WHEN WILL THE TRUTH BE REVEALED?
The Carpathian Basin is the only geographical unit in Central Europe that is completely self-supporting. The land provides everything in abundance. The territory is protected by natural borders that are easily defended. In the past, the peoples who lived in this territory enjoyed peace and prosperity when they were not threatened by the Germans, Tartars, Turks or Austrians. Because of man’s greed and false accusations, the Treaty of Trianon, in 1920, divided this unity. Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and one third of its population to the surrounding states.
It is only as one complete unit that this territory, the Carpathian Basin, is able to provide security and prosperity for the inhabitants. A section of this territory is unable to provide all the needs of the people and therefore, separate from each other, different sections are not viable and are unable to serve as a defense bastion between East and West as Hungary did in the past.
Slowly, with the passing of time, those people who gained the Hungarian territories at Trianon have begun to realize that the Decision at Trianon was unjust. There is still hope that the Trianon borders can be changed. This change will not be brought about by the Great Powers but by the sober realization of the people living in these territories.
Hungarian political analysts, in their studies of the Treaty of Trianon all, without exception, blame the dismemberment of Hungary on the fact that the Hungarians were not given the right to self determination, whereas the Czechs and Slovaks insisted upon this as their right.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Pan-Slav movement took root in Russia but the Hungarian aristocracy ignored the danger of the growing nationalistic demands of the peoples living in Hungary, instigated by the leaders of the Pan-Slav movement. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, in May of 1867, the Russians arranged a Pan-Slav Congress, where 300 Czechs, Serbs and Croatians gathered. They were mainly teachers, professors, priests, bishops and politicians, all persons who had immediate connections with the people. Another Pan-Slav Congress took place on July 13, 1907. These assemblies prepared the way for the First World War.
In 1913, the Belgrade, Bucharest, St. Petersburg agreement was signed which understandably caused great alarm in Austria. The dilemma was to go to war or allow the establishment of a great Slav State right next to her borders. In the European political circles, the view was spread that the Monarchy’s measures regarding peace were „dangerous”. At the same time, there was no mention of the Pan-Slav anti-Austrian activities and demands.
The Slavs developed a very active anti-Austrian propaganda in the media and the person who organized this effort was Izwolszky, the Russian ambassador to France, who succeeded in turning the French against Austria.
„My intention is to influence daily the most important newspapers: Le Temps, Le Journal de Debats, Le Matin, L’Echo de Paris.” Izwolszky wrote this to Sazanov, on December 5, 1912.
The press attacked the measures the Austrians took to defend themselves yet these measures were forced on Austria by the Pan-Slav actions. Austria had to apply these measures to maintain the order inside the state. At the same time, the Russian support of the Serbs was presented in the media as the defense of a just cause.
On February 26, 1913, Izwolszky reported that the money which he received was used to pay Le Temps, L’Éclair, L’Echo de Paris for their services.
Henri Pozzi writes that in July, 1914, the above mentioned newspapers deceived the public and the French Parliament when they stated that the war could not be avoided.
On January 11, 1913, the German ambassador to Rumania, Waldhausen, sent a telegram to his government: „The Russian spies and numbers of secret supporters in Rumania, in the last few months, have grown enormously. All these agents emphasize their intentions to turn the country against Austria. What do they want to accomplish?”
A second telegram states: „The Rumanian-Russian propaganda has almost reached the point, as my Rumanian friends are telling me, where Rumania will break away from the Central Powers. This Russian propaganda has reached every strata of society.”
From the Vienna and Berlin secret archives and materials it has became known how much some French politicians were supporting these Serb and Russian agents.
. . . „The Rumanians do not really like the Russians yet, but they forgive the Russians for taking the territory of Bessarabia from Rumania. Now every Rumanian looks toward Transylvania with longing.”
The press forms the public opinion and is of decisive importance in the formation of the nation’s political view. Izwolsky, the Russian ambassador to France, through the French media, influenced the French ministers. According to Henri Pozzi, Izwolsky worked toward this goal for five years.
We know from the Soviet information, how much the Pan-Slavists paid to bribe the French press. In 1904, the press received 935,785 francs; in 1905, 2,014,161 francs; between 1905 and 1911, 7,894,360 francs; in 1912, 882,140 francs; in 1913, 1,102,500 francs; of this the sum of 374,000 francs was personally handed over in an envelope by Izwolsky. In 1914, they received 1,025,000 francs; in 1915, 931,000 francs; in 1916, 1,153,225 francs; of this 100,000 went to the Agence des Balkans. Between 1909 and 1912, Serbia gave France 275,000 francs from the money that she received from Russia. Of this money, Le Journal des Débats and Le Temps together received 150,000 francs. In 1913, the bribe of 700,000 francs was received of which 230,000 francs was given to Le Temps and l’Agence des Balkans. In 1914, of the 760,000 francs which were received, 437,000 were given to Le Temps and l’Agence des Balkans; 45,000 francs were given to Le Figaro; 15,000 to Le Radical; 50,000 francs to Charles Humbert, the director of Le Journal and 60,000 francs to Le Journal des Débats. Stefanovics, the Serbian agent in Paris, believed that the above-mentioned numbers, during the time of the Peace Conference, increased tenfold. In order to the opportunity to annex Fiume, the Serbians gave Le Temps 3 million francs. In August of 1932, the Yugoslav press office in Paris, at 20 Boulevard de Courcelles, received 6 million dinars. The Belgrade Government had at their disposal 25 million francs (60 million dinars) for the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior, which they could spend on propaganda for the Serb claims. Czechoslovakia used almost twice as much money for their purpose as Yugoslavia. Here we do not count that basic money which the three Little Entente countries collected together in Geneva, in 1934, and which was administered by Benes. „Twenty years earlier, the Russian ‘envelopes’ were handed over personally.”
