in White, Gardner and Schopflin, pp. 221-264.
 Ibid., pp. 221-222.
 lbid., p. 236.
 lbid., p. 238. It should be noted that in Romania it is the Hungarian and German ethnic minorities that make this demand, not the ethnic Romanians.
 lbid., p. 241. Cf. pp. 239-40, Ibid.
 Ibid., p. 243.
 Ibid., pp. 243-48.
 Ibid., pp. 248-50.
 McAuley, pp. 24-25.
 "Address by George Bush Vice President of the United States: Vienna, Austria, September 21, 1983." (The Vice President's Office).
 Ibid., p. 2. Cf. Czeszlav Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books, 1951). No page reference given by Bush.
 Sandor Balogh, "St. Augustine and Modern Democratic Ideas" (unpublished M.A. Thesis) NYU Library, 1965) p. 92.
 "The Voice of Deism," from Howard H. Quint, Dean Albertson, and Milton Cantor, (ed) Main Problems in American History (Homewood, Il: Dorsey Press, 1968) Vol. 1, pp. 79-80. Source: Thomas Paine, '1The Age of Reason," in Moncure D. Conway (ed), Writings of Thomas Paine (New York, 1896, Vol. IV, pp. 188-90.
 Humanist Manifestos I and II (Buffalo, NY' Prometheus Books, 1977), p. 3.
 "Humanist Manifesto" #5.
 Ibid., #7.
 lbid., #1.
 See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia (1957) and United States V. Seeger (1965).
 Humanist Manifesto II.
 By George W. Cornell, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 11, 1987, p.Dl.
 2According to David Martin, in the U.S. the "church is formally separated from the state, and even religion from school, and yet, the overall social order is legitimized by a pervasive ci~il religion" (~ General Theory of Secularization, New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 28), while in the U.S.S.R. "active evangelization amounts to interference with the rights of others while atheistic propaganda is part of the liberation of the backward" (p. 135.).
 Humanist Manifesto, # 14.
 Humanist Manifesto Ir, #10.
 Manifesto II, Introduction.
 lbid, p. 240.
 Milosz, pp. x-xi.
 see Balogh. The original idea for this terminology was suggested in the course "Modern Political Theory," by Professor Mark H. Roelofs of NYU.
 lbid., pp. 12-14.
 Donald Atwell Zoll, in his excellent essay, "On Tradition," The Intercollegiate Review, Winter 1983-73, pp. 3-12, defines "tradition" as "the manifestation within the historical process of partial actualization of the objective order of nature," p. 7.
 Balogh, pp. 4-7.
 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
 Ibid., p. 8.
 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
 See Figure I.
 Reagan's traditionalism is perhaps best illustrated by his appointments to the Supreme Court that were opposed by both Statists and Libertarians in Congress.
 See Figure II.
 See supra,
 See Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation (New York: Shocken Books, 1961).
 Cf. Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition--Moses to Lenin (Nev York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1968) p. 384.
 For summary of East-West differences regarding Central Europe see Figure III. The detailed analysis has been omitted in this report
 Brown, p. 78.
 Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger, 1975) pp. 27-29.
 T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunsvik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964 Science Edition). See especially: Chapter XX, "Genetic Aspects of the Authoritarian Personality: Case study of two contrasting individuals," by Sanford. For more on Authoritarian Personality, see pp. 162 ff., infra.
 Reported by Daniel Goleman, "Major Personality Study Finds That Traits Are Mostly Inherited," New York Times, Dec. 2, 1986. pp. C1-2. Cf Table. I.
 Helena Curtis, Biology (New York: Worth Publishers, 1975), p. 867.
 Ibid., p. 872.
 cf. Ibid. p. 884.
 Admittedly, the question of national character and of inherited political attitudes is a very delicate issue that has to be handled with great care, especially in the US. It could produce charges and countercharges of biologism, like the IQ studies of Arthur Jensen have provoked accusations of racism. But just because some findings can be abused, true science cannot, should not bow to political pressure, especially when such a potentially significant issue is involved. Instead, political scientists should warn against unwarranted use, or abuse of such findings.
