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(Die Südslavische Frage)

L. v. Südland


Introduction by Dr. Sándor Balogh





This Introduction and the attached review of a Croatian author's work were published in Europe in early 1950's, and were discovered recently.



Book review


The structure of the Monarchy was in a state of collapse, as a result of the insurrections that had erupted in the Balkans, when a book was published in Vienna in 1918, which was a belated cry of alarm. This book was the culmination of 20 years of painstaking research, whose goal was to enlighten the world to the dark milieu of the Balkans, where fanatics, influenced by the Byzantine ideology, had worked for decades, even centuries, with an unprecedented purposefulness to bring the entire Southern Slav world under their power.

Serbia and the Serbs played the principal role in that enormous power struggle. The above-mentioned book shed light on the motivation, the secret particulars and Byzantine characteristics of this role in the light of history, so expertly and with a captivating power the likes of which had never been seen before.

Shortly after this monumental historical work appeared, the Monarchy collapsed and, as a result, the book could not be circulated among the population. The Entente Committee for the Cease-fire, which arrived in Vienna, acceded to the demands of the Serbs, and ordered the confiscation and shredding of all books in the bookstores. Later, the Serb Royal Embassy did all it could to find any remaining copies and destroy them. In the confusing time following the collapse of the Monarchy, this book that had, in effect, been sentenced to death, had no effect and it fell into oblivion.

However it was not only the book that was sentenced to death, but also the author, Dr. Ivo Pilar, a Viennese functionary of Croatian origin. Referring to his origin and knowledge of the Balkan situation, he published the book under the pseudonym of L. von Südland [i.e. Southern Land]. The death sentence was not imposed by a court but was dictated by the Balkan thirst for revenge and the execution could be carried out only ten years later. It took that much time for those who were on his trail to find out who he was and where he lived. The execution was simple and in the style of the Balkans. He was tricked into a side street in Zagreb and was thrown from a third-floor window. After the fall, he was still alive, so he was beaten to death.

We wish to save the work- at least a part of it - of the writer who was sentenced to death along with his book, and we believe that we provide a useful service for all those who are interested in the Southern Slav political events and the spiritual motivation behind them. Events change in the life of nations but the historical and spiritual motivations usually remain the same. If we recognize these then we can more easily and with greater certainty judge the present and predict the future. In spite of the fact that it seems to be outdated, we believe that Südland's work counts as a rarity and addresses issues of current interest.
                                                            a K und K (Kaiser and King, i.e. an Austrian Army) officer
Note: Both the reviewed book and its author are real. There is an "Ivo Pilar" Institute of Social Sciences, founded by the Council of the University of Zagreb in 1991. It functions under the auspices of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Croatia. The Institute, which provides support for research, brings together 72 full-time employees and over 100 research associates and advisors. It also integrates the activities of three regional centers. (
According to Internet information, there was a new edition of the book printed: L. V. Sudland, South -Slav Question. Display of Complete Question, Edition of Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb 1943. We have not been able to locate copies either of the 1943 edition or the original.
More information about Pilar-Südland or his book can be found on the internet search engine under Ivo Pilar or L. von Sudland.
* * * * * *


(Die Südslavische Frage)
L. v. Südland
Vienna, 1918 Mainz-Verlag


In his book, in order to give a thorough explanation, Südland discusses the problem of all the Southern Slavs. The author, as he writes in his introduction, from the time he was a child, had the opportunity to visit all the states of the Balkans and become familiar with the people, their language and their customs. Slowly the research of the Southern Slavs became a passion for him. This stimulated him to find explanations for all the incomprehensible, invisible, and insurmountable obstacles which constantly faced all those who, because of their positions, wanted to create a lasting peace between the peoples living there. For many years, he studied the literature, history and politics of the Southern Slavs. He collected their brochures, newspaper clippings, and studied sociological and anthropological articles. He visited the ancient historic sites of the Balkans, in order to conduct his research in the original locations and speak to the local people.


In spite of all his efforts and detailed research, in the early decades he was unable to establish a comprehensive picture of the development of the Southern Slavs. . . . "It was only when we researched the religious history of the Balkan Peninsula and when we developed a knowledge of Byzantine history and Byzantine spiritual life, that we recognized the content of the Byzantine philosophy which was difficult to understand. Then the cataracts fell from our eyes and only then we noticed the horrible and shackling truth in its total nakedness," states Südland.


Südland's recognition of the Byzantine philosophy is a theme which is repeated throughout the whole book and he shows how the Byzantine Empire influenced the history of the Serbs. "This book is the cry of a tortured soul" he writes in his introduction, "which over the course of twenty years has seen the basic power of the Monarchy in the South gradually disappear . . . May this book be the vox clamantis in deserto (a voice crying in the desert) so that things down there may not continue in this way, because otherwise the state will suffer a loss that cannot be recovered."

The voice crying in the desert came too late but, even now, more than three decades later, it is still worth bearing in mind the writer's warning. Of course, in a series of excerpts, we can get only a pale picture of the outstanding work. Our first intention is that, instead of historical facts, we will give a historical analysis of the facts.


Südland used more than 200 sources in preparation for his book. The book is divided into ten chapters.

I. The Origin of the Balkan Slavs

II. The Croatians and the Establishment of Croatia.

III. The Serbs and the Establishment of Serbia

IV. The Establishment of Bosnia

V. Catholicism and Orthodoxy

VI: What is the core of the Southern Slav Question?

VII. The Monarchy and the Southern Slavs.

VIII. Efforts toward Croatian-Serb Unification

IX. The Solution to the Southern Slav Problem

X. Bibliography


In this review we will examine the chapters underlined.


We wish to inform you that Südland does not show any particular sympathy toward the Hungarians. However he praises the Hungarian political talent. We should emphasize especially his great admiration and esteem for the Bosnian-Hungarian governor, Benjamin Kállay, whom Südland considered the greatest expert on the Serbian question, even in international context. Chapter IX. provides a solution to the Southern Slav problem, according to which, from the states of Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Hezegovina, a separate state should have been formed and this state, along with the continued Monarchy, would have provided the status of a co-dominium to establish a balance of power.


(pp. 233-296)


In the first part of this chapter the author points out the historical reasons that the two churches became separate. At the same time, he states that they were not religious reasons but rather political.


The first reason was the difference in the disposition of the Greek and Roman peoples and the different pattern of development of the two peoples. The Greeks' cultural development was many-sided because of the very rich and very different levels of influence from the Near East. At the same time, this prevented the inner unity of the Greek people, so they never became authoritative. Rome, on the other hand, did not have as many outside influences. This is why we can state that the Roman culture was not many-sided and therefore the political development was more unified and more powerful. This made Rome more suitable to become an outstanding state, the likes of which had never before been seen in history.


"The more powerful Rome conquered Hellas. This is when the hatred between the Romans and the Greeks began. The Romans despised the 'graeculus mendax'. The Greeks despised the uncultured Roman warriors and the hard politicians, who were unwilling to acknowledge that they could not live without the Greek culture."


Another important reason for the eventual separation was that there was a difference between how the Romans and the Greeks perceived the idea of statehood. For the Greeks the idea of state meant that the individual was totally subordinate to the state. Plato's idea of state came from this concept. The Roman concept of state was the opposite; it protected individual self-determination within the law.


Except for the time of Alexander the Great, who was half Greek, the Greeks only began to be a political factor when they lost their independence as a state and came under the influence of Rome for a long period of time. Then, within the Roman Empire, the Greeks were able to use the advantages they had gained during the time of Alexander. When the Roman Empire separated into two parts in AD 395, in the Eastern part, the Greeks slowly came into power and displaced from their language and consciousness, the Roman elements in their society. Even with this ethnic victory, the Greeks were not a unified race, but in language, religion and culture, Hellenism became a concept, the concept of Greek civilization. The people itself was a mixture of the Balkan Slavs, Germanic peoples and especially the Syro-semites of Asia Minor. In general, this mixture of peoples and cultures strengthened the Eastern Roman Empire, so much that it lasted for more than a thousand years longer than its counterpart. After the fall of Rome, the Byzantine Empire or Eastern Roman Empire regarded herself as the only heir to the Roman World Empire, although she lacked the material and moral strength which she needed to carry out the responsibility of this task. First of all, she lacked a strong ethnic unity, without which she could not reach the peak of historic achievement.