The pro-Slavists created the Agence des Balkans publishing company, which was one of the branches of Le Temps. The two worked together. They were knowingly falsifying material for payment and they destroyed a country which had defended Europe for a millennium. Pozzi writes: „We should feel nausea and contempt if we look at the editions of Le Temps, Le Journal, l’Éclair, le Matin, Le Journal des Debats, L’Echo de Paris, and Le Figaro in the year before the beginning of the war. The press tendentiously formed the public opinion with lies. The French people knew only as much of the events as the Serb and Russian agents allowed them to know.” 
On March 11, 1914, at a lecture by André Tardieu in Bucharest, the French ambassador, the Rumanian president, Rumanian foreign minister and the commander of the Rumanian army were present. The title of his lecture was „Transylvania: Rumania’s Alsace-Lorraine”. The title and the lecture itself were a provocation to Austria. The goal of Tardieu’s lecture was to convince the Rumanian chauvinist and imperialistic circles to support the Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists. Izwolsky and Veznic informed Tardieu about Sazonov and the Belgrade Black Hand plan. Pozzi says that Tardieu knew that the war against the Monarchy was definite and it was only a question of months or weeks before it broke out. 
Tardieu, who was the spokesman for the Quai D’Orsay, was a big influence on Rumania because, through him, the Rumanians felt a support behind them against Austria-Hungary. These anti-Austria-Hungary politics were started by the Russians. The Russian propaganda tactics were taken over by the leaders of the Little Entente, who used them against Austria and also to annex Hungarian territories. The Serb preparation for war was well-hidden from the people of the world. The Serb political demands forced Austria to step up with a strict demand against Serbia but as soon as that happened, the Russian government could not stand by idly. „Austria (not Hungary) informed Russia that she would stop the formation of the Great Slav State beside her borders.”
Serbia, Rumania and Greece renewed their secret agreement of 1912, which stated that Greece and Rumania, in the case of a Serbian-Austrian war, would go to the aid of Serbia.
In July and August, 1913, at the Peace Conference at Bucharest, Spalaikovic, the leader of the Serb delegation, declared: „Bulgaria had to become the ally of Rumania and Serbia so that she could help these two powers to attain their nationalistic goals against the Monarchy.”
If we read through the decisions of Trianon, then we wonder how it was possible that the Great Powers could have been misled to such a great extent. How was it that they did not know any Hungarian history? How could the French and the English trust the Little Entente and how can they trust that they will take the responsibility to protect Europe in the future?
At the time of the negotiations at Trianon, the principle of Self Determination was a well accepted term which was regarded as important when the Rumanians, Serbs and Slovaks were considering border changes. The Allies even regarded this for the benefit of these people although it was later proven that only their own people took part in the voting. For example, in Túrócszentmárton, a Hungarian territory, only the Slovak people were allowed to vote. On October 9, 1918, the Czech representatives walked out of the Viennese Reichsrat. On October 14, Benes informed the Allies that the temporary government of Czechoslovakia was officially formed. On October 15, the French government accepted the temporary Czechoslovak government. On October 18, President Wilson rejected the peace proposal of the Monarchy, which was the plan to create a federation of the Czech, Slovak and Yugoslav states. Instead of this proposal he accepted the government of Czechoslovakia. On October 28, the Czech National Council and the leaders of the four Czech parties, declared the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. On October 30, at the meeting of the Slovak Nationality Council at Túrócszentmárton, 90 Protestant and 15 Roman Catholic Slovak delegates declared Felvidék (Slovensko) to be annexed from Hungary. This Declaration of Independence of Slovakia, was accepted in 1920 as “the will of the people”, as a basis for giving Felvidék to Czechoslovakia. How could this be recognized as the will of the people when only Slovak delegates were given the vote and Hungarians were excluded?
President Wilson retracted his support for self-determination, announcing that the plebiscite would not be applied to the minorities in the Monarchy. General Smuts, the South African representative, vehemently opposed Wilson’s change of mind. He questioned why Transylvania, Felvidék, Ruthenia, Croatia and Slovenia could not exercise the plebiscite, while Silesia, Posen, the Saar province and Schleswig-Holstein were allowed to do so. The representatives of Japan, Poland and the British dominions supported General Smuts in his request for a plebiscite in the above-mentioned territories. Later, the Italian representative, Francisco Nitti, joined this group and demanded the renegotiation of these territories. He objected that the Serbs, Czechs and Rumanians received huge territories and huge numbers of population without a plebiscite. When Hungary was demanding a plebiscite in Felvidék, it was flatly rejected because Tardieu knew that the plebiscite would be favorable to the Hungarians. Tardieu, in his memoirs, stated: „We had to chose a plebiscite or the establishment of Czechoslovakia.”
President Wilson’s knowledge of Europe was shockingly lacking. He was just a toy in the hands of others, which they knew how to use. In 1924, Tamas Masaryk stated:
„On July 30, 1918, in Pittsburgh, I supported that ‘agreement’ which the representatives of the Slovak Americans and the Czech emigrants made in Cleveland on May 17, 1915. This agreement served the demands of a small group of Slavs. God knows what kind of a childish thing they were dreaming of, some kind of Slovakia which would have autonomy, its own administration, independent parliament and jurisdiction, their own schools, etc. . . Without any hesitation, I supported these Slovak demands in the name of the Czech people.
„This agreement was like an individual agreement made by only a few emigrants. Except for two of them, they were American citizens. There was no reason that I should not sign this worthless paper, especially since this ‘agreement’ was made on a holiday. This under American law makes it invalid.”