 See Gray, p. 4, Supra.
 cf. J. Nettl, "Takeover in East Germany," in Roger Pethybridge, ed., The Development of the Comunist Bloc (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1965), pp. 31-40.
 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Governments of Germany (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), p. 191.
 Buc, p. 65.
 lbid., p. 63.
 Lawrence Minard, "A Balkan Despotism," Forbes, May 11,1981, p.136. It should be noted that Forbes contrasts Hungary ("The Hungarian Exception,") by the same author in the same issue (pp. 119-128), showing the social and economic conditions in the two countries. For other examples of differences between Eastern and Central European political culture see pp. 13-15, Supra.
 lbid. It should be noted how accurate the ters, "Despot," is in the case of the Rumanian dictator. cf. Hailgarten's definition, p. 91, infra.
 Ibid.; emphasis added.
 The imperialistic nature of the "Russo-Soviet Empire" is discussed and documented by Cohn S. Gray, in Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), "The Soviet Union as an Empire, pp. 77-87.
 Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies, Movements and Regimes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983), p. 131.
 Ibid., p. 132. Please note that the Communist Party of the U.S., for the most part, has been quite loyal to the Soviet Communist Party.
 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 119.
 Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: a comparative Analysis using New Indices," The American Political Science Review LXII, 4 (Dec. 1968), p. 104.
 Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, (January 1968). p. 245.
 Ibid., p.246.
 Why Men Rebel, p. 418.
 lbid., p. 11.
 American Sociological Review 27,1 (Feb. 1962): 5-19.
 Ibid., p. 6.
 “Psychological factors," p. 249.
 Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change" The American Behavioral Scientist 14 (May/June 1971) p. 678-682.
 Gurr, "Psychological Factors," p. 249.
 "Strife' the act of striving or vying with another," Webster's New World Dictionary, (2nd College ed., 1972) p. 1410.
 For example, in the "Battle of Lexington more than a year before July 4, 1776, it was the frustrated Major Pitcairn that ordered his troops to fire first, and kill eight colonists, when they refused to disperse.
 For details and circumstantial evidence of this theory see infra, Chapter 6..
 George Bancroft, History of the United States of America. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1893) 3rd vol., p. 466.
 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1965) p. 218. See also Bancroft, 4th vol., p. 270.
 Perhaps it will be helpful to understand civil strife better if we compare it to labor strife. In labor disputes there is a distinction between strike and "Lock-out." Revolution is comparable to strike, while the equivalent of Gerő's gambit would be a "lock-out." Yet, political science does not even have a term for such a maneuver.
 Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1961).
 Ibid., pp. 503-5
 See Figure IV.
 Ibid., pp. 505-6.
 Ibid., p. 506.
 See Edmund 0. Stillman, The Ideology of Revolution - The People's Demands in Hungary October - November 1956 - (New York: Free Europe Press, 1957), pp. 32-35.
 0f the tremendous amount of Solzhenitsyn's writings, a two page statement, "Solzhenitsyn on Communism, Advise to the West in an hour of extremity,'1 in TIME (Feb. 18, 1980, pp. 48-49) seems to be the best summary, and the present critique is based on this essay.
 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, compiler, From Under the Rubble, essays by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Mikhail Agursky, A.B., Evgeny Barabanov, Vadim Borisov, F. Koraskov, and Igor Shafarevich; translated by A.M. Brock, Milada Haigh, Narita Sapiets, Hilary Sternberg, and Harry Willetts (New York: Bantam Books, 1976).
 "Solzhenitsyn on Communism," p. 48.
 Ibid., p. 49.
 Gray, Geopolitics p. 35. For Pipes quote see "Detente: Moscow's View,” in Richard Pipes, ed., Soviet Strategy in Europe (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), p. 9. Emphasis in the original, by Pipes.
 lbid., Gray's Emphasis. The Soviet slogan, “Proletarians of the World, Unite!” openly admits that they aim to conquer the world.