Rome, however, did not give up the struggle and the Roman aristocracy, with the help of the Germanic peoples, regained their power, not only to restore the Western Roman Empire but also to regain the glory of the Roman Empire from the hated and despised Greeks. At Christmas-time, in AD 800, Pope Leo III. crowned Charlemagne, the strongest political figure in the Western World at that time, as Western Roman Emperor. This act caused the power-hungry Eastern Romans to hate the Papacy. This political event was the main reason for the continued separation and hostility between the Eastern and Western Churches, as long as the Byzantine Empire existed, while the questions of dogma took a secondary role.


Although the schism came about for political reasons, the fundamental reason for the struggle between the churches was each one's claim to the sanctified right to obtain world power. This is why there was hardly any possibility of mending the schism. The daughter of the last Byzantine Emperor married Ivan III. of Russia and, with this marriage, the Byzantine Empire handed over its inherited role as ruler of the world to Russia. Russia, with this inheritance, with Orthodox caesaro-papism and Byzantine imperialism became what we now see. The author asks: "Can we count on Russia, for any reason, ever giving up this imperialism?" He answers his question: "No, not on any account, rather we can expect her to want to strengthen this goal and extend her territories even farther, with all the results this will bring.."


* * * *


In AD 324, on the order of Constantine I. Christianity became the state religion in the Byzantine Empire. He insisted upon one condition that, without reservation, the Church was to serve the interests of the State. "It is understandable that the Church, in order to avoid persecution, accepted this condition. Ever since, she has found it impossible to free herself of this condition, although she has made many desperate attempts to do so. The 1100 year-old Byzantine Empire foiled every attempt. The Byzantine Empire was so powerful that it was able to weather all kinds of storms and keep the Church subordinate to the State. The Eastern Church defeated herself with her own weapons."


The Greek philosophy prevailed and the Orthodox Church accepted the necessity of the individual becoming subordinate to the State. In the eyes of the State the Church was nothing more than a larger individual entity.


Over the course of history the State and the Church grew together like "body and soul". Theoretically, the soul, that is the Church, maintained its superiority, but the State dominated the everyday life of the people. This dualism developed into the so-called "caesaro-papism". The government of the State and the Church was in the hands of one person, so that the State and Church became forged together as body and soul. How perfect this union was is shown by the law which Emperor Leo brought into being: "If a state law proves to be more expedient than a canon law, the former must be adopted. The reverse is also true: if an ecclesiastical law is more expedient, then it should be adopted." In this way all differences between State and Church, between Emperor and Clergy were swept away and a situation was established which even today is found in most Orthodox nations.


The author compares the establishment of the Byzantine Empire with the progress of Rome and he comes to the following conclusion: If we study the development of the Byzantine Empire and the Roman Empire, side by side, we will notice that neither state was able to work well with the Church. In both places, a bitter struggle took place. One difference was that in the Byzantine Empire, the State was superior to the Church, while in the West the Church was unable to achieve such superiority. Another difference was that, in the East, the situation became stabilized. The State and Church cooperated under Canon Law, in a relationship like body and soul and, although there was always a dispute between them on minor matters, an orderly symbiosis was developed. In Rome, the situation was totally different, where the Church was unable to fulfill its own demands, which to the present it has not given up, and it is just for this reason that the relationship between Church and State is not in balance and the problem is not solved. It is not possible to know when the two will clash with each other.

                                                *             *             *             *          *


Südland makes an interesting statement about the differences in the political viewpoints of the two Churches:


"In an Orthodox state the Church is one part of the State. It receives its position and glory from the State. The hierarchy of the Church is very involved in matters of state, since the two exist in a symbiosis. If the Orthodox state is in difficulties, the Orthodox clergy feel the repercussions. The result of this situation is that the Orthodox clergy wholeheartedly support the Orthodox state, even if they have to sacrifice some religious interests temporarily. This is a phenomenon which has not been manifested, at least to such an extent, in the Roman Catholic Church. The State is able to do a lot, however it cannot do everything. It appears as if the State needs the Church as a partner. The State is able to influence the conscious spiritual life; however it cannot influence the unconscious. Only religion and the Church are able to enter the territory beyond the threshold of consciousness.


That state which unrestrictedly rules the Church, can have a more far-reaching influence on the people, with positive and negative results. The Orthodox state can, therefore, more easily oppress the people and treat them more harshly than can a Catholic state, simply because a revolution is less likely to erupt in an Orthodox state. If one does break out accidentally, there is much less chance of it succeeding.


There has hardly ever been a state which has oppressed its citizens as much as the Byzantine Empire did. The Byzantine Empire dared to do this because, through the medium of the Church, it had a strong influence over the people. The same situation is in effect in Russia today, according to Südland.


As a result of this the Orthodox state is much stronger and more enduring than the Catholic state. It is able to withstand much more adversity from inside and outside pressures, without losing its strength. Most historians have expressed admiration for the unheard-of hardy life-strength which made it possible for the State to withstand so many misfortunes, and inner struggles. In spite of unbelievable moral, social and political corruption, it was able to fight off its enemies. In the same way, Russia's cohesive strength amazes us: once a land is annexed to Russia, it unmistakably tends to cause the colossus to blend together."


The author goes on to show the unbelievable regenerative power of the Orthodox state and, in connection with this, he brings up, among others, the example of the Serbs: "As we have seen, the Turks were very thorough in their destruction and division of the Serb state. The poor, ignorant peasants were very brave in revolting against such a huge power and they were successful in creating a new state in one stroke. It was not in vain that, because of this, the Serbs in Central Europe gained the admiration of Ranke, Kállay and others . . . The Serbs were the first people who were able to gain their freedom and regenerate their state because their national church was an invisible force which, throughout the centuries, constantly generated the power to restore their state."


Südland then writes about Russia in the following prophetic words, giving the reason for Russia's constant attempts to conquer Constantinople, that is, the Byzantine inheritance.
"Why did Russia do this with such rare tenacity? In order to create a Roman Empire of the Slav nations and, in addition to this fearsome power, to obtain Europe as well. Woe to Europe if they are able to accomplish this!"


In connection with the reason for the Orthodox state's ability to regenerate itself, the author again mentions the theory of the body and soul that has been canonized, according to which the relationship between the State and the Church is only normal if the Orthodox Church resides in the State as the soul resides in the body. But beware of the Orthodox State! We misunderstand the concept of the religious exclusiveness of the Orthodox state, if we accept the thesis that the Anatolian Church [i.e. the Orthodox Church], at some time in the future, might find a Catholic, or Muslim state worthy of being its place of residence. In a heterodox state, from time to time, it is possible to bridge the gap but the Anatolian Church would never accept such a solution as final.
To prove his thesis, the author quotes Professor Cvijic: "The Serbs, with all their power and might, with their full being, represent true nationalism, their own goal and that of the Southern Slavs. This is only possible on a national basis. This is why no foreign [i.e. non Orthodox] power will ever find a Serb who will serve it loyally. . ."


This thesis can be valid reciprocally. People who practice a non-orthodox religion in an Orthodox state can never be counted as first-class citizens. This is true in the Byzantine Empire where, in order for someone to be counted as a Greek and as a first-class citizen, he has to belong to the Orthodox Church. Therefore we can conclude that, just as the Orthodox state does not recognize a non-orthodox person as a full citizen, the Orthodox citizen does not recognize a non-orthodox state, in which he is forced to live, as a valid state.


However, we cannot condemn the millions of Orthodox Christians who live in non-orthodox states, because they are completely innocent and ignorant of this fact and carry this fateful heritage in their unconscious.


It is surprising that the Orthodox clergy does not play a major role in the political life of the state. Active political work is not appropriate for the clergy. The clergy, especially the higher dignitaries of the Church, in most cases, remain in the background and instead they endeavor to delegate their work to state agencies or to the people themselves. This behavior can be observed only under normal conditions. In an abnormal situation, especially in a heterodox state, the Orthodox clergy go to the other extreme and become more involved in politics than the Catholic clergy.


We can state that, in general, the Roman Catholic clergy play a more open role in politics and this role in many cases is questionable and often intentionally directed against the State. Often, the higher dignitaries of the Church are active politicians. We can state that there is no precedent for this among the Orthodox clergy. This seems to be contrary to the intensive political influence of the Orthodox Church. This can be explained by the fact that the activity of the Orthodox clergy is for the most part invisible. It takes place backstage and from there they maneuver and intervene. Their most important activity is the circulation of political ideas by which they influence the people. Among the Serb people, political enlightenment and the swift spread of political ideas is very obvious. This is a characteristic example of the activities of the Orthodox clergy.