Masaryk silenced the truth. In Cleveland and in Pittsburgh the Slovak-Americans were demanding an independent Slovakia within Czechoslovakia. This was accepted when they signed the agreement. Here is the proof: „The Slovak-American League today made a declaration according to which they are willing to work together with the Czech state, which includes Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia, on condition that the constitution of this state will assure the Slovak autonomy.”
This was that „worthless paper” which Masaryk referred to, which changed the map of Europe. Wilson, based on this agreement, believed in the brotherly unification of the Slovak and Czech people to create Czechoslovakia. After Wilson had accepted this agreement, the Trianon Conference also accepted it. How well that brotherly unification worked can be shown by the break up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, into the Czech State and Slovakia.
How was it possible that the agreement at Cleveland was officially accepted? In Cleveland, just the emigrant Slovak-Americans voted. What happened to the Hungarians’ right to vote? They were 30% of the populace of Felvidék, which became Slovakia. How could an emigrant league vote in the name of the people of the motherland? (Even today, the emigrant Hungarians are not allowed to vote in Hungarian matters, and their voice is not heard.)
On October 16, 1918, Emperor Charles I. promised autonomy to all the minorities and with this action he solved the problems of the “suppressed” minorities. In this way, he thwarted the plans of the Slavs to dissolve the Monarchy on the grounds of minority suppression. The Slavs then became scared and made even more efforts to prevent this promised autonomy from actually materializing. They ignored his announcement and simply blamed the Monarchy for the outbreak of war. Masaryk traveled to Washington and told President Wilson that the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he had accepted, could not be nullified. Wilson told the Emperor that the Pittsburgh Agreement was final and that there was no way to maintain the Monarchy. He also declared that no plebiscites were to be allowed. In this way Wilson retracted his principle of the right of self-determination. The Hungarian soldiers and their leaders, trusting in the Conference to allow a plebiscite to take place, laid down their arms.
Another important example of the carelessness of the western politicians at Trianon, was that many of them did not take part in the negotiations but came to enjoy themselves and to pursue their own business interests.
„On February 5, 1919, at the suggestion of Benes, the Czechs announced the desire to annex the city of Kassa, which was populated almost completely by Hungarians, giving as their reason that it was a Czech city. Lord Balfour, who was informed in time by his Hungarian friends, made a speech on behalf of the Hungarians and his convincing arguments had a great effect on the representatives, even on Clemenceau who decided to send an unbiased committee to Kassa to check over the claims of Benes. Benes, as a skillful player, immediately supported this decision. According to a strategy proposed by Colonel House, two Americans were appointed to this committee, Robert Kamev and Edward Karmezin. In Kassa, which was occupied by Czechs, this committee was received by Secac, the county manager and Hanzalik of the Czech police.
„The two Americans were originally Czechs. One of them had become an American citizen two years earlier, the other only eight months earlier. Obviously, nobody in Trianon was aware of this. Both of these officials had been childhood friends of Benes.
„Hanzalik revealed what happened to the delegation at Kassa. With a lengthy testimony, as the audience laughed out loud, he described how he went with the committee of experts at Kassa, into the first tavern and for a whole week they enjoyed themselves at the expense of the Conference.
„This report. which supports the statements of Benes that Kassa was a Czech city, was composed by Hanzalik in one of the rooms of the Hotel Schalk. Because of this statement which is kept in the archives of the Peace Treaty as a serious proof, the fate of more than one hundred thousand Hungarians was decided and, without any further examination, the city of Kassa was annexed to Czechoslovakia.”
In order to influence the decision makers at Trianon, the Rumanians and Serbs resorted to unusual means. Pozzi says that first the Rumanian women appeared in the dining-rooms of the hotels at Trianon and Versailles. „Take Ionescu and Bratianu brought a ring of beautiful women to the defense of the true cause. These women were the members of the Bucharest elite. They all fought for the cause of expanding the power of Rumania. These ravishing patriotic women constantly pressed their affections on the experts, politicians and diplomats of the Conference to further the Rumanian cause.” Prince Cantacuseno smilingly told Pozzi, „Really, this outstanding idea could only have come from TAKE. Poor Antonescu almost stopped breathing when Clemenceau congratulated him on the beautiful women.”
The American wives of the Serb diplomats and their women friends also dangerously disturbed the composure of the decision makers of the conference. The whole of Paris admired the wife of the Serb ambassador, Veznic. In the evenings, this ravishing woman obtained serious and passionate friends for the Serb cause. Her salon was visited constantly by statesmen, diplomats and rich men. It looks as if Queen Marie of Rumania contributed to Rumania’s territorial gains, because her lady-in-waiting, Mabel Potter Daggett, writes:
„A gentleman kissed her hand and the measure of state is on the way. Comes a day when it is consummated at last. Someone thinks he did it, a senator, a prime minister, a king, a crown-consul, or perhaps it is a whole parliament of men. That’s the way she lets them feel. Brilliant minds! She applauds. Their names get written in government reports. History will take care of hers. Though on the stage of Rumanian political affairs the lady has not appeared at all, yet listen!! From the wings there is sometimes the swish of a red kilted-skirt, the echo of a woman’s soft laughter.”
Plans for the division of Hungary began to be discussed well before the final Treaty Negotiations, even before the outbreak of the First World War. Around the middle of June, 1914, five days before the assassination in Sarajevo, it became clear that Rumania would join with the Russian instigated anti-Hungarian Entente. This was already planned in 1913 but materialized when the Russian Czar Nicholas II., accompanied by Sazonov, visited the Rumanian Royal Family. This alliance took place in the absence of the Rumanian King Carol, who was of German origin. His nephew Prince Ferdinand and Ferdinand’s wife, Princess Marie represented Rumania. Sazonov asked Bratianu what conditions the Rumanians would ask for declaring war against Austria-Hungary. Bratianu stated that they would demand the whole of Transylvania, the Hungarian territory of the Bánát and half of the Austrian Bukovina. They also demanded that Russia guarantee the territorial integrity of Rumania and pay the cost of the war preparations. On June 24, Take Ionescu, in a secret telegram, informed Tardieu and Edgar Röels of the success of the negotiations with Rumania: „Complete agreement between Sazonov and Bratianu. At yesterday’s meeting, the agreement was effected in the best mutual interest. Rumania’s rightful claim to Transylvania, the Bánát and Bukovina was acknowledged.”
