The pre-1956 Hungarian Events Re-examined:
the Fascist Card.
v. Sandor Balogh, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus
To the superficial observer and historian it seems that the book on the 1956 Hungarian "Uprising," one of the many names used to identify the bloody rebellion against the Hungarian Communist regime that shook the Kremlin's iron rule over its satellite empire, is closed. According to traditional wisdom, “It was a popular uprising against an oppressive regime that, in desperation, had to call in the Russian troops to put down the rebellion staged by students and workers.”
But during the last fifteen years more and more has become known about the background maneuvering that actually provoked a people's ire and swept the Communist regime of Ernő Gerő from power, so the term "uprising" might not be that accurate.
Yet, now that the Communist Empire has collapsed, it seems like Monday morning quarterbacking, without any real benefit, to re-hash those events that happened almost a half century ago. But we must consider that, in addition to Russia, the dominant power of the former Soviet Empire, in several former satellite countries in East Central Europe Communists or former Communists are still in power, and even where they are out of power no real purges were made. Consequently, the government and the military is still full of Communists and former "political officers"[1] who once were the lackeys of the Soviet regime.
This author wrote his dissertation in the 80's about the Soviet-Hungarian relations from 1948 to 1956. The main thesis of the dissertation was that the events of 1956, including the Polish Solidarity strike at Poznan and the events in Budapest, as well as the East German dissent in 1953 and the Prague Spring under Alexander Dubcek, were not nationalist uprisings. Those nations, having long affiliation with Western culture, rebelled against the more primitive, more Soviet despotic rule and the forced imposition of Byzantine culture. The thesis was proven by arguing that the more nationalist but Byzantine Orthodox Bulgarians, Serbs and Rumanians have never rebelled against the Soviet rule.
This topic is still very timely, since the West, including the US foreign policy establishment still does not realize the importance of political culture, especially the role that the Orthodox Byzantine culture plays in politics. The imperialistic expansionary tendencies of Russia are based on the Byzantine messianic zeal to conquer and convert more and more peoples. Since the completion of the Dissertation more information strengthening my argument has drawn closer to my attention on this issue, some of which I will include as attachments to this essay.
Concerning the Hungarian events themselves, I had proposed a secondary thesis that the popular version, i.e. that the events were a popular uprising initiated by the students and/or workers, depending on whose interpretation one accepts, is inaccurate. Based on the application of the “theory of revolutions,” and a careful analysis of the UN Report on Hungary this author had argued that the rebellion was prepared and provoked by the government and the Communist Party.
The most authentic evidence for this came from the mouth of Imre Nagy himself. On the morning of October 23, when it was announced, that the university students were planning a demonstration and they demanded the return of Imre Nagy to power, his friends, in a small private meeting, had urged Nagy to attend the demonstration, but Nagy refused. He reminded the group that ten days earlier he had received warning from Imre Mezö, the only member of the top Communist leadership who still had contact with Nagy. According to Mezö, “Gerő was planning a major provocation against Nagy. He let the situation deteriorate to the degree that it was in Poland, and used it as an excuse to eliminate the entire opposition within the Party.”[2] Therefore he had to be very careful, which explains his behavior during the first few days, until it became obvious, that Gerő had lost his game.
If this is true, of course the Hungarian people fell into the trap. But once provoked, they responded splendidly to the challenge and, in spite of the involvement of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, they had succeeded in ousting the much-hated Communist Party from power. The Soviets had to bring in new troops to put down the rebellion of that valiant small nation and restore the Communists to power.
There might seem to be some inconsistency between the two proposals, rebellion against the violent imposition of a foreign culture and the premeditated provocation. But there is a simple explanation. The Hungarian and the Soviet leadership expected the provocation to lead to a minor disturbance in Budapest to be easily cleaned up by the Soviet troops. But it turned into a major rebellion because of the cultural differences, and the Hungarian people’s deep seated desire to be masters of their own fate. Being used to the docile reaction of the Byzantine Orthodox Russian people, they did not expect what actually happened in Budapest, namely that the freedom loving Hungarians would not stop until they had defeated the hated regime. According to General Malasenko’s report, “…the events have exceeded our imagination."
Since 1990 evidence has appeared that not only completely supports the thesis of the dissertation, but gives new insight into the methods used by the Kremlin.
There is also evidence that Eisenhower and Dulles had to reassure the Soviet leaders that the US would not interfere if they reasserted their rule over Hungary.[3]
Thus, if we take into consideration the role the World Government concept might have played in the events, Ambassador Bohlen’s reference to the approval on „legmagasabb szinten” (highest level) might refer to the highest level of the „foreign policy establishment,” which was not necessarily President Eisenhower.
Further analysis shows that up to November 4, when the Soviets attacked the sleeping Budapest, the US did everything it could to protect the Soviet aggressor in the UN. Gordon Gaskill, an American journalist, chronicles the US behavior at the UN in the Virginia Quarterly.[4] Henry Cabot Lodge, the American Ambassador to the UN did everything he could to delay, sidetrack, or hinder the efforts of the so called Cassandra Club, led by Cuban UN Ambassador, Dr. Emilio Nunez-Portuondo,[5] to take effective UN action to save Hungary from the Soviet intervention.[6]
In the following (Part I) first I shall reprint the Preface, Introduction and Chapter VI of my dissertation, which suggests that the events of 1956 were planned and provoked by ErnőGerő, the head of the Hungarian Communists. My thesis was based mainly on political theory and logic.