Among the many responsibilities which the Orthodox Church delegates to the State is the propagation of the Orthodox religion. The Greek Orthodox Church has never been strongly involved in missionary work. They willingly hand over this tiring, dangerous and unappreciated work to the western fanatics [i.e. western Churches]. The Orthodox Church expands its reach by subduing entire states and, with the full power of the [Orthodox] state, can legally propagate their religion. Every religion has the desire to make converts because, if it does not expand, it will decline. In the Orthodox states, it is the religious force which continuously drives the politics of expansion.


We must not ignore this religious force when we discuss the Southern Slav question because it was the failure to recognize it which caused the Monarchy's lack of success in Balkan politics.
The Orthodox state "ceteris paribus" ["everything else being equal"] is politically more active, stronger and more vital than the Catholic state.


* * * * *

In the following chapter, Südland discusses the moral attitude and characteristics of the of the Byzantine society and of the individual. He states in the introduction that the moral corruption of the Byzantine Empire, which the monasteries especially tried to fight, to a certain extent remains even today in the successors of the Byzantine Empire, who unfortunately still carry with them this sad legacy. None of the peoples who adopted the Byzantine religion was able to free itself from this Byzantine poison.


We cannot get a true picture of the Eastern Orthodox Church and its characteristics unless we compare it to the Roman Catholic Church. The believers of Roman Catholicism possess a moral ambition and the Church has built a system by which the average believer rejects immorality. This system works strongly and creates barriers to sin with ideas of everlasting life, eternal damnation, hell and the devil etc. If the religious consciousness is strong enough, then, most of the time, these moral barriers are enough to protect the believers from straying.


In regard to the Eastern Christians, we have to consider that, at the time of the Byzantine Empire, they sacrificed all their valuable possessions to their insatiable thirst for power. This spirit has infected both the Church and the believers. The individual citizens became as power-hungry as the state. The ruthless thirst for power and the drive for individual advantages was incompatible with the drive to respect moral standards and the inhibitive ideas that follow from morality. These ideas were discarded because they were a confusing nuisance. As a result of the teachings of the Eastern Christian State and Church, the Orthodox people simply became unrestrained and knew no limits. The Eastern Christians also speak of the transitoriness of the world, sin, everlasting suffering, life which is pleasing to God, maybe even more so than the Roman Catholics, but these are empty words and do not encourage ideas in the souls of the believers. When an opportunity for personal advantage offers itself to an Eastern Christian, he takes it and no sense of moral duty prevents him from so doing.


However, this is not enough, the author says. The Byzantine Empire came to the conclusion that evil itself is power. Thus, evil was used in a cunning way to increase power . . . This unscrupulousness can be observed in Serbia, Romania and Russia.


There is, however, another side to this frightening picture, which is actually good. The Orthodox Church develops a much stronger individual than the Roman Catholic Church can in general. The Orthodox believer does not rely on anybody. He lacks trust in others, unlike the Roman Catholic. . . Since the Orthodox believer does not trust anyone, he also does not expect anyone to trust him, so he must be more diligent and more intense. He cannot offer mercy, clemency or leniency and he does not even expect it for himself. He knows for sure that only strength, knowledge, cunning and intrigue can save him. He develops these characteristics to the full extent. The driving force of his activity is the desire for power and this is why he makes sure that he is there, where the authority is, where there is acknowledgment and money and where other means to power can be obtained . . .


To camouflage these dangerous characteristics, over the course of time written and oral communication has been developed, which is very appealing. For this societal communication between the Byzantine Christians, there are strict formulae based on origin and convention, which have to be followed ceremoniously and elaborately, and conducted with calmness and dignity, which takes a great deal of time. Their speech is very unctuous, dripping with warm empathy and good wishes, with a flowery moral quality, none of which is present in the Byzantine religion. This way of speaking was developed for the purpose of camouflaging the lack of religious feelings and the latent readiness to fight.


Added to this is a deep solidarity among themselves against the non-orthodox religions, which can be observed among the Byzantine Christians. The liturgy of the Byzantine religion demonstrates that it nourishes their inner-connections. The Catholics, on the other hand, go to church to connect with God without interruption, and with fervent prayer hope to gain strength and find comfort and consolation. The church is constructed to provide the milieu for this. It is totally different in the Orthodox religion, where the individual connection with God does not seem to be present. The Orthodox Christians go to church to sing together, everyone kisses the cross and everyone takes part in the service. The singing, the long service, and repeated prayers, conducted in the vernacular, influence the people with the power of suggestion, which they find comforting. This is a very different atmosphere. . . Everyone feels the strong bonds which bind him to the rest of the believers. . . The main goal of the Orthodox service is to chain the believers to the church and nourish the feeling of solidarity and the strength of the masses and keep it alive. This is why Orthodoxy has the ability to achieve its goal with the masses. The service itself is used for the purposes of Power. . .


* * * * *


The Basic Theory of Byzantinism and Orthodoxy


In this section, the author sheds light on the reason that the Slav peoples became the medium for the Orthodox Religion. To understand this, we have to take into account the aforementioned facts. The Greeks, the most able people of ancient times, could not boast of a lasting political success. In spite of this, because of the aforementioned reasons, they outlived the Romans and, after the fall of the Roman Empire, in the Eastern part of the Empire, they were able to make headway, even in the time of their decline. Thus, a large Empire fell into their hands, a world power, along with traditions and the concept of world rule. Yet, as a people, the basis of every state, they were in a decline and in total dissolution. In the case of certain fatal sicknesses, in the last stage of death the desire to live suddenly flares up. This is what happened to the Greeks. On the threshold of death, the desire for life and greatness, the thirst for power and rule was renewed. But they did not have the strength necessary to realize it.


However, the Byzantine Empire recognized the strength of the Slav masses and this is the reason that three quarters of the Slavs in the world are Orthodox. This is not an accidental phenomenon; there is a reason behind it. The only accident is that some Slav tribes were neighbors of The Byzantine Empire. The Russians were not neighbors. There were other peoples who were neighbors of The Byzantine Empire, who did not become Orthodox, like the Croatians and the Hungarians. What was the deciding factor in this? asks Südland. He answers his own question.
According to Südland, the majority of the Slavs considered themselves to be politically inferior. One reason for this was that, in the Slav soul, the world of feelings predominated and suppressed the world of intellect. Another reason was that, since most of them were occupied with agriculture, they considered ownership of land to be more important than politics. This does not mean to say that the Slavs did not like freedom but they loved the land even more than their freedom. The political inferiority of the Slavs had an unfavorable effect on their community life. They were always dissatisfied and they were longing for help and order. This frame of mind made it easy for the Orthodox Church to influence them because it felt it was its responsibility to give to the Greek people whatever would help them to progress and maintain a higher standard.
The Orthodox Church spoke to the Slav people in this way: "Pay homage to me and I will give you world rule. Look, it is not necessary for you to be strong, warlike or even knowledgeable or virtuous; you can still obtain world rule. Just stay with me."


The majority of the Slav people concluded the bargain. They sold their Aryan-Slav soul for political power.


The proof that it happened in this way is the case of the two Slav peoples who refused to accept the conversion to Orthodoxy - the Croatians and the Poles. These two most typical Slav feudal states were strong enough to create an aristocracy for themselves and establish the internal political order which the rest of the Slav peoples were lacking, causing them to become victims to the orthodox temptation.

                                                    The Byzantine Hatred


At the basis of the beliefs of every religion is the concept that it considers itself to be the only means of salvation, and this is why it is more or less intolerant toward other religions. In the history of the world there has hardly ever been a religion which has advocated such an intense hatred toward other religions as Islam. In spite of this, in the Ottoman Empire, other believers were allowed to practice their religion and they belonged to the political structure of the state. (Rajah)


Catholicism strives for universalism and cannot be tolerant of other religions. This was evident in the events of the Middle Ages. It must be pointed out that, in this intolerance, only the clerics were active, while the Catholic believers were inclined to merely ignore members of other religions. In modern times, religious tolerance among Catholics has progressed to the point where the Catholic believers are accepted by believers of other religions as their most favored neighbors and co-citizens.