On July 31, 1914, Bratianu informed Sazonov that Rumania would accept the Russian proposals. The next day, the telegram was sent to the French newspapers and a copy of this telegram can still be found in the archives of the Quai D’Orsay. Pozzi says that the final text of the plan for the Russian-Rumanian alliance is to be found for the first time in his book: A századunk bűnösei, p. 192. No other historians have mentioned it, not even Poincaré. The following is the final text:
„By signing this agreement, Rumania agrees that, with her full army, she will take part in the war which Russia has declared against Austria-Hungary . . .– . . . Russia, at the same time, agrees that she will not make peace with Austria-Hungary until the Dual Monarchy gives those territories to Rumania where Rumanians are living.”
On August 17, 1916, France, Britain, Italy and Russia, made a secret agreement to give all those territories to Rumania which she had demanded. Many historians and politicians want to silence the fact that Rumania went into the war as an ally of Russia. They would rather mention that Rumania went into the war on her own. If they would accept the truth, that the anti-Austrian alliance between Russia and Rumania existed well before the war, then it would become public knowledge that Russia worked with a well-prepared plan which caused the war. This would mean that the responsibility for the outbreak of war would be Russia’s. If these preconditions had been public knowledge, if Rumania’s demands to her allies as conditions for entering a so-called „just war” were publicly known, then everybody would have learned that the „re-annexation” of Hungarian territories to Rumania was nothing more than a forceful conquest. Telegram of Edgar Roels: „If Rumania wishes to receive what we promised her, then she has to decide once and for all. The peace will come in two months and Bratianu has to understand the promise that we gave him would be kept only if Rumania takes part on the side of the Entente. Here they are wondering why Rumania has been vacillating for such a long time in keeping her promises.”
France wanted Rumania as an active military partner at the Peace Negotiations on the Entente side. There was an obstacle to Rumania becoming the comrade-in-arms of France in that, six months before the end of the war, Rumania had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers in Bucharest and had become an ally of Germany. With this act she nullified the secret agreement with the Entente powers that she had signed at Bucharest in 1916. This meant that Rumania lost her right to obtain the territories, which were promised to her in that secret agreement. So to demonstrate that she was a military ally of the Entente, Rumania mobilized her army and attacked the retreating German Commander, General Mackensen from behind. The German army had already surrendered the day after Alexandru Morghilon resigned and the Hungarian army had laid down their arms a week before that. The French foreign ministry only succeeded at the last minute in persuading the Entente to accept Rumania as an equal partner. Ernő Raffay says that it is obvious that Rumania, with armed force, intended to achieve the goal that she was unable to achieve in 1916, the annexation of Transylvania and to extend her border to the one promised her at the secret treaty. If Rumania had reached that goal, the present Hungarian territory to the east of the Tisza would be Rumanian territory now.
On December, 1, 1918, at the Rumanian National Assembly at Gyulafehérvár, the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians declared that they wanted to join the Rumanian kingdom forever. On December 13, this decision was seconded by the Consiliul Dirigent. This was a breach of international law because the International Peace Treaty Conference had not yet assembled so they could not have accepted it. There were approximately 100,000 Transylvanian Rumanians who took part in the Rumanian National Assembly. The rest of the populace of this territory, Serbs, Saxons and Hungarians were not allowed to take part in this assembly. This makes it illegal. Later, it came to public knowledge that this National Assembly was arranged by the Royal Rumanian Government through the Transylvanian Rumanian leaders. It is obvious that the Rumanians intended to influence the decisions of the Peace Treaty.
The Hungarian Prime Minister, Dénes Berinkey, declared that the only solution to the dispute was the plebiscite which was denied. Instead of this, it was suggested that those territories which the Hungarians occupied when they entered the Carpathian Basin, be taken away from Hungary and „given back” to the „rightful owners”, i.e. the peoples of the Successor States, the Czechoslovaks, Serbs and Rumanians. So it became clear that the anti-Hungarian politics of the Successor States had reached their goal among the Entente politicians who were unfamiliar with the geography and history of Central Europe.
According to Berinkey’s reports of October 12, November 9 and December 1, 1918, Hungary did not, of her own will, give up Transylvania to Rumania. The Hungarian Government did not acknowledge the National Assembly of Gyulafehérvár because only Rumanians attended it and no Serbs, Saxons or Hungarians. Another reason that we cannot acknowledge the decision of the Rumanian National Assembly is that in 26 counties the Rumanian populace was only 43%. These reasons are enough proof for the rejection of the Gyulafehérvár decision.
The Serbs, the southern Slav people, wanted to form a new state called Yugoslavia (the state of the southern Slavs). Dr. Trumbic said to Pozzi: „First of all I demanded that the Serb government guarantee that the Yugoslav Administrative autonomy should be inviolable and so, in the future, in Great Serbia, the Yugoslavs should retain the rights and privileges which they enjoyed under Hungarian rule.”. . .