Based on new revelations it is also possible now to place the events of 1956 into the larger context of the Cold War. On the one hand, the Soviets needed to react to the creation of NATO and the keeping of a huge American contingent in Europe and, on the other hand, the American policymakers did not want to risk alienating the Soviet Union and jeopardizing their goal of creating a World Government, more recently code-named as New World Order, as outlined by Arthur Schlesinger in his book, Vital Center.[7] Schlesinger’s theme is that “the noble concept of World Government” will begin to make contact with reality, when the Soviet Union and the United States meet at the “center” : they will respect human rights more, and we will move toward socialism.
Therefore Schlesinger had cautioned the American foreign policy establishment not to scare the Soviets away from moving toward this center. He even mentioned the Hungarian tyrant, Matyas Rakosi and warned that, no matter how bad he was, the West should treat him with kid gloves, so that they might continue to move toward the “vital center.” It was this spirit that Eisenhower and Dulles supported and there was circumstantial evidence available in the 1980's to suggest it. To get concrete evidence, I even placed a request in the Hungarian newspapers published in the West, asking anyone who might have information about the invitation and planning of the Soviet intervention to contact me. Unfortunately, there was no such information forwarded to be included in my dissertation.
Since 1990 however, articles and memoirs providing factual information and personal interpretations have become available. In Part II., I shall review these articles and in the Conclusion I shall try to present a coherent picture of the pre-1956 planning and preparation, based on this new information. I shall attempt to organize the available information into consistent conceptual units and work out the conflicts, but still more research is needed, especially from still unavailable official secret documents, for the full and accurate understanding of those events. It seems that the so far released documents had been carefully screened, in order not to make public any damaging documents.
Part I. The Dissertation
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PH.D. DISSERTATION
ABSTRACT
Cultural and political patterns of Communism in Central Europe: A case study of the Soviet-Hungarian relationship, 1948-56.
Balogh, Sandor, Ph.D.
New York University, 1987.
The dissertation seeks to compare and explain the two different patterns of development in Central and Eastern/Southern Europe: while in the Central European countries like in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Sovietization provoked major resistance, in the Eastern-Southern European countries like Russia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet rule has been tolerated for four decades without any serious challenge.
The thesis of the paper is that the Central European nations, with strong western traditions, have rejected Soviet style Communism, since it has the "birthmarks" of the Byzantine Russian Orthodox culture, while the Eastern and Southern European countries that have Orthodox cultures themselves, including the Russian people, do not find the Soviet system too alien to their own culture.
The dissertation is a case study proving that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was more a desperate rejection of Russification than a nationalist uprising. As part of this study, the dissertation also analyzes the relationship between the Kremlin and the Hungarian "puppet" government.
· Chapter One analyzes the Russian Mind, tracing it back to its Byzantine roots, through the Slavophile School, Russian Messianism and Panslavism, and Orthodox Authoritarianism.
· Chapter Two reviews the relevant aspects of Hegel's and Marx's systems, arguing that their system is more compatible with the Russian than the Western Mind.
· Chapter Three argues that the Soviet Union is not only a direct descendant of Orthodox Russia, but is "the political expression of Russian nationalism.”
· Chapter Four reviews Hungary's thousand year old western orientation, up to World War Two.
· Chapter Five details Russification in Hungary from 1948 to 1956.
· Chapter Six shows how the cultural conflict had sharpened in Hungary to the point when Hungarians could not tolerate it anymore.
· The Conclusion shows that Russification even today (as of the 1980’s) is a major burning issue in Hungary.
The author left Hungary in 1956.
Order Number 8801514
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Cultural and Political Patterns of Communism in Central Europe: A Case Study of the Soviet-Hungarian Relationship, 1948-56.
Balogh, Sandor, Ph.D.
New York University, October 1987.
PREFACE
It is probably in order to give a brief summary of the long history of this dissertation. I completed my oral examinations in 1969, and my Dissertation Committee directed me
“to shift the focus of your Ph.D. Dissertation plans to a careful and detailed study of the development of Communism in your native Hungary. The Committee believes that your special knowledge in this area may well yield information of considerable and lasting value to the academic community. The Committee also believes that your ready familiarity with this material makes it possible for you to think of completing your dissertation within a relatively short span.”[8]
Unfortunately, the “short span” has turned into eighteen long years.
The story of these years should be told, since it has direct relevance to my study. Not wanting to rely completely on memory and available secondary sources, I immediately applied for a visitor's visa at the Hungarian consulate through my travel agent. The visa was rejected with no explanation. The next summer I applied direct to the Consulate, to be rejected again. Since then I have applied several times, have applied for a research visa under the IREX program even, but it was still refused by the Hungarian authorities. I also wrote to Janos Kadar himself, to no avail. The text of the rejection was always the same:
"Under the current visa regulations your request cannot be processed."
I have not even been able to get an explanation in eighteen years. I have visited the Hungarian Consulate in New York, the Embassy in Washington, and written several letters, to no avail. The last promise I received was in August of this year that when one of the employees of the Consulate returns from his vacation in early September, he will explain what the law or regulation is. Now it is October, and I still have no explanation. I also wrote to the U. S. Embassy in Hungary, asking them to try to find an explanation. They responded on July 7, 1987, that the "Embassy has requested the Hungarian authorities why your repeated visa applications have been refused. As soon as reply is received, I will inform you." I have received no such information yet.