The situation among the Orthodox believers is quite the contrary. The Orthodox believer hates believers of other religions. To live together with people of different religions is an unbearable suffering for them. This is why they instinctively try to keep themselves separate. Where the historical progression has forced them to live among other religions, the Orthodox believers create a separate area (like a ghetto) to maintain their distance from the others, like the Serb quarter in Bosnia. Woe to the believer of another religion who finds himself in the Orthodox quarter. He will be forced from there by the selective human viciousness. [Translator’s note: This is happening at the present time (Dec. 2004) in Serbia in Délvidék, (formerly Southern Hungary)]
The author brings up a number of examples to prove his thesis. Among others, he quotes a Frenchman, Viconte de la Jonquière: "Si par impossible l'Empire de Byzance renaisserait, on assisterait bientôt à une persécution religieuse contre les non-orthodoxes qui dépasserait de bien loin toutes les horreurs des guerres de religion du seizième siècle. . ." (1881) (If by some impossibility the Byzantine Empire were to be reborn, we would witness a religious persecution against the non-orthodox which would surpass by far all the horrors of the wars of religion of the sixteenth century. . .)


Many recognize the hostile attitude of the Serbs toward the people of other religions with whom they have to live. This can be observed especially in Bosnia, where the Serbs try to force out the Muslims and Catholics from their land in this territory. Südland also brings up many historical examples of this and explains the reason for the Serbs' hostility to be the teachings of the Orthodox Church, which states that every citizen of the Orthodox State should be a member of the Orthodox Church. This idea is in the soul of every orthodox believer and, if the Orthodox state does not exist, he tries to achieve it. This hatred is particularly intense against Catholics and Catholicism, as many famous historians have recorded, such as Pichler, Finlay Gfrörer, Helfert, Fallmerayer, etc. This hatred is alive not only among the Serbs but also among the Romanian Orthodox believers.


"Orthodoxy preserved the hatred which was deeply implanted into the soul of the believers, so that at the right moment in the struggle for power, they could use it as a weapon against the other religions."


"If we look into the bitter, stubborn, one thousand year-old struggle which is behind Orthodoxy, and we want to evaluate its result, we must say that Orthodoxy did an almost perfect job. It created strong, hardy, almost unshakable states and raised individuals who were selfish and who were ready to annihilate other peoples. Their main enemies were Islam and Catholicism. If we disregard the major conflicts, Orthodoxy is an outstanding mechanism for religion and the state. It continues to prepare for new campaigns for political and religious expansion. This is all accomplished silently and invisibly, without anyone realizing the spreading influence of Orthodoxy in the surrounding territory. Before 1463, there were very few Orthodox believers in Bosnia. Now 43% of the populace is Orthodox. Until 1500 there were no Orthodox believers in Croatia. Today 24% of the populace is Orthodox. In Dalmatia, we see the same situation where the Orthodox believers are 14% of the populace."


After this, Südland mentions the situation in Transylvania, where the Romanians are progressing with the propagation of the Orthodox religion and the energetic Hungarians are unable to make any headway in opposition to them, other than perhaps in politics. The Romanians are increasing in number in comparison with the Hungarians and the Saxons. (Translator’s note: Orthodox Catholic Churches are being built in Hungarian communities where there are no Orthodox Catholics, in preparation for the settlement of Romanians in these areas. The Romanization is not so obvious in communities of mixed ethnicity as it is in the Hungarian areas of Transylvania. These settlements are a violation of the collective human rights. (Information taken from the Magyar Demokrata, p. 50, April 17, 2003) In Covasna and Harghita, two counties in Romania's Transylvania region with 75 percent and 85 percent ethnic Hungarian majorities, the Orthodox Church has embarked on an ambitious construction program. With the state's financial backing, it has proposed 65 projects in the two counties, even though most ethnic Hungarians are Protestant or Roman Catholic. . . . The church-building boom has renewed decades-old fears here about attempts by the Romanian government to repress--or expel--the ethnic Hungarian population of Transylvania . . . Romania's 1.6 million ethnic Hungarians comprise about 7 percent of the country's population
"There is a fever of construction of Orthodox churches in almost entirely Hungarian areas," Joszef Balint-Pataki, head of the Romanian section of the Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, said in an interview in Budapest. "Our feeling is that the ultimate goal is to change the ethnic makeup, and this has always been the strategic goal of the Romanian government. I cannot find any other explanation for these churches."
. (Information taken from an article by Peter Finn in the Washington Post, February 11, 2000 "A matter of Orthodox Church and State. Building Program alarms Romania’s Ethnic Hungarians".)


Then the author quotes Fallmerayer: "The Roman Catholic Church in the Byzantine (Orthodox) countries is not only not progressing but is obviously losing ground, no matter what they say, report or write to refute this fact."


The worst situation in this regard was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Orthodox Church pushed out the Catholic Church, even in those places where the Catholics were numerous and in the political arena they almost completely eliminated them! In the Monarchy they were not able to recognize the significance of this.


Südland asks bitterly - "What does the world care that the strong Orthodox state, just as the strong Orthodox individual, unchangeably and forever, from the moral and cultural standpoint is on a lower level? The world is not interested in morals or culture, just in power. This is the secret of the success of the Orthodox Church up to now and in the future. The Byzantine Empire acknowledges this desire for power and skillfully and mercilessly takes advantage of both states and people . . ." In 1851, Fallmerayer wrote, not in vain: "Anatolia's policy, from year to year, throws darker and darker clouds over the West and now we are all feeling that a new order is forming in Europe."


The Byzantine Danger


Südland acknowledges that the topics covered so-far were not strictly on the subject of the Southern Slav question but it was necessary to provide a more comprehensive picture of that problem because the question of the Southern Slavs is only a segment of the enormous struggle which took place in the territory which extends from the Baltic Sea to the southern point of Dalmatia. It is impossible to discuss only the struggle taking place in a small segment without taking into account the wider picture.


Without doubt, this giant battle has its ethnic, national, political, social and economic aspects, still the strongest and oldest problem is the religious issue. A good example is the case of Rumania [in W.W. I]. For political and economic reasons, she should have stayed on the side of the Central Powers, since she must have known that Russia presented the greatest danger to her. Still, from the beginning, her sympathies were on their side and she was only waiting for the appropriate moment to switch and stab the Monarchy in the back. The religious conviction of the Rumanian masses inevitably attracted Rumania to the Byzantine side. Nobody will understand the history of Eastern and South Eastern Europe or foresee the future development of the region without learning to appreciate the awful power of the alliance of the Byzantine state and the Byzantine religion.


In the last part of the chapter Südland presents a powerful prophecy concerning the danger that Russia presents to the world. She will attack, not in the name of pan-Slavism but of Pan-Russianism, to threaten the future of Europe with her Byzantine concept of the state. It is in Russia's interest to expand the small Balkan countries, since they will fall into her lap, in due time.


(pp. 297-401)

The concept of Pan-Serbism


In the previous chapter it was necessary to discuss the history and religious history so that the reader might have an overall picture of what is at the root of the Southern Slav question. According to Südland: "At the deepest core of the Southern Slav question is the Byzantine philosophy of state and religion, that is, that the Southern Slavs should reconquer the ancient territory of the Byzantine Empire and the whole of the Balkans. Only Orthodox believers and Orthodox peoples, faithful to the Byzantine Empire, should be allowed to live in the Balkans. All the rest, by force or cunning, should be torn out by their roots."


Russia's Balkan politics and all the wars which Russia conducted in the Balkans all had the goal of forcing out the Catholic and Islamic influence, to change this territory into an entirely Orthodox territory. All they would need to do was to conquer a small part of Asia Minor and then the Byzantine Empire would be reborn and made even greater by the addition of the largest state in the world, Russia, with the greatest military force in the world. As for the small Orthodox states in the Balkans, they would be doomed because they would throw themselves into the arms of the Russians, like moths flying into a flame. "The next step will be for Orthodoxy to adopt the idea of the Roman World Empire, and conquer all those territories which at one time belonged to the Roman Empire -- Italy, Spain, France, Great Britain, Asia Minor, and North Africa. After this, the rest of the remaining world. This is all possible, if they are strong enough. . ."


After this, the author calls our attention to the misunderstanding of the "Great Serbia idea". It is regarded as natural for a nation to have the goal of becoming stronger and bigger. Therefore, nobody regards this as aggression. In theory, if there is a Great Croatia or a Great Bulgaria, [or a Great Romania, trans.] then why can there not be a Great Serbia?