 See "Berlin and its East-West Role: Need to Get Rid of Smokescreen Terminology," in Aussenpolitik, No. 4, 1986, translation in The German Tribune, Dec. 14, 1986, p. 5. In light of Gray's comments, why is it a crime to call the GDR's "loyalty to its alliance into question”? It is not a matter of German loyalty to the Soviet Union but a matter of the Soviet occupying and dominating part of Germany, part of Western Europe. Similarly, except on a much larger scale, the Helsinki Accord of 1975, by recognizing the inviolability of the existing boundary between East and West seems to sanction the already conquered Soviet territorial gains that the Soviet can use for further expansion.
 Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 163.
 lbid., pp. 168-9
 For published statements by Jean-Paul Sartre and Haldor Laxnes, Nobel Price Winner Icelandic Socialist, see Francis S. Wagner, ed.--The Hungarian Revolution in Perspective (Washington, DC' F.F. Memorial Foundation, 1969) pp. 26-7.
 "Solzhenitsyn on Comunism," p. 49.
 David K. Shipler, The Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 438; cf. pp. 447-451.
 lbid., p. 265. Shiplers description of the Russian yearning is almost an answer to McAuley's demand (see above)
 Cf. Ibid., p. 349.
 (New York: Penguin Books, 1984).
 Ibid, "Introduction," Ibid., p. 21.
 Ibid., p. 20.
 Ibid., pp. 19, 21.
 Ibid., p. 19.
 E.g. lsaac Deutscher, in "Socialism in One Country" quotes Plekhanov. Cf. Ibid., p. 106.
 E .g. the existence of the "nomenklatura," cf. Ibid., p. 26.
 lbid., p. 139. Liebman 's emphasis.
 Ibid., p. 17.
 Ibid., pp. 60-94.
 lbid., p. 79.
 lbid., p. 80.
 lbid., p. 81.
 Ibid., p. 82. Mandel's emphasis.
 lbid., pp. 83-84.
Preobrazhensky's term, p. 81.
 “Marxism and Primitive Magic,” p. 112.
 Ibid., p. 113.
 Ibid., p. 114.
 Ibid., p. 116.
 Ibid., p. 129.
 Ibid., pp. 161-2.
 Ibid., p. 165.
 Ibid., p. 548.
 Ibid, p. 549.
 In 2006 one might even add Putin to the list.
 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program, in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels, Basic writings on Politics and Philosophy; Doubleday and Co., 1959, p. 117.
 Ali, p. 7.
 Cf. Frederick Engels, “On Social Conditions in Russia,” in Feuer, pp. 470-474.
 Bertell Ollman, Social and Sexual Revolution, essays on Marx and Reich (Boston, South End Press, 1979) pp. 48-98.
 Ibid., p. 60.
 Ibid., p. 48.
 Robert Hotz, “The Soviet Response to the US Strategic Defense,” in Assessing Strategic Defense; Six Roundtable Discussions, edited by . Bruce Weinrod (Washington, DC, Heritage Foundation, 1985) p. 49.
 Meray, p. 23.
 Ibid., p. 24
 Reshetar, pp. 263-64. It should be noted that Nagy's "New Economic Course" (NEC) in Hungary was announced on July 4, 1953, about one month earlier than the Malenkov policy in the Soviet Union.
 Meray., p. 25.( Cf. pp. 271-2, Supra, Note #1.)
 Meray, p. 27.
 Ibid., p. 28
 Reshetar, p. 264
 Imre Nagy, ON COMMUNISM, In Defense of the New Course (New York: Praeger, 1957).
 William Solyom-Fekete, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF A REVOLUTION. Hungary's Legal History: 1956-1966
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Law Library, 1982) p. 7.
 Bill Lomax, Magyarorszag, 1956, (Hungary, 1956) trans. Gyorgy Krasso (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Corvin Publishing L.T.D., 1982), p. 12; the following chronology is based on Lomax, pp. 12-14.