The Hungarian consul in New York city also suggested that I should re-submit my visa application stressing "humanitarian aspects" of the case, like "visiting a sick family member." But this completely misses the point. At this point I just wanted to know what the "current visa regulations" were, and in particular, how did it apply to me. I did not question their right to establish their regulations, but I believe that under the Helsinki Final Act's provisions, they should at least make public the regulation.[9] Was it something that they were ashamed to reveal publicly?
It was also suggested by the Hungarian Consulate in New York that I may appeal the decision by sending them the appeal fee. But what can one appeal if one does not know the applicable rule? If it is purely a personal decision, as it has been suggested by someone familiar with the system, namely, that a party functionary a long time ago has placed your name on a black list, and he is long dead and nobody cares to remove your name, why should it cost you money to have your name removed? These may look like minor or even moot points, but it is relevant to the current state of affairs in Kadar' s Hungary that prides itself of being one of the most liberal satellite governments.[10]
This obstacle prevented me from completing the dissertation within the time limit normally allowed. Growing family responsibilities have also played a role in further delay. Finally, in 1982, I was granted Sabbatical leave that enabled me to re-start the entire project. So, this paper is essentially the result of work done during the years after 1982.
I have to admit, however, that the delay has helped in maturing my thesis and I believe the end-product is much better, more seasoned and mature now than it would have been had it been completed ten years ago. Also, the perspective is much better now. I doubt that I could have gotten the same insight before 1980, when the Polish Solidarity movement was outlawed.
Before 1968 an important perspective to study the Hungarian Revolution was missing: The so called Prague Spring was the first and only uprising that was defeated by Soviet troops. Before 1980, one could only compare the events of 1956 with the Czechoslovakian situation in 1968. But after 1980 the final piece of the puzzle fell in place: there were protests and uprisings in all the Western oriented Communist countries, and there was none, in the forty years since World War II ended, in the countries with Byzantine culture. The pattern was clear, and the thesis of the dissertation was a natural: the countries that have Western cultural traditions have rejected the Soviet rule not because of nationalism, or because of anti-socialism, but because the culture that the Soviets imposed was foreign to these peoples.
I have to admit that at first I was hesitant. So many people, including experts, Neo-Marxists, the media, even statesmen, accept the myth that the Soviet Union is a Marxist and Socialist country, and in spreading Soviet influence, they spread Socialism. My thesis clearly went against the “main-stream” of the relevant literature and the experts. Could I be the only one who sees that the "Emperor has no clothes?" But as I did my research I have discovered that there is a solid body of evidence to support my thesis--it just has not been applied to the Satellite nations.
For the successful completion of the project I owe a great deal of gratitude to a large number of people. First, of course, is my thesis advisor, who also worked with me on my M.A. Thesis, and over the years, has guided me through this much larger project, Professor Mark H. Roelofs of the Department of Politics at NYU. I am also grateful to the Department for re-admitting me to the program after such a long delay. I should also thank the members of my Committee for their suggestions and insights, like suggesting that I review the literature on the Political Culture approach and the recent Theories of Revolution. I believe both suggestions have improved my understanding of the problem and have enabled me to develop further both areas.
I also owe more than just honorable mention to Radio Free Europe in Munich and its Hungarian section for their invaluable help during my three weeks of research there after the Hungarian authorities refused my visa for research in Hungary. The excellent library resources of RFE have almost made up for my inability to do my research in Hungary. Consultation with Dr. Aurel Bereznai, Carlo Kovacs, Istvan Polgar, Laszlo Rasko, and the assistance of Mrs. Szamosi was especially helpful.
Among the institutions that have helped, I should include my own school, Hudson Valley Community College for the two semesters of Sabbatical Leave, for the encouragement of my superiors, and the concrete help given by my colleagues, Joe Marsh and Tony Walsh in proofreading several versions of my raw draft. Special gratitude is earned by the typing pool and those dedicated typists for patiently typing and re-typing, correcting, and printing the several versions of this dissertation.
Among my friends I should thank so many, but the following gave more than friendly encouragement to deserve special mention: Attila Csutkay, Denes Szegedi, and Botond Zahony have helped me from their libraries or other resources.
Last but not least, I should thank members of my family. My wife, Sara, had tremendous patience in not only encouraging me, sticking with me, but also in tolerating the piles and piles of books, manuscripts, typed sheets, in my den, the porch, living-room table, and wherever I found empty space for my material. Exercising tremendous self-control, she did not throw out any of my papers. All my kids were just as patient over the years when they asked me to do something or go somewhere and I excused myself to work on my dissertation. My daughters, Suzanne and Marianne, were especially helpful in checking my references and helping to prepare the footnotes.
Thank you to all. Without you, I would be still working on this project.
Of course, as customary and proper, I will take the blame for all the mistakes that still might be found. I only hope that I succeeded in reducing them to the minimum.
A. INTRODUCTION
THE IMPORTANCE OF CENTRAL EUROPE:
Geopolitics
Central Europe is historically one of the most important geopolitical regions of the Earth. It is part of what the Scottish geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, refers to as East Europe in summarizing his theory about world politics:
who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.[11]
One could find numerous examples in history to prove this principle. Unfortunately, the victorious nations of W.W.I. did not take Mackinder's advice and fragmented Central Eastern Europe instead of creating a power base which, allied with the Western democracies, or even alone, would be able to stand up to either German or Russian pressure. Hitler, on the other hand, based on Karl Haushofer's work,[12] who himself was a follower of Mackinder, did recognize the importance of the region, and his first step to carry out his plans was to secure Central Europe.