Among the Serbs, the interpretation is different: because of the way they are, the Serbs are unable to set their boundaries. It is more appropriate to talk of Pan-Serbia than Great Serbia. The core of the Southern Slav question is that the Serbs want to dominate the Bulgarians and the Croatians. They wish to be the dominant power in the Balkans and eradicate or assimilate the remaining peoples. In this way they will conquer the entire territory of the Balkans and make the people Serb. The proof of this is in the next chapter.


Serb State and Church Traditions


· The Serb settlements in the center of the Balkan Peninsula form the first basis of Pan-Serbism.
· Second, the Serb nation reached its peak during the dynasty of Nemanjide. The memory of this has remained for centuries in the Serb imagination. This peak of greatness, although it was very short-lived, took place under Dusan the Great, who assumed the title of Byzantine Emperor, and intended to place the Byzantine Empire under Serbian power, take over all its traditions, and create a Serb-Greek Empire. The Serb standard of living, security, development of trade, the pomp and glory of the Church were never at such a high point and it is understandable that this had a strong influence on the soul of the Serbs. The very brave attempts of Dusan the Great to take over the Byzantine Empire and the Byzantine concept of world rule made the deepest impression on the Serbs.


What is so remarkable is that this short-lived fame still lives on, deep in the soul of the Serbs. Other nations have had similar short-lived periods of glory, e.g. among the Hungarians, the age of Lajos the Great (1342-1382), Mátyás I (Mátyás Corvinus) (1458-1490), yet they have not made such a deep impression that the Hungarians would desire to recapture the greatness. It is the Orthodox Church which keeps this desire alive among the Serbs, because there had never been such a great period in Serbia as in the time of Dusan the Great and in the dynasty of Nemanjide. The soul (the Church) has never forgotten this desire on behalf of the body (the State). This desire for greatness, just like the Church, is eternal and the State has taken it over as its own everlasting tradition. As long as one single Serb Orthodox church remains, it will do its utmost to restore this greatness. To reach this goal, it was necessary for the Orthodox Church to keep alive the political and state traditions in the soul of the Serbs, even to the present time.


There is another thing we should not forget: Except for the Greek Orthodox Church, the Serb Orthodox Church is the most ancient Orthodox State Church. It was established much earlier than the Russian Orthodox Church, which was inherited by marriage from the Byzantine Church, only in 1472. This is why we have to state that the Serbs had a stronger and more ancient right to the inheritance of the Byzantine Church than the Russians. There is no question that the Byzantine Church and State traditions were inherited by both the Serbs and the Russians. The spirit of this tradition dictates the conquest of the Balkan territory with all the states in that area, just as they had once belonged to Rome.


The Serb state adopted the primary concept of the Byzantine Church and State -- one state and one religion, with one lay and priestly prince. From this, it follows that Serbia, just like other Orthodox states, would like to take over the rule from the others. One particular characteristic of the Orthodox states is that they want rapid territorial expansion in every direction. If they happen to collide with other Orthodox states, they try to assimilate them quickly and unite with them. [Wasn't Tito's policy a form of defense against such an aggression? Note from the writer of the article.] Over the course of history it can be observed that there were continued clashes in the Balkans between the Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, or Greeks, which can be explained by the above statement. This assimilation causes ethnic problems, which the Greeks try to smooth over by saying: "A person is Greek if his religion is Greek Orthodox."


In these efforts to assimilate each other, not only the power of the intention of the Orthodox Church, which for the Catholic Church would be nearly impossible to fathom, becomes obvious, but also the lack of boundaries in regard to time and territory and the disregard for reality, which is consequently one component of Pan-serbism.


The Serb Orthodox Church as a National Political Factor


The Serbs, as a closed ethnic power, came to the fore only in the nineteenth century. This, and the growth of their numbers, is due to the work of their church. The Church proposed the principle that a person is Serb if he belongs to the Serb Orthodox Church. Thus, the Church converted the surrounding peoples, who became Serbs and also a large number of the Balkan Rumanians, who were much more primitive. The national Serb Church works to make more people Serb by this automatic acceptance, to increase the Serb population and the Serb power and influence. The Croatians, the most closely affected people, quickly recognized the expansionist policy of the Serb Church and often made complaints in both the Croatian and the Hungarian National Assemblies. . .


One form of the expansion was the acceptance of mixed marriages, where the children were almost always counted as Serbs. The Serbs knowingly supported and encouraged mixed marriages. At the same time, we have to recognize that, contrary to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church recognizes divorce. This has become very important in modern times, because it has increased in frequency. If a Roman Catholic wishes to divorce and remarry in the Church, all he has to do is to convert to the Orthodox religion, and it is permitted. In the Balkans many people take advantage of this possibility. Therefore the numbers of Serbs increase, because whoever is of Serb (Orthodox) religion is counted as Serb. The assimilation factor is always a component of the Serb political plans.


The Patriarchate of Ipek (Pec)


At the time of the Turkish rule, the establishment of the Patriarchate of Ipek played a large role in the spread of the Pan-Serb concept. The Patriarchate of Ipek was established as a compromise between the Serb Orthodox Church and the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs acknowledged the Turkish rule and in exchange they received the right to re-establish the Patriarchate of Ipek. The jurisdiction of the Patriarchate extended over all the countries conquered by the Turks in which Serbs were living. It was comprised, not only of Serb territories, but also Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Croatia, and Southern and Central Hungary as far as Budapest. This agreement was in no small means due to the good-will of Sokolovic, who was of Serb origin and created a state within the state. The Serb state therefore ceased to exist but its role was taken over by the Patriarchate of Ipek. The Patriarch made sure that the ancient traditions were continued.


As the Serb historian, Steno Stenejevic wrote: "At that time, the Serbs began to feel that something existed which bound them into a larger unit. This feeling later spread to the entire population. The masses felt this intuition from time to time and from place to place and the emerging consciousness of this larger unity gave to the people solace and hope for a better future. Since the leaders who followed were also relatives of Sokolovic and empathized with the Serbs, the Patriarch of Ipek, without any pressure, with well-thought out plans, was able to strengthen his position. His main goal was to establish more and more monasteries because his experience showed that, around the monasteries, the Orthodox religion was able to put down strong roots. It was at that time that Roman Catholicism was suppressed in Bosnia. At the same time, the Patriarch tried to expand the borders of Orthodoxy in every direction, even to Bulgaria and Dalmatia. The title of the Patriarch was: "Patriarch of all Serbs, Bulgars, and inhabitants of the shoreline territories." The whole organization was working in the spirit of Saint Száva and its goal was the strengthening of the Serb people within the Serb Orthodox Church. Beside this, says Südland, the Church had not only religious and ideological goals but also financial goals. It was very obvious when the Patriarch, right at the very beginning, established five Orthodox bishoprics in Hungary and one in Slavonia (Buda, Pécs, Szeged, Arad, Temesvár and Versec as well as Oranovica). One can see the genius in this action, where the Patriarch was able to obtain the very rich and fertile land in Southern Hungary and Slavonia for the Serb Church and the Serb people, noted Sudland. [One may add that this occurred without a shot being fired or a soldier being killed, and Hungary was in no position to mount a defense against this insidious attack.].


The author goes on to say that we have to take all this into account, if we wish to appraise the consequences and effects of the already established plan for unification of Church and State, on the entire territory of the Balkans. We cannot ignore, either, another axiom of the Church: The Church can never give up any possession which it previously owned. It bows before force but never gives up its right. In this point, there is no difference between the Catholic and the Orthodox Church. This law rules the Orthodox Church's continued expansion.


Soon after the establishment of the Patriarchate, the star of the Ottoman Empire began to wane. An organization like the Anatolian Church, which had such a fine political feeling, sensed the collapse. Because the Turks were losing their strength, the structure of the Patriarchate, with its fat bishoprics in Hungary and the opportunity to squeeze the Catholic Church, was in danger. As the influence of the Ottoman Empire was declining, the Austrian Empire was in ascendance. Therefore the Patriarch thought it would be wise to change his alliance to Austria. There is no doubt that the plan of the Patriarch was to allow the whole territory to come under the power of Austria, but the plan did not materialize, because the Turks found out about the two-faced politics. The Patriarch, Arsanios Cernojevic, was forced to flee from the Turks and, in 1690, 36, 000 Serb families followed him to Syrmia and Southern Hungary. This meant that the Serb Orthodox Church transferred its center to this area and its followers brought their national traditions and state identity with them, along with the desire for power, with the Church's absolute influence over the population. It was supposed to be a temporary situation but, in time, it became permanent, with obvious results on the populace. In the same period of time, 30,000 warriors arrived under the leadership of the Vajda, Georg Barankovic. Soon after, the newly settled Serbs demanded the formation of a new state in this territory, which they can treat as their own, which is now called Vajdaság. From this point on, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in constant struggle with the Patriarchate and the nationalist group who both claimed "status in statu" position.