37,000 - 47,000 Serb families had arrived in Hungary in 1690, with their patriarch, Arzén III, who was forced to flee from the Turks. They settled in the territory known as the Bánság. On August 21, 1690, Emperor Leopold gave a document to the Serbs, which gave them the protection of the Emperor’s army, allowed them to practice the Greek Orthodox religion and use the calendar of the Greek Orthodox Church. He also allowed them to use their language, relieved them from paying the tithe and exempted them from military service. On December 11, 1690, he informed the Hungarian authorities that as soon as the territory of the Serbs was freed from the Turks, these Serb refugees would return to their own land. We can see that these privileges were given only to the Serbs who came in with Patriarch Arzén, and that they were expected to return to their own land. However, conditions in Hungary were safer for these half-nomad Serbs and they enjoyed the higher cultural level of the people in these southern Hungarian territories, so they decided to remain even after their country was finally freed from the Turks.
Again, between 1737 and 1739, large numbers of Serbs arrived in this territory with their patriarch, Arzen IV. Soon after this, more Serbs, fleeing from the Turks, flooded this area. In 1790, the Serbs came forward with the demand that they officially be given a territory from the Hungarian land as their own. Leopold II. (1790-1792), agreed to grant their demand.
Under what pretext was the Bánság annexed to Yugoslavia in 1920, when the population of that territory was two thirds Hungarian? The Hungarian enemy, Trumbic himself, proved that there was no Hungarian oppression. There was no other reason than the fulfillment of the Pan-Slav ideal which was aided by the lack of knowledge on the part of the politicians, the corruption of the participants at the Peace conference, the power of money and beautiful women.
The Corfu Agreement which the Serb government effected on July 27, 1917, supposedly states that the south Slav minorities desired to join with Serbia. Pozzi says: „This is a barefaced lie and one of the greatest frauds of the age.”
Pozzi brings to the attention of the official politicians and historians that: „it was not the leaders of the Monarchy’s so-called ‘suppressed south Slav minorities’ who negotiated this unification but it was three individuals, Wickham Steed, the foreign correspondent for The Times, Seton Watson, the leader of the Slav propaganda in London and Doctor Trumbic, the former mayor of the Dalmatian city of Zára.” This agreement was signed on July 27, 1917, in the name of the Yugoslavs by Trumbic, and in the name of the Serbs by Pasic. On July 4, 1932, Pozzi spoke with Trumbic in Zagreb and asked him to tell him in detail about his role in the Corfu Agreement. This interview came to the knowledge of the Pan Slav authorities and therefore the Serbs arrested Trumbic, accusing him of working against the state. The 70 year old Trumbic was imprisoned at Mitrovic for four months. He was fed every other day, the soles of his feet were beaten regularly with a stick, his male organs were tortured and he left the prison half dead after four months. Trumbic was not a well-known person. Neither the Croatians nor the Slovenes knew him. Therefore he was not a trusted representative of the people.
The three individuals who made the Corfu Agreement did not represent the people and offended the people’s right to self determination when they appointed themselves to make the agreement. With this act, five million Austro-Hungarian, Slovene and Croat Catholics were placed into servitude. The Corfu Agreement was the reason that the Allied Powers at Trianon, believing that this was the will of the people, took this territory from Hungary and gave it to the Serbs. The Croatians had been demanding the plebiscite since July, 1917. Trumbic explained his action at Corfu: „I would like to ask my homeland to forgive me. I could not have known, I could not have foreseen the results of my mistake.”
Those who created the Corfu Agreement did it with the intention of preventing the Italians from possessing the Adriatic shoreline. They announced publicly that this agreement was made for the sake of the minorities rather than the interest of the government. This announcement was timed to come out right at the Peace Conference. This time Britain and France did not regard the demands of Italy so their plan materialized.
Seton Watson wrote about the Corfu Agreement in the London Review of Reviews five years later, in 1923. He stated that the „suppressed minorities” were represented by a few dozen Croatians, Slovenes, Illyrians, and Serb emigrants and these were joined by a few Czech soldiers who were Italian prisoners of war. He told Pozzi that the Frenchman, Magat, the Director of the Corfu Press, said, „This was the height of absurdity, but it was a great success!”
Seton Watson and Stefan Osusky managed to persuade the leaders of the Slav representatives who were still under foreign oppression to accept the Corfu and London agreements. Then, on April 8, 1918, by public acclamation they made them accept the Rome Declaration. In this Declaration, the assembly announced that all the Yugoslavs wanted to join Great Serbia. At the same time, they declared to be traitors and suppressors those who wanted to declare an independent State of Croatia, Slovenia and the Adriatic possessions. The Entente powers blindly trusted the Rome Declaration and voted that Czechoslovakia and Great Serbia come into existence. This was why the Wilsonian principle of the real self-determination of the people did not materialize. This is how the South Slav (Yugoslav) peoples unified under the free hand of Serbia.
Wilson himself announced, before he went to the Peace Conference that the right to self-determination did not apply to the minorities of the Monarchy. This announcement came as a tremendous surprise to the delegates at the Conference. Wilson, in October 1918, wrote to Emperor Charles I. that the minorities of the Monarchy, in the last months of the war, had officially expressed their desires through their authorized representatives in Corfu, Rome and Pittsburgh. Therefore the Conference had no other duty than to accept these desires. Clemenceau was not interested in „the secondary questions”. He was never interested in the Central European questions. He only wanted the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire.
Lloyd George opposed the dissolution of the Monarchy: „The dismemberment of Austria and Hungary is not the goal of this war.” However, Masaryk and Tardieu convinced him to drop his opposition. They promised to give Britain concessions in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia and they promised to give special attention to Britain when the German colonies were divided up. When Lloyd George realized his mistake, in accepting the dissolution of the Monarchy, it was too late.