It might be true that, with ICBMs and assorted space weapons, the military importance of Central Europe has declined, but it could change soon, as the insanity of an all-out nuclear war becomes more obvious. If either nuclear disarmament talks will be successful or the SDI program is deployed, the prospect of traditional warfare will increase. Consequently, Central Europe's military significance as a buffer zone will increase, making Mackinder's theories timely again.
From the American side, Spykman, the renowned expert on geopolitics echoed Mckinder's warnings: better pay attention to Central Europe. During World War II, preparing America for the following peace settlements, Spykman pointed out that “The greatest difficulty will be that of balancing Germany and Russia."[13] Following Mackinder's suggestion that was disregarded by the victors after WW I, namely, "a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia, "[14] whose neutrality would be protected by the rest of the world,[15] Spykman proposes "a great Eastern federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. "[16]
Although American policy makers and our media have not yet realized the importance of Spykman’s and Mackinder's warnings, Western Europe is more concerned than ever. As recently as November 1986, following the breaking of the Iran-Contra controversy in the U.S., a column in Die Zeit suggested that the "silver lining" for Europe in Reagan's difficulties could be that Europe now might be free to "embark on initiatives of its own in the pursuit of political progress for the West.”[17] The three Western interests, according to the article, include "keener attention to Ostpolitik while Washington is lying low.”[18]
In the same issue of Die Zeit, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt talked about possible progress toward making some accommodation regarding what he refers to as Eastern Europe.[19] These statements follow a series of pronouncements by European statesmen concerning Ostpolitik, which is the code name for Western politics toward the rest of Europe including Central Europe.[20]
Cohn S. Gray, a contemporary student of Mackinder and Spykman is even more emphatic in his study.[21] Gray repeats the importance of the Central European region in terms of contemporary power relations: “Geopolitical relations in Central Europe are a matter of major interest to this study, because--unlike the clashes of East-West interest elsewhere (save with respect to the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf in particular)--the achievement by the Soviet Union of hegemony over this region would, in and of itself, mean a decisive and immediate shift in the global balance of power. Even Soviet success in the Persian Gulf area would largely have meaning in terms of its effects upon the policies of European countries (and Japan).[22]
Based on the importance of this region, Gray issued following warning to the U.S. policy makers:
”… looking at the world of the late 1970's, the theories of Mackinder and Spykman yield a common logic for policy. The United States cannot afford to tolerate the effective control of Eurasia-Africa by the Soviet Union. It must serve, in its own vital interests, as the functional successor to Great Britain as an active balancer of power on, and bearing upon, the Rimlands of Eurasia. Such a geopolitical task is as essential as it should--given steadiness of purpose and an appropriate popular understanding of that purpose--be successful.” [23]
The question that Central Europeans are wondering, and perhaps would like to have some say about, is this: might Spykman's suggestion be realized with a neutral Central European Federation, or might Central Europe be annexed by Western Europe, as opposed to now being annexed by the Soviet Union.
One can only hope that after the world has paid a heavy price, because the statesmen twice failed to consider geopolitical considerations in Central Europe, this time the world leaders will heed the advice of the experts and the leaders of Western Europe.
But Central Europe has another important rote: it is there that Eastern style Communism clashes most directly with Western culture and crucial Western interests.
CULTURE
The significance of understanding the people and culture of a country, especially as important as the Soviet Union and the Central European nations including Poland should be obvious. During W.W. II, US marines and other troops were provided with detailed information on the native cultures in the South Pacific. This material, collected from the Human Relations Area File, "is said (to have) prevented many costly mistakes and saved many lives.”[24] Yet, influential policy makers and opinion molders seem not to take into consideration the basic cultural feature of the Soviet Union, namely that it is an Orthodox, Byzantine empire with a non-Western mindset, and that the people in Central Europe have an old, established Western culture. Their failure to realize this has led to many costly mistakes, like the Yalta agreement, to name only the most significant. The average GI participating in W.W. II knew more about the culture of a small tribe in the South Pacific than Churchill, or U.S. Presidents, including Roosevelt, Eisenhower or Reagan know about the USSR, Poland, or Hungary.
It is not only that the world leaders are ignorant of the cultures of peoples whose fate they hold in their hands, but they are not even interested. Cultural conditions are completely neglected in favor of military and/or economic considerations. Yet, genuine peace cannot come about until more interest is directed to peoples' minds, their values, ways of life, traditions, etc.
As a result of the total disregard for cultural and historic factors, after World War I., the victorious Allied Powers accepted a peace plan that resulted in a number of national and millions of individual and family tragedies, greatly contributed to the development of the Cold War and helped to destabilize an already fragile continent.