150 years later, in 1849, within the Monarchy, we can find a Serb state, the so-called Serb Voivodina (Vajdaság). According to Südland, the establishment of Voivodina (Vajdaság) was not accidental but was planned at the time of the escape from Serbia proper of the national church which embodied the forces to enlarge the Serb national state.


This Serb Orthodox Church in Austria-Hungary was not only able to support itself but was also able to strengthen its position. The Serbs settled in the most fertile areas of Hungary, which were the best organized in the Monarchy, and the people and the Church were able to make a good life for themselves. Their cultural development progressed rapidly. As a result of this, the newest history of the Southern Slavs was written in Southern Hungary. In this area Popa Jovan Raic was born. He completed his theological studies in Russia and in Athens and then returned to Karlóca. His life work was the 2000 page The History of the Different Slav Peoples, namely Bulgarians, Croatians and Serbs, which later became the source for western historians. Naturally, it represented Serb interests, especially influenced by Pejachevich, Engel and Gebhard and prepared the way for future conquests.


The concept of conquest born in the Church ideology is today the most important component of Pan-Serbism.

* * * * *

Interestingly, the scientific founders of this Pan-Serbism, which was of Byzantine style, were two Slovaks: Jan Kollar, a poet, and Josef Safarik, a linguist. Both of them were influenced from an early age by the Serb Orthodox religion. The latter, Josef Safarik, was a teacher at the Serb Orthodox High School in Újvidék (today Novi Sad). Südland writes that, under the influence of the teachings of the Serb Orthodox popes and monks, over the decades, Safarik accepted the theory that the territories which were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Ipek were Serb national territories and he even called the Bulgarians and Croatians, Serbs. He later revised his theory about the Bulgarians to a certain extent, but Safarik's theory, which he supported with linguistic arguments, had a basic influence on the development of Serb imperialism, although the theory was faulty.


Südland then lists many different Serb studies to prove how much, in the past century, the Serbs were influenced by the Pan-Serb idea.  He mentions the well-known Serb historian, Vuk Karadzic, who, in 1849 published a paper in Vienna "Ein Koffer voll Geschichte, Sprachkunde und Volkssitten der Serben aller drei Konfessionen." (A Trunk full of History, Linguistics and Folk Customs of the Serbs of all three Religions). From the title, it is obvious that the writer, following Safarik, calls the Catholic and Muslim Croatians "Catholic or Mohammedan Serbs" and, in a very characteristic way, entitles the first chapter of his book: "Everywhere Serbs, everyone of them". In other words: "It is difficult for those Serbs [i.e. Croats] who are Catholics to declare themselves Serbs, but they too must slowly become adjusted to this, because if they do not wish to be Serbs, then they simply have no nationality."


In 1872, M.S. Milejewic published a paper entitled "Adalékok a szerbek történelméhez" (Addenda to the History of the Serbs) in which, among others, the following outrageous and erroneous statements can be read: "The Serb tribes' first re-settlement and migration was caused by the Chinese, against whom the Serbs were fighting for 3000-4000 years without stop. . . They migrated across Siberia and finally they reached the Serb triangle, which is presently called the Balkan Peninsula. The whole of Asia was at one time settled by Serbs and this means that the Serbs lived there, as an independent and ruling people. . ."


The Serb Orthodox pope at Karlóca, Nikola Bogovic, wrote in his book: "The History of the Serb Orthodox Church.": "It is clear to me that the Serbs took the teachings of Christ from the apostles Andrew and Paul. . ." He later writes: "The Gospel of Olfilos is also a Serb Gospel." This sick desire for power, megalomania and imperialism does not always manifest itself in such an obvious offensive way, but the fact is that, as Südland states, the thoughts and actions of the Serbs are driven by the above mentioned factors.


* * * * *


Pan-Serbism as the Leading Political Philosophy of the Serb State



Under this title, Südland emphasizes how fast this Pan-Serb philosophy has spread, especially since Raic-Safarik and Vuk Karadzic wrote about it in Serb circles. In his preface, the author quotes from the writings of the well-known historian, St. Stanojevic, from which he makes the following conclusions:


1.      The Pan-Serb movement began in Southern Hungary, where the Patriarch of Ipek (Pec) salvaged, preserved and encouraged the continuation of the traditions of the Greek Orthodox Christians who had fled into this territory.


2.      Pan-Serbism, based on the philosophy of Vuk Karadzic, had, as its goal, the unification of the Serbs.


3.      In 1860, the Serb leader, Milos, adopted the Pan-Serb philosophy of Vuk Karadzic. Milos intended to divert the attention of the people away from the interior problems and direct it to outside goals [territorial expansion].


As a result of this philosophy, in every direction, the Serbs became agitated by nationalist propaganda, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Dalmatia and the territory of the Monarchy. Südland gives many pages of examples to refute the incorrect theory of Seton-Watson, that the Pan-Serb movement was the brain-child of the Karagyorgyevic family.
Among other writings, Südland mentions a Serb school-book, which appeared in its third edition in 1890: The Serb World in Words and Pictures, in which the following countries are named as Serb states. 1. The Serb Kingdom. 2. Old Serbia. 3. Macedonia. 4. Montenegro. 5. Bosnia-Hercegovina. 6. Dalmatia. 7. Istria. 8. Croatia. 9. Slavonia. 10. Smyrna. 11. Bácska. 12. Bánát. 13. Serbia under Bulgarian rule (West Bulgaria).


* * * * *


The Pan-Serb philosophy naturally caused a reaction among the Croatians. Dr. Anton Starcevic, a Croatian politician was the one who, in order to counterbalance the above thirteen states, created the idea of "Great Croatia" and the idea of "Orthodox Croatia". With these ideas he succeeded in stopping the idea of Yugoslavism and he began to attract Orthodox elements to the side of Croatia. The Serb National Church, whose desire was to conquer, saw that her goal of taking over Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was in danger. Furthermore, at the Berlin Congress, contrary to Serb expectations, Bosnia-Hercegovina was not joined to Serbia but rather to the Monarchy.
The Pan-Serb philosophy in its original, unlimited form, as propagated by Safarik and Karadzic, could not be taken seriously but Serbia, in time, gained strength in her struggle for independence and a political generation grew up, which recognized that it would be idiocy to declare Siberia and Christ to be Serbian. The people created more concrete goals, which partly satisfied their thirst for power. They also weighed the realistic possibilities. Beside the goal of conquering the whole of the Balkans, they had more realistic goals. In 1899, 15 years after the Bulgarian-Serb War took place, which was not advantageous for the Serbs, a book was published in Paris by Miroslav J. Spalajkovic : La Bosnie et l'Hercegovine, which gave a new meaning to the Pan-Serb philosophy and had a great influence on the Serb politics of the future. The Monarchy did not recognize the importance of the book, which has led to many troubles since that time.
The main themes of Spalajkovic's book are the following:


1.      The Bosnian question is not just a local problem. It should be of interest to all the European powers, since it represents one important part of Eastern European politics. "The French would commit a grave mistake if they were to give up paying attention to the Serb people, who were the victims of the forceful anti-Serb politics of Bismarck and Andrássy."


2.      Bosnia and Hercegovina are Serb nations, unified in ethnicity and nationality, although they are divided by religion. The followers of all three religions are Serbs. The book does not mention Croatia but the author notes that the most beautiful ethnic Serbs are to be found in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Therefore, the only raison d'etre (purpose) of Serbia and Montenegro is to acquire these two countries and establish Great Serbia, and only Austria's Balkan aspirations stand in the way.


3.      The author presents the idea of Great Serbia in such a way that it is acceptable to the Western European people. At the same time, he states that Austria-Hungary is attempting to eradicate the Serb people. The majority of the Orthodox believers in Bosnia and Hercegovina do not wish to live under the rule of Austria, he states, but they rather dream of the unification of the Serbs. Südland quotes from Spalajkovic the following statement that is characteristic of the Byzantine historical falsification: "The Orthodox religion is the oldest religion in Bosnia and Hercegovina because it represents the establishment of the Christian religion and civilization in these countries."