The Hungarian delegation arrived at the Chateau Madrid in Neuilly on January 7, 1920, where they were placed under a strict military guard, as if they were common criminals. The Hungarian delegates sent eight studies to the Conference, with all kinds of information and maps. These data proved that Hungary was blameless in the outbreak of the war, described Hungary’s role in the history of Europe and explained why the history of Hungary is not well known among the Western European nations. These studies showed that, for centuries, Hungary was not allowed to have a foreign policy, not even foreign trade, under the Hapsburg rule. Under public law, Hungary and Austria were separate states in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The unity of Austria was a result of the dynastic politics whereas Hungary had already existed as a unified state for a thousand years.
The Hungarian delegation mentioned in the studies sent to the Congress that, if Hungary were carved up, then instead of one multi-national state, they would create three multi-national states. If they took into account the interests of these three states the conflicting interests would be multiplied. The historic Hungarian borders were unpopulated mountain ranges. The borders of the new artificial states would cut through economic centers and such borders would not seem to be secure in the future. If Hungary were carved up, it would make it impossible to protect Hungary against flood and the pollution of the waterways. There would be a risk of the Successor States poisoning the drinking water for Hungary.
The Entente powers disregarded every Hungarian argument. The Conference, on the last day, January 16, allowed Count Albert Apponyi to speak to the members, but they limited the length of his speech. The decision had already been made and there was no possibility for change. There were only two possibilities, to accept the decision or refuse it. Just as Apponyi said, „The only choice left for the country is to commit suicide so that they will not kill her” because the territory which would remain for Hungary would be unable to survive.
Apponyi said that the conditions of the Peace Treaty opposed the principles that the Allied Forces had advocated. They opposed the interests of Europe. They opposed the requirements of civilization. They opposed the economic reconstruction, and general human interest. He said that the newly formed states would become heterogeneous states just as Hungary was but they would not have the economic unity of Hungary, which in time would require the re-annexation of these territories to Hungary. Another reason that the mutilation should not occur was that the Successor States, who were culturally inferior, by every means would apply oppression on the Hungarian people who would come under their rule. This would cause the cultural standards on these territories to decline. This would also cause a constant unrest between the peoples. He also emphasized that if the Conference favored the Hungarian proposals, then Hungary would provide a very wide cultural autonomy and, depending on the geographical possibilities, would give territorial autonomy to these peoples. Transylvania would remain an autonomous country under the Hungarian Crown. He proposed the plebiscite on those territories that were located between the present Historic Hungarian borders and the borders suggested by the Conference, with the exception of Croatia, which had always been an autonomous state. Every person over the age of 21, regardless of sex, and who was living on this territory on November 1, 1918, should be allowed to vote.
Lloyd George felt that Count Albert Apponyi was not strong enough in his demand for a plebiscite: „It was unfortunate that he (Apponyi) did not emphasize the plebiscite on those borderline territories where the Hungarians without question were in the majority and the Borderline Committee annexed these territories to other states for economical and geographical reasons. If he had directed his critics to these territories, there would have been enough material to put him into a strong position which would be indisputable.”
On May 6, the Allied Forces gave the text of the final decision to the Hungarian delegation and the accompanying letter written by President Millerand of France in the name of the Entente. Here is a part of the Millerand letter:
The Allied and Associated Powers have conscientiously studied those documents, which the Hungarian Delegation forwarded to the Congress on the subject of the conditions of Peace. In our examination we were led by the desire to make decisions that serve the truth and those higher interests, which we guard. If the result of this study leads us to disagree with the Hungarian Peace Delegation’s counter-proposals, the only explanation we can offer is that the Allied Powers find it impossible to accept the proposals of the Hungarian delegation. . . .
„But when the Border Committee starts its work and comes to the conclusion that the decisions of the Peace Treaty somewhere . . . . are unjust, and it is in the general interest to correct these injustices, then you (Hungarians) may submit a report to the League of Nations.
„In this case the Allied and Associated Powers will accept that the revisions of the original borders be undertaken in those places where the committee has found that they are unjust. The Allied and Associated Powers trust that this procedure will provide enough possibilities to correct all the injustices where basic objections are brought.”
On January 11, 1935, Millerand, in the Est newspaper denied writing this letter. He forgot that there is a written document to prove that he did so! Pozzi quotes from a letter from Millerand to Lloyd George: „We all definitely acknowledge that there is a possibility of revisions of the Treaty.” When Millerand showed his letter to Clemenceau, Clemenceau said: „We have committed so many merciless acts that now we can at least correct one.”  Because of the promise of possible revisions in the Millerand letter, Hungary signed the Treaty on June 4, 1920. Three weeks later, Millerand, in a circular letter, informed the Border Committee that the duty he had assumed in the name of the Entente was invalid. This letter was dated June 22, 1920.
The Border Committee was disturbed because they had not known of the original letter so they did not know what duty he was referring to. On June 22, 1920, in spite of the circular letter, the Border Committee gave Muraköz to Hungary, because the majority of its population was Hungarian. This decision was accepted by the League of Nations. But because the Serbs had already occupied this territory and would not move out, the Entente Advisory Board allowed them to stay there. Ever since, the Entente has behaved as if the Millerand letter never existed, yet this letter was written in their name.
The Hungarian National Assembly replied to this letter on May 10. This is an excerpt from that letter:
„ . . . When we were demanding the plebiscite, we (Hungarians) were considering the rights of the peoples concerned. We chose that path because we intended to close out every possibility of disagreement. We accepted the plebiscite as a basic principle because it is an unquestionable principle, unparalleled in its effect. We also declared that we would accept in advance the will of the peoples concerned.”
. . . „With this declaration we gave our final answer to the continued accusations that the Hungarian people oppressed their minorities. We will give these people, whom we supposedly oppressed, the choice of where they wish to belong.”