The difference between Eastern and Western culture is so vast that only the blind cannot see it. Stjepan Buc, having had experience in the pre-communist Croatia in Communist Yugoslavia, and now living in South America, sees the difference as follows:
Striving for power is generally characteristic of human beings. But if two do the same, it is yet not the same. As the eastern individual is quite different in his nature and character, so will he act and react differently. . . The historians, e.g. have proved that the term "democracy" in Byzantium meant something quite different from what it means to us. "Democracy" means for them what "anarchy" means for the Westerners. What in the West is generally termed "democracy", that is dictatorship in the East; what is "peace" for them, that is "a peace of cemetery"; their "coexistence translated for us means that burglary is to be voluntarily acknowledged by the legitimate owner as a just action of the burglar. Different logic, different moral conceptions; hence, a different philosophy and different ethics.[25]
THE POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH
During the last three decades the role of cultural factors in politics has been re-discovered, reinforcing the unique cultural position of Central Europe. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss the political culture movement in detail, but a brief analysis is in order.
The first major step was to use the political culture concept to understand, analyze,[26] and compare[27] political systems on a basis other than the state institutions. Next, Brown and Gray used political culture as the basic concept to study change in the Communist states,[28] creating, as it were, an almost separate branch of the political culture approach.
While Brown and Gray used a country by country approach to analyze the Communist states, White, Gardner, and Schopflin published a volume, based on a conceptual analysis of the same Communist systems,[29] from a political culture perspective. Following these and other studies of the different Communist states, a second volume by Brown analyzed the studies of political culture and Communism.[30]
The progress in these three decades has been tremendous. While at first there was little agreement even concerning the definition of political culture,[31] and the concept was used mainly as a descriptive tool, by 1979 political culture studies became more developmental.
In 1979 White presented a study of Soviet politics emphasizing “important elements of continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary systems."[32] But White's study failed to go back to analyze the roots of the pre-revolutionary Tsarist system.
While White's approach was a step in the right direction for the political culture school, it was not that new. As White himself admits, "there are brief accounts of Soviet political culture in two recent texts, referring to Barghoorn's[33] Politics in the USSR4 and Reshetar's The Soviet Polity.[34] Actually, there are several other works doing the same thing.[35]
Further, White's approach is quite inadequate. While he correctly anchored the Soviet system in Tsarist Russia, he failed to similarly anchor the Russian political culture in something solid. Mary McAuley took White to task for his undocumented and seemingly unfounded though quite correct assertions about Tsarist Russia.[36] McAuley expects political culturalists to provide the entire chain of explanations, from the present to as far back as necessary, to explain contemporary political culture.
”(I)f today's political culture has its origins in yesterday's political culture, we would expect our authors to seek the source of the traditional political culture--not in the yesterday's politics and society--but in the belief system of an even earlier stage of that society.”[37]
But White missed the point in his response. Instead of following McAuley’s suggestion, White backtracked into what he considers a more tenable position. Instead of boldly answering the challenge and tracing the Russian character back to its Byzantine origins[38] White responded by limiting the scope of political culture:
”(I)t should be pointed out, that a political culture approach does not provide--and as far as I know has never been presented as providing--a satisfactory explanation for all aspects of the politics of a nation or a social group.”[39]
But McAuley had, of course, just issued that challenge to White, and White failed to respond to it. In his conclusion, White reasserts a limited concept of the political culture approach:
”(T)he task of the political culturalist, as I understand it, is a relatively modest one. In the case of a Communist state, ...first identify the main features of the pre-revolutionary political culture.... The second task...is to identify the main features of the contemporary political culture... These two tasks, as I see them, are largely, if not entirely descriptive in character...
The third and more difficult task is to compare the pre-revolutionary and contemporary political cultures to see to what extent, if at all, the former appears to have made a continuing contribution to the later... The fourth task...is to examine the extent to which the political culture...is likely to influence future patterns of political development and change.”[40]
It is beyond the scope of this Introduction to argue the merits or demerits of White's understanding/definition of the political culture approach, yet, in order to argue for an open-ended time frame for the study of political culture, an inconsistency in White's approach must be discussed.
In his explanation of the first three tasks of the political culture approach, White seems to take the Russian Revolution of 1917 as the central event, and analyzes the relationship between the immediately preceding and the contemporary political systems. First, in doing this, he skips several decades of development, the entire Stalin era, seeming to suggest that nothing important happened during those decades.
But even more important, how is the "central event" around which the analysis is focused, determined? While the Russian Revolution is obviously the great event in the life of the Soviet Union, there are other important events, and some political culturalists might focus their study on the pre- and post 1953 era, making Stalin's death the central event. Or World War II. If this line is followed, the political culture approach will deteriorate into a study of social and political change![41]
The only adequate way to explain the political culture of a given nation is to forget about central events, and go back as far as necessary in the past of the nation to explain the present. Do what McAuley suggested![42]
It is helpful at this point to illustrate the inadequacy of White's approach with two relevant cases.
George Schopflin's essay, "Hungary: An Uneasy Stability,"[43] applies the political culture approach to Hungary. Schopflin explicitly limits his inquiry to the post 1867 (the "Compromise") period in his very first sentence: "the modern history of Hungary can be said to have begun with the Ausgleich (“compromise” - [sic]) between the Hungarian gentry and Vienna, whereby the Hungarians were granted complete self-government."[44]
Aside from the fact that the statement is erroneous, since even after the compromise of 1867, "Ties to Austria remained, not only through a common monarch, but also through joint ministers of foreign policy, defense, and finance and a commercial and customs union renewable every ten years,"[45] hardly a case of "complete self-government", picking 1876 as the beginning of "modern Hungary" is arbitrary. Any single date is quite arbitrary, but if one is desirable, the liberation of Hungary from the Turkish occupation during the last decade of the 17th Century, or the revolutionary era of 1848, or Trianon at the end of World War One, when Hungary lost 2/3 of her territory, but regained national independence, are all more appropriate starting points.