4.       At the Berlin Congress, Bosnia and Hercegovina were given to Austria-Hungary which was a severe injustice, according to Spalajkovic. This must be regarded as a temporary situation, resulting from egotistical goals. Their only mandate was to police these territories, which therefore could not be annexed to Austria-Hungary.


5.       [#5 is missing in the original]


6.      The Monarchy's main goal was, in overstepping her mandate, acting as pioneer for the German "Drang nach Osten", to prepare the conquest of the East, with intrigue and force, beginning with Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Austrians hated the Serbs inexorably and tried to strangle them with canonical and educational laws.


7.      By law, these two countries still belonged to Turkey, so she still had the right to intervene.


8.      The Monarchy did not fulfill its mandate. It did not re-establish order. It destroyed trade and was hostile toward the people of these countries. Austria also failed to fulfill its most important duty, the agrarian reform, although the small Balkan countries elsewhere were able to institute their own land reforms.
(In another chapter of his book, Südland mentions the real reasons that Spalajkovic was so intent on having land reform in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The land in this territory was in the hands of the Muslim Croatians, who rented it out to the Orthodox. The Orthodox Serbs who rented the land made up 74% of the renters. At the same time, they were only 43% of the total populace. If the land reform were to take place, all at once the largest part of the land would be owned by Serbs. Since the land was rented out indefinitely, and the owner had the right to only one third of the harvest, the value of this rented land was only one third of that of the free land i.e. land that was not rented out. If the land reform were to take place, the Muslims who gave up their land would receive only one third of the value of the land, whereas the divided lands would be free lands and would have full value at the moment when the larger part of the former rented lands came into Serb Orthodox hands, which would mean enormous financial gain and enormous power for the Serbs. This was the real Byzantine goal behind the plan of Spalajkovic.)


9.       Spalajkovic calls the Monarchy a number of different insulting names. He even compares its politics to Dante's Inferno. He quotes foreign, especially French, writers who were anti-Monarchy. As a final conclusion, he states that: Austria-Hungary as it is shown by history, is an unviable state formation; on the other hand it deals in a friendly way with Russia.


10.   Spalajkovic offers a number of new ideas, with the purpose of supporting his thesis.
· The Balkans for the Balkan peoples.
· The theory of nationality as the basis of the modern public law. (pp.119-121)
· When there are changes in sovereignty, we should consider the national aspirations of the affected peoples. (p.129)
· When a nation suppresses another people within its borders, the Great Powers must intervene.


According to Südland, Spalajkovic also paints the Hungarians in very bad colors: ". . . In this respect, Hungary poses a real danger to the European family of nations. This is why a collective intervention should be undertaken for the benefit of the oppressed peoples, in the name of justice."


Südland writes in another place that it is almost impossible to write enough about the contents of this book with quotations like the following: "The scientific parts of this book are worthless. They are masterpieces of diplomatic jokes and political propaganda."


(pages 514-540)


Under this title, Südland explains the relationship between Croatia and Hungary. In 1102, the Croatians gave up their independence as a state, in order to form an association with Hungary and accept her protection. In this union, because of the geopolitical location, Hungary was always the stronger partner and, naturally, the situation was always more advantageous for Hungary than for Croatia. Südland does not agree with the views of some historians, according to whom the secret goal of King Kálmán the Booklover (1095-1116) was to annex Croatia to Hungary. Hungary, by joining with Croatia, received a territory which was very difficult to defend. According to the Croatians, the long period of Croatian dissatisfaction was caused by the fact that Hungary paid very little attention to the defense of the Croatians, because she found it more important to attend to her dynastic interests toward the North. . .


After the Battle of Mohacs [1526], the Serbs slowly started their infiltration into Southern Hungary, as they were trying to escape from the pressure of the Turks. During the centuries of wars between the Hungarians and the Turks, the populace in the territory of Southern Hungary was extremely reduced. After the recapture of the Bácska-Bánát territory from the Turks, this territory remained unpopulated.


The great migration of the Serbs began in 1689, as it was mentioned already, under the leadership of Arsenius Cernojevic. The settlement of the Serbs in Hungary did not go smoothly. Südland writes: "The Hungarian aristocracy and religious hierarchy constantly complained about the Serb brutality and abuse which was directed against the Catholic priests and the peasants, whose money and possessions they stole, whose animals they robbed. They even took the church possessions. . ." A deep hatred developed between the Hungarians and Serbs, whom the Hungarians called "infernos nostros hostes" [our infernal enemies].


The situation settled down in the eighteenth century as Hungary became stronger. At the end of this century, Josephinism required the country to become centralized and the Hungarians and the minorities to become Germanized. Südland states: "The resistance to this trend was strongest and most successful in Hungary." The Croatians tried to come closer to Hungary, looking for a defense against this Germanization.


Soon after this, the Hungarians tried to use Josephinism to their advantage. The movement toward Hungarian nationalism, following the example of the French Revolution, tried even harder to centralize and unify the country on a national platform. ( Translator's note: Since for centuries the official language in Hungary had been either Latin or German, the Hungarians, who were becoming stronger and more nationalistic, wished to have Hungarian as the official language of their country, including Croatia. ) The geopolitical situation of Hungary, which dictated such progress, made this effort easier. The conflict between Hungarians and Southern Slavs, wrote Südland, which had never before existed in this form, was only the result of this development. There were always problems of political, dynastic, social and economic nature, but the conflicts of principle began at the turn of the 18-19th century, when the Hungarian state started to threaten the language of the Serbs and the Croatians along with their public and ecclesiastical rights. Still, there was a difference between the aspirations of the Serbs and Croatians. The Serbs, inspired by the desire to rule, and supported by the State Church, wanted to establish an independent state in the territory in which they had taken refuge as they were fleeing from the Turks. They wanted to establish a new state within the borders of Hungary, which in the case of Voivodina actually became reality. The Croatians, on the other hand, wished to continue their 1300 years existence as a state, in which they had survived the Turkish rule, within the frame of the Monarchy, and extend their borders to Dalmatia and, from 1878 on, to Bosnia and Hercegovina.


The Hungarian aspirations were fulfilled in the ideas of Lajos Kossuth, who was successful in dissolving Erdely's (Transylvania's) autonomy and re-annexing it to Hungary. Croatia did not want to be re-annexed to Hungary - writes Südland - for the sole reason that, with this autonomy, among the peoples of the Monarchy, they stood as the most ancient state-founding people. The more the pressure from Hungary grew against the Croatians, the more they opposed joining with Hungary. We could almost say that it was the Hungarians who woke the Croatians from their sleep. In 1848, the Hungarians wanted to force the issue and the Croatians took up arms to defend the remains of their ancient statehood.


Kossuth's concept of independence, as the author states, was intertwined with Széchenyi's concept of economy, which was expressed in this slogan: "Hungarians, to the sea!" In order for the Hungarians to reach the sea, they would have to dissolve the Croatian autonomy. In 1848, the Hungarian dream of national independence collapsed. The Croatians and the Serbs were the cause of this collapse. Hungarian politicians studied the situation intensively and tried to find a way to anticipate, in the future, the collaboration of the Croatians and the Serbs. In 1848, the Serbs and Croatians were on friendly terms and helped each other and it was natural that the Hungarians wanted to prevent this in the future.


The Croatian and Serb hopes, which looked very promising in 1848, soon after suffered an ignominious failure. After ten years of existence, Voivodina lost its independence and the Croatian freedom fight ended in absolutism and the Compromise of 1868. There is a well-known adage that in 1851, the Croatians received as a reward whatever was used to punish the Hungarians. This bad luck of the Croatians was much greater than that of the Serbs. Beside Serbia and Montenegro, Voivodina, was a third state formation, a recent acquisition. In Croatia it was different, because the Croatians defended the last remnants of their ancient state formation, the loss of which would be fateful for the entire nation. The Serbs more easily overcame the defeat of 1859, which meant that Voivodina lost its independence, than the Croatians did the events of 1868. Therefore, it was obvious that the resumption of friendly terms between the Hungarians and the Serbs took place much earlier than between the Hungarians and the Croatians.


Between 1848 and 1867, according a Serb statesman, Jovan Ristic, the situation between the Hungarians and the Serbs began to improve, as Südland states, referring to the fact that Michael Obrenovic married a Hungarian Countess, Julia Hunyady.