The Allied Powers did not apply to the Hungarians this principle, which they were advocating at the beginning of the war. The French politician Charles Danielou recognized this in an article in The Daily Mail on June 21, 1927.
„Those who intended to apply the principle of self-determination made the biggest mistake when they excluded three million Hungarians. The ratio of the three million in the new states to the eight million who remained in Hungary is too great. Who would believe that these eight million Hungarians would accept a situation where they would be separated forever from the three million Hungarians in the new states? It is especially ironic that the Czech border was pushed 40 kilometers further toward Budapest so that the city would be within firing range of the Czechs. At the same time, Bácska was annexed to Yugoslavia so that Belgrade would be far from the firing range of the Hungarians.”
Some anti-Hungarian propaganda advocates that there were some assemblies where the people were allowed to decide where they wanted to belong but we have to state that these so-called „assemblies” were not representative of the whole population and they were not authorized to make decisions in the name of a particular people.
Finally the Hungarian delegation had to accept the decision of Trianon. The Hungarian Government needed to borrow money to rebuild the country. Their application for a loan was accepted on condition that they sign a document stating that there was no coercion when they signed the Treaty of Trianon and that they had ratified it willingly. They needed the money so they signed the document.
When the Hungarian government signed the Dictated Peace with a knife at their throat, they did that as a result of the letter they received from President Millerand of France. This is the reply of the Hungarian government to Millerand:
“The Hungarian government is convinced that, in the spirit of understanding and development, the disputed questions in the Peace Treaty will be resolved and, in the same manner, all those injustices which are not even mentioned in the letter will be discontinued or perhaps the Great Powers do not regard these as injustices. In this hope, and the knowledge of the difficult situation the country is in, the Hungarian government is forced to sign the Peace Treaty.”
We can see that the Hungarian government, knowing the country’s alarming situation, and at the same time, trusting that the injustices would be discontinued, signed the Treaty. The fact that Hungary was not allowed to be present at the negotiations for the Treaty, and could not defend herself from the accusations, and the fact that decisions were made without her, are all reasons that Hungary is not legally bound to the Treaty, states Ernő Raffay. Thus the struggle for revisions is legal.
The American Congress did not ratify the Treaty of Trianon but made a separate peace treaty with Hungary on August 29, 1921. Even in France the dissatisfaction continued for weeks in the French Parliament, yet they were the ones who created the Treaty of Trianon. The French Parliament ratified the Treaty only on the condition that the French Government would make further examination of the unjust decisions.
The decisive committee report was so long that it would take weeks or longer to study it. However, the delegates were given only a few hours to read it. Lansing was very angry. Because of that Tardieu and Lansing had a strong argument. How is it possible that the trial of a common criminal can take months yet here where the fate of millions was in the balance a decision had to be made within hours? How could new artificial states with artificial borders be created in such a short time and how could they be sure that they would survive?
As long as Hungarians live in the territories of the Successor States, we cannot expect to see democracy there, because these states are afraid that sooner or later, Hungary will demand border revisions. This is why all the Successor States build up their armies to be many times greater than the Hungarian army. The building of this superior force indicates a hidden aggressivity. We can see that in the way that they are now openly demanding more territory from the already mutilated Hungary. This is why, until the injustices of Trianon are set right, there will always be the seed of war in Central Europe. This stress is not caused by the Hungarians, but by the Successor States’ continuous anti-Hungarian policies. None of the states keeps the agreements it signed in regard to the Hungarians living within its borders, not even according them the basic human rights. This is why the Hungarian people have no other choice than to demand revision.
In 1975, the final clauses of the Helsinki agreement allowed the peaceful revision of borders. Therefore it is legal to talk about the subject of revision.
Masaryk, the President of the Czech Republic, often expressed his regret about Benes’s forceful Trianon victory and stated to Polson Newmann, the editor in chief of the English journal The XX. Century, on August 30, 1930,: “I am very willing to take into consideration a revision of the present borders for the benefit of Hungary.”
Today we cannot avoid the revision of Trianon because, of those nations which were created at Trianon, Czechoslovakia no longer exists. The Treaty was not made with Slovakia. Yugoslavia of 1920 no longer exists either because Croatia has separated from it unable to withstand the Serb oppression. Benes gave Ruthenia to the Soviets so that Pan-Slavism could enter into the heart of Europe. The Soviet Union has also dissolved. The Ukraine never owned Ruthenia. Rumania because of her politics of assimilation, taking away the rights of the minorities, has proved that she cannot rule Transylvania. This is why the Szeklers and the Transylvanian Hungarians now demand the autonomy of Transylvania, which would have a good economical connection with Hungary.
Many foreign politicians have spoken out against the injustices committed against Hungary at Trianon and some have even supported a revision of the borders. For example:
Philippe Gaillant wrote in 1968:
“The Treaties of Trianon and St. Germain committed the first crimes against the geography and history of the Danube Valley. Everything went according the wishes of the victors who here, paradoxically broke their own principle of self determination. They carved up Hungary in the actual meaning of the word. It is enough to glance at the map and it is understandable why there is no longer a land which could defend the civilization of Western Europe from the Russians. When the time comes, and it will come, to rebuild a strong Europe, there will have to be functionally regulated connections between the peoples of the Danube Valley, so that that territory would become the bastion of the West and would defend Europe against the remaining barbarians.”
Sir Robert Gower, Member of the British Parliament, wrote:
“The Entente powers acknowledged the Czechoslovak Republic in the summer of 1918. It is also known that on August 16, 1916, in the secret agreements, they promised Rumania the entire territory of Transylvania and a significant part of the Hungarian Plain. At the meeting of the highest council of the Entente in June 1918, they announced, as a military goal, the establishment of the State of Yugoslavia. That goal could only be achieved by the dismemberment of Hungary. They made a decision over a country without a hearing.”