But even more important, selecting any starting point is arbitrary. There are many features of the Hungarian political culture that go back far beyond 1867. But even setting 1867 as the beginning is completely superfluous for Schopflin, since in his analysis he restricts himself to the comparison of the Horthy regime (1920-1945) and the Kadar regime (1956 to the present). Curiously, Schopflin skips the 1945-1956 period. Thus, the unmentioned "central event" in this study seems to be the 11 year period, dominated by the Stalinist rule of Matyas Rakosi. In his eagerness to find a contrast between the Kadar and the Horthy regimes, relying almost exclusively on reports published in Hungary after 1956, Schopflin emphasizes two aspects of Hungarian political culture before 1945: strong nationalism and "insecurity, fear of extinction."[46] These two features seem to be important for Schopflin because he thinks that they were used as excuses for the leaders of Hungary before 1945 to overlook and/or violate Hungary's democratic traditions (he never explains where those traditions came from as McAuley would demand). Using (or abusing?) the political culture approach Schopflin succeeds in producing one of the most one-sided and inadequate descriptions of the twenty year period between the two World Wars, leaving his readers worse than ignorant about that period of Hungarian history.
The second relevant case to illustrate the inadequacy of White's approach concerns Central Europe, and just by coincidence, is based on a work that White coauthored.
In Communist Political Systems the authors discuss "Democracy and Human Rights"[47] in the Communist countries. The chapter begins with a distinction between "Western liberal democracy" and Marxist and other theories of Democracy. Next, they point out that the human rights record of the several Communist states is quite diverse: some do better than others.[48] So far so good. But because their approach focuses on individual countries and is limited to the immediate past before the Communist takeover, they fail to see the deeper pattern that should be obvious.
Concerning the demand for human rights, they contrast Bulgaria, where "there appears to be very little demand for the extension of individual rights," with Poland, where such demand is high and constant.[49] The liberal idea of "the independence of the courts from the political system" is demanded in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and even in Romania."[50] As far as the press is concerned, "(l)n Hungary there is at the present no formal censorship," just like in Poland and Czechoslovakia. But in Romania and Albania, it seems, there is no need for censorship since the press there has a purely propagandistic role.[51] Also, there is extensive "samizdat" activity in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and in Romania by the Hungarian minority and the Fundamentalists (but not by the Orthodox Romanians). But "in Bulgaria...there has been little evidence so far of significant (samizdat) activity."[52]
Further, the rights to free association and assembly have been claimed and used again in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and little Croatia. The official ritual of mass demonstrations on May 1 has been abandoned with the onset of de-Stalinization, "except in Albania and Romania."[53] Concerning religious freedom, "religion is formally banned and individuals are punished for religious observance" in Albania. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary the churches struggle for their independence. "In Eastern Orthodox societies such as Bulgaria the churches have never claimed the same degree of autonomy and by and large they have been integrated into the framework of the state."[54]
It is quite obvious that on every issue the line up is the same: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the side of Western liberal ideas, while the ethnic Romanians, Bulgaria, and Albania always on the side of "Marxist or other" theories of Democracy. Is this pattern a coincidence or is there an explanation? It is impossible to explain this without going to the roots of political culture, much deeper than White et al. are willing to go. McAuley has every right to be puzzled about the political culture approach when even "Gray himself suggests that Hungary and Poland show (today) the same commitment to democratic values as does Czechoslovakia and that there is nothing in their past political culture to suggest that they should."[55] To find the democratic traditions in Hungary and Poland it is necessary to go back much farther than White of Schopflin do.
Therefore this dissertation proposes to go back sufficiently not only to find the roots of democratic traditions in Central Europe, but hopefully, find what is the common denominator, the common cultural heritage of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
THE WESTERN AND EASTERN CULTURES
The thesis of this dissertation is that Central Europe belongs to the Western civilization, while Russia has an Eastern, Byzantine civilization. It is in order at this point to explain and clarify the difference between the two cultures, the two minds: the Eastern and the Western.
Vice President Bush, upon completing his trip through Rumania and Hungary, addressed this issue in a speech he gave in Vienna.[56] He described how, on an earlier occasion, he stood before the Iron Curtain, "a high concrete wall topped with densely packed barbed wire." Then, he added: "As I looked out to the East, I had the momentary impression that I was standing in a lonely outpost on the edge of Western civilization... Historically, of course, it could not have been more false."
Then the Vice President went on to talk about "Mitteleuropa-Central Europe," quoting Czeslaw Milosz, dissident Polish intellectual. Milosz wrote about his fellow intellectuals in Central Europe and their "extinguishment" seeing their countries, which "are rightfully part of an ancient civilization, one that is derived from Rome rather than Byzantium 'surrender to a hegemony of nation',"[57] which has such a different, a Byzantine, civilization.
"It has often been remarked – continued the Vice President - that of the three great events--the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment--Russia took part in none. But Mitteleuropa...took part in all." Thus, it is these three
events that are the touchstones, the identifying marks of Western culture.