 Ibid., p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 35
 Ibid, p. 45
 Ibid., p. 47.
 Ibid., p. 46.
 Ibid., p. 48.
 Ibid., pp. 47-50; also cf. pp. 58 supra.
 2The Provisional Central Committee of the Party suggested this explanation in its Dec. 5, 1956 Resolution (Ez Tortent [This Happened--Articles about 1956] Budapest: Nepszabadsag, 1981, pp. 23-4). The1981 article that quoted the 1956 Resolution supports this accusation against the U.S., New York Times, Radio Free Europe, etc. Ibid, pp. 4-25.
 Cf. Meray, p. 87.
 3This account by Lomax reinforces the personal experience of this author.
 1Endre Marton, Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 126.
 Meray, p. 85.
 Vali, Cf. pp. 254-7.
 Probably in conjunction with the Nov. 7th celebrations of the anniversary of the Great October revolution.
 Ibid., p. 273
 Ibid., p. 274.
 Ibid., p. 276.
 Zinner, p. 461
 Noel Barber, SEVEN DAYS OF FREEDOM (New York: ; Stein and Day, 1974) p. 127
 Melvin J. Lasky, The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book. (New York: Praeger, 1957) p. 178.
 Alice Gimes, The “Secret” Meeting in AZ IGAZSAG A NAGY IMRE UGYBEN;(The truth in the Nagy Imre case) Századvég füzetek, Budapest, 1989, 54-55 o. also Aron tobias ed., in Memmoriam nagy Imre, Szabad Tér Kiadó, 1989, 178-9 o.
 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem Hungary (New York: General Assembly, 1957, supplement No. 18) A 3592 , par. #54.
 Ibid. #157-9.
 Andras Hegedus and Zoltan Zsille,. ELET EGY ESZME ARNYEKABAN (Life in the Shadow of an Idea. A Biographical Interview with Andras Hegedus). Vienna: by the author (Zsille), 1985, pp. 261-65.
 Laszlo Oltvanyi, HARCOK DELBUDAPESTEN, 1956 (Fighting in South Budapest, 1956) (Munchen: The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' World Federation, 198l) pp. 33-44.
 Radio Free Europe, The Ideology of Revolution - The People's in Hungary, October - November 1956 (New York R.F.E. Press.) p. 16. A more detailed breakdown of these categories is presented in the Appendix.
 lbid., p. 14.
 Tibor Méray, THIRTEEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE KREMLIN, New York, 1959
 Cf. Igazsag, November 1, quoted in Lasky, p. 167, also for an insider's account see Hegedus, pp. 271-76.
 Cf. U.N. Report, #246-258
 Hegedus, p. 259, 267. It is interesting to note that Hegedus admits that the events were "unexpected" as far as Nagy was concerned; Nagy wasn't part of a conspiracy.
 For complete text see Appendix. Source of Declaration is Wagner, Hungarian Revolution..., pp. 163-7, also Zinner, pp. 485-489.
 Cf. Wagner, p. 167.
 Oleg Penkovskiy, THE PENKOVSKIY PAPERS (Garden City:Doubleday, 1965) quoted in Barber, p. 147.
 Alperovitz claims 80-20 ratio, cf. p. 249, Supra; while Marton wrote that Churchill gave Stalin 75% versus 25% for the West (Marton, p. 276.).
 For a detailed analysis see Gordon Gaskill, "Timetable of a Failure", Virginia Quarterly, Vol. 84, Spring 1958, pp. 137-152.
 1Barber, p. 150.
 Barber, p. 151.
 Cf. Barber, p. 128.
 See Appendix
 Barber p. 159
 Cf. Marton, 207, Barber, 180, Meray pp. 271-2, Kozi-Horvath Jozsef, "Mindszenty es Nagy Imre Kapcsolatai" (“Relationship between Mindszenty and Imre Nagy") Nemzetor, September 1981, p. 6.