“It is difficult to understand why the Hungarian request was rejected when it was based on the Wilsonian principles. That opinion that in the case of a plebiscite, the nationality negotiations would be unnecessary, cannot be accepted. That fact that three and a half million Hungarians were cut off from their motherland can in no way be justified.”
Francesco Nitti, Prime Minister of Italy, stated:
“In Trianon, the great intriguers of international politics met by appointment. Europe was pushed into the serious danger of decadence, not so much by the war as by the Peace Treaty. The right of self-determination, which the Entente echoed during the war, was just a lying formula, which they advocated in the time of danger. They did that to win the trust of all those involved but they did not make the Peace Treaty as they had promised. Those who made the agreements betrayed the concept for which men sacrificed their lives. The conditions which were forced upon the defeated nations were humiliating. No Englishman, Frenchman or Italian would accept for his own country such conditions which were forced upon Hungary. From a Cardinal Primate to a simple peasant there is no Hungarian, who is worthy of the name, who could accept these conditions.”
 Kostya, Sándor: A Felvidék, Budapest, 1990, p. 26
 Pozzi, Henri: Századunk bűnösei, p.99; (Izwolszky to Sazonov: Paris December 5, 1912, Russian Diplomatic Documents, State Publisher, Moscow and St. Petersburg, 1922)
 Pozzi, p.100; Raffalovics to Izwolszky, February 26, 1913, Russian Diplomatic Documents
 Ibid. p.104; Jan. 11, 1913, telegram from Waldhausen from Bucharest
 Ibid. p.104; Telegram No 33. March 1, 1913, Z. 22. 3rd. Document package, Athens
 Ibid. p.105; Telegram No.66, September 16, 1913, from the castle of Szinaja
 Pozzi, p. 140-141; Stefanovics tables.
 Pozzi, p.142
 Ibid. p.142; Izwolsky to Sazanov: The Black Book, December 5, 1912
 Pozzi, p. 146
 Pozzi, p. 148
 Ibid. p. 171; telegram from George Lewis, French ambassador to St. Petersburg, February 9 and 10, 1913 (Yellow Book , Telegram No. 104-105
 Pozzi, p. 173
 Ibid. p.173; Telegram no. 294 from Blondel, the French ambassador to Bucharest
 Ibid. p. 247; Viorel Tilea: L’Activité Diplomatique de la Roumanie de Novembre 1919 a 1920
 Pozzi, Op. Cit. p. 224; Tardieu: La Paix, 1921
 Ibid. p.248; T.G. Masaryk: The Making of a State, London, 1924, p. 229
 Pozzi, Op. Cit. p. 248-249; Le Temps, February 4, 1910. La Guerre Social, 1915, II. 3
 Pozzi, p. 249
 Pozzi, p. 250
 Pozzi, p. 222
 Pozzi, p. 266-267
 Pozzi, p. 215
 Pozzi, p. 215
 Pozzi, p. 215
 Potter Daggett, Mabel: Marie of Romania, p.290-291
 Pozzi, Op. Cit. p. 189; Sazonov: Sechs Schwere Jahre, Berlin, 1927, Memorandum to the Czar, June 24, 1914, Russian Diplomatic Archives
 Pozzi, p. 189
 Ibid. p. 192; Archives of the Empire, St. Petersburg, August 7, 1914, Black Book , Sazonov: Sechs Schwere Jahre
 Ibid. p. 193; Rumania before the Peace Conference: Documents de la Conférence Official; Rumanian publication Paris 1919. Annexe A.
 Ibid. p. 196; Telegram to Take Ionescu, from Bordeaux, September 15, 1914, the archives of the Agence des Balkans, S.R. 11/37
 Raffay, Ernő: Magyar Tragédia; Trianon 75 éve, Budapest, 1996. p. 75
 Raffay, p. 71
 Pozzi, p. 231
 Ibid. p. 22; The New Universal Encyclopedia, edited by Sir John Hammerton, The Educational Book Co. London, Vol. 9, p. 7451.
 Pozzi, p. 232
 Pozzi, p. 228
 Pozzi, p. 228
 Ibid. p.232; Poincaré: Victoire et Armistice, p. 365
 Pozzi, p. 233
 Pozzi, p.233
 Pozzi, p. 236-237
 Pozzi, p. 237
 Pozzi, Op. Cit. p.. 238; Poincaré, Op. Cit. p. 406-407
 Pozzi, p. 244
 Ibid. p. 244; Poincaré, Op. Cit. p. 429
 Pozzi, p. 276
 Pozzi, p. 245
 Raffay, p.151
 Raffay, p. 155-156
 Raffay, p. 159
 Raffay, p. 194
 Raffay, p. 162
 Pozzi, Henri: Szazadunk bűnösei, 1936, translated by Dr. Frigyes Marjay, Budapest, p.292; Letter to Lloyd George
 Pozzi, p. 293
 Pozzi, p. 293
 Pozzi, p. 293
 Raffay, p.164
 Raffay, p.179
 Raffay, Ernő: Magyar Tragédia, Trianon 75 éve, p. 45
 Ibid. p. 220; Nicholson, Harold, British delegate: Peacemaking, 1919,
 Pozzi,Henri: Századunk bűnösei, p. 298
 Kollányi, Károly: A Kárpátmedence Európában, Budapest, 1991, p. 17; Gaillant, Philippe: Fallait-il détruire l’Autriche-Hongrie? – la Revue du Xxme. Siecle Féderation, no. 395, decembre, 1968
 Ibid. p. 18; Gower, Sir Robert: La Révision du Traité de Trianon, Paris, 1937
 Ibid. p. 21; Nitti, Francesco: La Paix et suivantes, Paris, 1925