While one may elaborate the significance of these events somewhat, culture, even the more limited aspect, political culture, is a very complex phenomena, and it requires a great deal of oversimplification to fit it into just two categories: East and West. These two categories, of necessity, will be quite broad, will require a high level of abstraction, and may, at times overlap.
Also, a fourth great historical fact may be added to the Vice President’s list that distinguishes the East and West: in the West there was a long struggle between the Church and the State, that ended with the separation of the two. This did not happen in Russia. In the West there existed a struggle between the Church and State, from the time Christianity became the state religion in Rome. The relationship between the two entities posed a great dilemma:
”Should the Church, already a developed social institution, continue in the Hebrew tradition and become a ghetto church? Or should Christians return to the concept of Seneca and conceive of the Church as the "greater commonwealth"?
The dilemma became so great that even many bishops disagreed...”[58]
It took many centuries for the West to come up with its solution: complete separation of the two. The East had its own solution: subservience to the temporal authority. The outcome in the West set the stage not only for the Reformation (only in a secular society can more than one religion flourish), but created two authorities, two sources of truth, in fact, two truths for the West (e.g. creation as the religious truth and evolution the secular truth).
Reformation implied the acceptance of two truths: a subjective (religious) and an objective (secular) truth, in effect, creating religiously a pluralist society. Renaissance marked the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modernity. While it did go back to the secular classical ideas and philosophies, the major result of the Renaissance was the introduction of industrialization, urbanization, the scientific concepts and the positivist method. Finally, the Enlightenment meant a complete break with religion and revelation, enthroning reason as the only source of truth.
As the result of all these changes, the individual emerged as the measure of all things. Russia has missed all this. She has never experienced separation of Church and State, religious (or other) pluralism, industrial and scientific revolution, and rationalism. And in Russia, the individual was never allowed to challenge the authority.
The consequences of Reformation, Renaissance, and Enlightenment in the West were devastating for its traditional Christian culture. The discussion of the differences between the current Eastern and Western cultures would not be adequate without reviewing some aspects of this development.
First, as part of the scientific revolution, Deism challenged some religious notions and explanations concerning nature. Thomas Paine, in his classic statement on Deism, professes:
“ I believe in one God, and no more: and I hope for happiness beyond this Life...
”I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant church, nor by any other church that I know of. My own mind is my own church...
”The existence of an Almighty power is sufficiently demonstrated to us, though we cannot conceive, as it is impossible we should, the nature and manner of its existence...
”Deism then teaches us, without the possibility of being deceived, all that is necessary or proper to be known. The creation is the Bible of the Deist.”[59]
Paine still finds science and belief in God consistent, through the "demonstrable fact" of Creation. SCIENCE carved out an independent niche for itself in the intellectual sphere. A milestone in this development was the “Humanist Manifesto,” a document signed in 1933 by some thirty four intellectuals, including John Dewey.[60] While this Manifesto obviously follows the Deist tradition in its negative attitude towards organized religion, in many aspects it goes beyond Paine's position.
First, the Manifesto, instead of fighting religion, proposes to create a new revolution of secular Humanists, re-defining the traditional concept of religion: "Religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method,"[61] and "Religion consists of those actions, purposes and experiences which are humanly significant.”[62] Second, the signers of the Manifesto do not believe in Creation. Its very first point states clearly:
"Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created .”[63]
It seems, indeed, that Supreme Court has given secular Humanism the advantages (without the burdens) of religion, at least as far as tax exemption and conscientious objector status is concerned.[64]
The first Manifesto was followed forty years later by "Humanist Manifesto II," signed by almost two hundred intellectuals from countries as diverse as the United States, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
This Manifesto continues the attack on religion announcing that we affirm a set of principles that can serve as the basis for united action--positive principles relevant to the present human condition. They are a design for a secular society on a planetary scale.[65]
The document includes a section on ethics like how the "preciousness and dignity of the individual person is a central humanist value," on the "Democratic Society," on the "World Community," and on "Humanity as a Whole."
There are many indications that not only the Supreme Court but Congress, along with the news media and the educational establishment is influenced by this secularist trend. It has become so influential that the Associated Press story, "Neo-paganism seen entrenched in West" made page one of the religion section of the daily paper.[66]
The critic, the Rev. Carl F. H. Henry, a Baptist scholar, lecturer and author, reminding one of Solzhenitsyn's charges, claims that “the West has lost its moral compass, and sinks in neo-pagan naturalism that says nature alone is real, that man is essentially a complex animal, that distinctions of truth and good are temporary and changing."[67]
While it took several centuries for the West to become an officially secular society, in the USSR it came suddenly, with one blow in the Great October Revolution. In any case, however, while secular Humanists in the West and Communists in the East disagree about human rights, they have a common denominator in anti-religious naturalism which leads to an anti-Church attitude in both cultures.[68]
Thus, many Humanists in the West may have divided loyalties when it comes to the Christian heritage of the West: since they do not believe in it, should they defend it against a potential attack by fellow atheists or naturalists? Some find it difficult to take sides, while others find it not difficult at all to support the Soviet side. One factor that makes this choice easier is the professed belief in Science (as opposed to Faith) by both the secular Humanists and the Communists. Thus, Science serves as another common denominator.