 Kozi-Horvath Jozsef, "Mindszenty es Nagy Imre Kapcsolatai" (1tRelationship between Mindszenty and Imre Nagy") Nemzetor, September 1981, p. 6.
 United Nations, par. ~9l. Note the similarity of Nagy's tone and Kossuth's prophecies: pp. 109, ff., Supra.
 Lorand Tamaska, MD, "Ötszaz gramm pragai sonka--A magyar '56 háttere" (five hundred grams Ham from Pague--the background of the Hungarian 1956.) in HUNNIA, October 25, 1994, pp. 21-31.
 Ibid., p. 23.
 Ibid., p. 27. It should be noted that the main purpose of organizing the Warsaw Pact was also to justify the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary. Thus, Tamaska's interpretation would make sense only if we make a distinction between stay and intervention: while the Soviet may stay in Hungary for defense purposes against foreign enemies, but under the Pact it did not have the right to the Soviet military to interfere in Hungary's domestic affairs. For such intervention the threat of fascist restoration had to be invoked.
 Ibid., p. 25.
 Ibid., p. 27. It seems a book was published in Hungary last spring that claimed that Janos Kadar ”predicted in January 1956 that there will be a revolution in the Fall.” The degree of ignorance about 1956 in Hungary is frustrating. The reaction to this assertion in the weekly, DEMOCRATA, was violent denial. According to Karoly Szalay if one wants to narrow it down to a centrally directed provocation, he is, mildly speaking, ignorant, more accurately, malevolent idiot.” Demokrata, October 20, 2005, p. 45.
 Ibid., p. 25.
 Ibid., p. 28.
 Ibid., p. 30.
 Ibid., p. 31.
 Ibid., p. 30.
 Ibid., p. 27.
 Ibid., p. 26.
 E. I. Malasenko, "The Special Army Corps in the Fire in Budapest" in HADTUDOMÁNY (MILITARY SCIENCE) 1994, # 1, pp. 121-4; excerpts from the book with the same title, published in Russia.
 The term would refer to major independent units of the Armed Forces, like in the American Army there is the "Second Army," or "Third Army."
 Malasenko, p. 122. Emphasis in all quotes is from the original
 Ibid., pp. 122-3...
 Ibid., p. 123.
 Ibid., p. 124
 Igazsagügyi Miniszterium Tenyfeltaro Bizottsag, 1994, “Sortuzek, Megtorlas Menekules.” II. Report
 Ibid., pp. 9-10, cf. Vojenno Isztoricseszkij Zsurnal 1993, #10.
 II. Report, pp. 62-63;
 Ibid., tape #2.
 Robert Szalay, 1956, A FORRADALOM IGAZ TORTENETE; Ami a történelemkönyvekböl kimaradt (1956, THE TRUE STRORY OF THE REVOLUTION; What was left out from the history books), MET Publishing, 1999, 40 pages. Preface by Geza E. Bankuty, President of the World Council of '56 Hungarians.
 Ibid., p. 39.
 Ibid., p.5. It should be noted that this author feels that the true roots of 1956 go back to 1949, when the oppression turned the people against Communism and the Soviet Union. 1944-45 were important dates as the Hungarian people had direct experience of the barbarism of the Red Army, but it is absurd to trace 1956 to 1944. At the same time, 1953, giving a taste of freedom after years of brutal oppression was an important milestone on the road to '56, but '56 was much more than a return of post-Stalin era. Also, the Institute made a mistake when it gave exclusive credit to the Reform Communists for 1956, and Szalay also erred when he denied altogether the role of Reform Communists. Even if their role was only to provoke the confrontation, they had unleashed the popular resentment that swept from power the entire Gerő regime.
 It probably has not been published in print, but circulated on the Internet and was available on Bankuty's homepage, where Szalay's booklet was also available and could be down loaded in Hungarian..
 February 19, 2000, p. 21.
 MISSING PAGES FROM THE HISTORY OF 1956, Documents from the former Soviet Communist Party Central Committee’s Archives, Zenit Books Publisher, p. 42.
 Ibid., p. 45.