But there is even more common ground between the secular Humanists and the Communists, who prefer to call the Soviet system "Socialism," rather than Russian Imperialism. The first Humanist Manifesto not only condemns the Capitalist system but states that a "socialized and cooperative economic order must be established."[69] The Manifesto II backtracks a little, and states only that "the door is open to alternative economic systems,"[70] yet leaves the door open to Socialism. Also, Manifesto II lumps various kinds of Humanism together:
"The varieties and emphases of naturalistic humanism include ‘scientific,’ 'ethical,' 'democratic,' 'religious,' and 'Marxist' humanism. Free thought, atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, deism, rationalism, the humanist traditions. Humanism traces its roots from ancient China, classical Greece and Rome, through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, to the scientific revolution of the modern world.” [71]
So, without themselves being Communist, many in the West see in the Soviet Union more a potential ally ("if only...") rather than an enemy, let alone enemy #1. For many, including some in the "liberal" (i.e. "mainstream”) religion, the Papacy is much more dangerous than the Soviet Union. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., for example, proposes to treat the Soviet Union as a potential ally. He recommends that we should move toward Socialism, the Soviets should move toward us a little in the area of human rights, so that the two shall meet at The Vital Center, as the title suggests.[72] Schlesinger's conclusion may frighten some: "When Russia loosens the totalitarian grip, then the noble dream of world government will begin to make some contact with reality.”[73] It is hardly necessary to point out that such optimism completely disregards the hard facts of political culture that is based on hundreds of years of tradition in the West, and an even older tradition in the East. Schlesinger wants the Russians and the Americans live under one World Government! It will happen only when the lion and the sheep sleep together.
Before leaving this topic, it should be pointed out that this secularization process was somewhat slower in Central Europe, (in fact, it is practically non-existent in Poland), creating another dilemma for some in the West: should they support, in the name of human rights, pre-modern, Christian societies in Central Europe against the Soviet "liberators," who have views much more in harmony with the Humanists in the West? Thus, the more-or-less Christian Central Europe is, in a sense, caught between the Neo-Pagan West, and the atheist East.
But this is not all the difference between the two cultures. In the West, the practice of pluralism and the use of reason led to the introduction of a new yardstick. Instead of: "Is it true?", the question became: "Does it work?". If a theory or solution does not work, try another. Thus, a willingness to experiment, along with a toleration of other people's ideas became the basic characteristic of the Western mind. This difference is perhaps best summarized again by Milosz: to be sure, "in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform--to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of mortal sin."[74]
THE WEST: THREE ALTERNATE APPROACHES
But this is only the attitude toward "ideas" ("truth" in the East!). To better appreciate the relationship between the Eastern and the Western mind, it is important to examine the ideas, or "truth" itself, as perceived in the two worlds. The political ideas in the West can be grouped into three basic categories that are referred to by various names. One set of terminology is suggested in this author's study of "Saint Augustine and Modern Democratic Ideals"[75]: Christian, Liberal, and Social Democracies.
Christian Democracy, as defined there, [76] is based on the assumption that there is a universal human nature and man is, by nature, a social being. The isolated individual is insufficient, and could not successfully find out through trial and error the norms necessary for survival. Successful norms are learned from revelation, or from social experience: the successful patterns of behavior become the norms. These norms, once found, are transmitted through tradition. Therefore, the secular contemporary term for this approach is "Traditionalism."[77] This approach includes individuals as diverse as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Burke, William Buckley, or President Reagan.
The Liberal Democrat believes in the complete independence of the individual.[78] This idea first appeared in Calvin's writings: no humans, no society can save man, except God's mercy. From this religious beginning, through secular writers like Hobbes, Thomas Paine, or Ayn Rand and the "Libertarian" school, the secular concept evolved in a reversal of the Calvinist notion, that man is so perfect, he can do anything he wishes. If it can be done, the individual has the right to do it.
The third approach, emphasizing equality of all, is Social Democracy.[79] From its Rousseauian beginnings (Rousseau wanted a society "strong enough to prevent anarchy, yet, at the same time, safeguard liberty"[80]) it has deteriorated through Hegel, Marx, T. H. Green, Franklin D. Roosevelt and others into a form of "Statism." Because of these three different approaches, the Western political culture is characterized by a "polarity": a struggle, between the state, society, and the individual. The Russian culture does not have this characteristic of "polarity": a struggle, between the state, society, and the individual.[81] The Russian culture does not have this polarity: there the concept of "authority" includes the obligation to follow.
These three traditions in Western culture can be illustrated with a triangle,[82] where the representatives of the three approaches, Libertarianism, Statism, and Traditionalism, are at one of the three corners, with their followers. The non-ideological masses are in the center constituting the "swing-vote," deciding which ideology is going to rule in a democratic fashion, since none of the three approaches is based on "truth." Eventually, as each approach in its turn will lead to a crisis, the public will turn to the next one, thus producing a sort of a rotation of ideologies.
This can be
illustrated with the current situation in the United States. It seems
that for the past two decades or so the crisis of the statist approach has
been felt, and since the 1968 presidential election in each case the more
traditionalist candidate won. Yet, the public is still ambivalent, and keeps
returning statist (i.e. Liberal and Democrat) candidates to Congress,
creating a deadlock of a sort, like the current three ring circus,
the Iran-Contra Congressional hearing in which liberal Democrats are out to get
the traditionalist Republican president,[83]
in a re-play of the Watergate affair some fifteen years ago. This deadlock will
be broken only when the public makes up its collective mind, and elects
followers of the same ideology to both the Congress and the White House.