After the Compromise, the struggle between the Serbs and the Croatians caused the further increase of the national feelings of the Croatians, and their antagonism toward the Serbs increased. By their aspirations to annex Slavonia and Dalmatia, the Serbs perceived their own goal of Pan-Serbism to be in danger. The occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, by the Monarchy in 1878, further bewildered the Serbs and they could not bear the thought that after the loss of Slavonia and Dalmatia, they would now lose Bosnia. The Serbs immediately turned to the Hungarians for help, emphasizing the danger to both peoples from the increasing strength of the Croatians in Bosnia.


This step was a typical example of the Byzantine politics. As Südland writes: "The Serbs had no difficulty in convincing the Hungarians of the necessity of taking strong action against the Croatians, which would serve the interests of both the Serbs and the Hungarians." In other words, the Serbs succeeded in setting the Hungarians against the Croatians. What made it easier was, that the 1868 Croatian-Hungarian Compromise and the entire creation of Dualism (the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) indicated that the Croatians, especially within Hungary, were to be treated as a danger to the country.


Südland then spends a lot of time discussing a book by Pesti called: Horvátország keletkezése [The origin of Croatia], which denied the viability of Croatia as a state and demanded its annexation. It was in effect a scholarly declaration of war against the Croatians, which strengthened the position of the Serbs. Under the administration of bán [governor] Khuen - Héderváry, as is well known, the Serbs were his main supporters. It must be noted that the Serbs initiated their friendship with the bán when Héderváry became governor, and not vice-versa.
"Under the governorship of Khuen-Héderváry, the Serbs were able to do whatever they wanted, because they were regarded as the state-forming element. Their main success, however, with the help of the Hungarian writer, Pesti, consisted in turning the political situation to the disadvantage of the Croatians. It was not the Serbs, with their aspirations to conquer, who had to be stopped, but the Croatians. It was not the Serbs who were a danger to the Monarchy, but the Croatians. It was not the Serbs and Orthodoxy which caused difficulties for the Southern part of the Monarchy, but the Croatians and the reactionary Catholicism in the background. "It is simply amazing", states Südland, "how the Serbs distorted the truth."


If we can accept the fact that there is a distortion and the Catholic Croatians were blamed for the actions of the Orthodox Serbs, then we can understand the Byzantine State and Church ideology, and what a danger it poses.


"In spite of this advantage, the Serbs only managed to have some success in Croat-Slavonia, which was under Hungarian rule. Here, in the course of twenty years, there was a silent Hungarian-Serb entente, meanwhile, it did not go well for the Serbs in Bosnia and Dalmatia. Kállay, who saw their intentions, did not want to give them any concessions. In Dalmatia, the popularity of the Starcevic party endangered the Serb goals. The Serbs found it necessary to strengthen their influence within the Monarchy. Again, they turned to Hungary. The former Serb Prime Minister, Milan Pirocanac, around 1890, gave the Hungarians a confidential memorandum, with the approximate contents: "The Hungarians have no access to the sea. The road to Fiume crosses the territory of Croatia. The Hungarians should decide to annex Varazdin, Zagreb, and Fiume-Modrus, but should allow Slavonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Dalmatia, which are inhabited by Serbs, to unite and be given to Serbia. If the Hungarians accept this, the Serbs will force out the Obrenovic family and unite with Hungary in a Serb-Hungarian compromise. In this way, the Hungarians will have direct access to the sea. They will expand their territory and, by avoiding Vienna, will become a great power."


The goal of this proposal is clear, states Südland. "With the help of the Hungarians, the Serbs would achieve the idea of a Great Serbia. . . and all the territories of the Monarchy, which at one time belonged to the Patriarchate of Ipek, would be given to the Serbs. This does not include the territory in Hungary. In exchange for receiving these territories, the Serbs would offer to the Hungarians the route to the sea. This proposal appealed to the Hungarians and awakened in them the Kossuth idea."


According to Südland, the Serbs never seriously considered this plan. This was typical of their politics which deceived others and which the Serbs used very skillfully, as Kállay very perceptively writes. The Serb plan partly succeeded and the conviction of the Hungarians, that the Kossuth idea could be achieved through Croatia, became stronger.


Südland several times noted in his book that the events described above developed and originated from the corrupt mentality of Dualism, which brought two components together. One was the goal of the Austrians to keep Dalmatia for themselves, which could be traced back partly to formal sovereignty issues and partly to economic politics. The other component, the Magyar component, consisted of the Austrians pushing the Deák idea of compromise between the Austrians and the Hungarians into the background and the Kossuth ideas came to the forefront. This was the reason for the troubles in the South, which were systematically created, and Byzantine philosophy or, more specifically, Pan-Serbism gained advantage.

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                                                              The Fiume Resolutions


In this chapter, Südland demonstrates, in a highly effective way, how the Serbs succeeded in using the Croatians to fulfill the Serb interests, utilizing the fact that the Croatians intended to obtain rule over Dalmatia.


As is well-known, in 1905, there was a political crisis in Hungary, a change of regime, because the Independence Party unexpectedly won the elections. Before this, in 1903, Khuen-Héderváry resigned from his position as bán and Benjamin Kállay died. In Serbia, a new dynasty, the Karagyorgyevic dynasty, came into power. There was some relaxation of tension in Serbo-Croatian politics because both nations felt endangered by the magyarization politics in Croatia. In Dalmatia, too, the Serb and Croatian politicians acted in a more friendly manner toward each other.


With the victory of the Independence Party in Hungary, the potential for antagonism between Austria and Hungary increased. In this situation the Fiume Resolutions created a great sensation. The Serb and Croatian representatives, in a ceremonial way, offered their support for Hungary's bid for independence. "Every nation has the right to make decisions, freely and independently, about its own fate." In exchange for their support, they asked for Dalmatia to be annexed to Croatia-Slavonia. In Slavonia, they demanded a reconsideration of the administration and new elections, among other demands. To give more weight to the Resolutions, the Croatian and Serb representatives at the Dalmatian Provincial Assembly declared that they were one nation and that they would fight side by side for the annexation of Dalmatia to Croatia-Slavonia.


According to Südland, in order for them to take this step, to win the support of the Serbs, to obtain Dalmatia and improve the situation in Croatia, the Croatians were willing to make concessions and they adopted the suggestion that the Croatians and the Serbs were the same people. These decisions were prompted by their opposition to the Viennese camarilla. At first, this was cause for joy in the Hungarian Independence Party but this happiness was soon tempered by obstruction from the Croatian Parliament. The Croatians objected to the mandated use of the Hungarian language on the Croatian railways. In spite of all this, the situation in Croatia improved in the period following the Fiume Resolutions. However, the Croatians attributed the improvement to the Serbs rather than to the Hungarians. Supilo declared in 1907: "We are able to achieve great things with the Serbs. Without them, just a little, and against them, nothing."
According to Südland, with this step the Croatians were ready for the Byzantine hypnosis. He states that the true impetus behind the Fiume Resolutions was the Serb guiding principle to incite the Hungarians, Croatians and Serbs to rise up against Austria. Südland offers proofs that there was a secret agreement between the Croatians and the Serbs, which stated that the Croatians would give up Bosnia-Hercegovina to Serbia. One of greatest proofs was the speech of Supilo on February 25, 1907, in which he repeated, word for word, the statements of Spalajkovic, which were quoted earlier, and demanded that if Bosnia-Hercegovina could not belong to Croatia, it should be given to Serbia, rather than allowed to fall into the hands of foreigners.


We can see, therefore, that the Croatians attempted to gain the support of the Serbs, in order to achieve their centuries-old dream of re-incorporating Dalmatia. At the same time, they allowed the Serbs to press into their hands the entire arsenal of the Pan-Serb movement, which the Croatians grasped desperately in their great need. They agreed to give Bosnia-Hercegovina to the Serbs and, as we shall see, the Croatians came under the power of the Serbs. . .
The Fiume Resolutions did not provide the Croatians with the advantages they desired because they managed to turn not only Vienna against them but also the Hungarian Independence Party, which had never given up the Kossuth idea. The Hungarians might have agreed with Vienna to effect a temporary alliance with the Serbs and Croatians but not a permanent one, because the Serbo-Croatian unity deprived the Hungarians of the possibility of ruling Croatia against the will of the Croatians. The Hungarians, in order to extricate themselves from this unpleasant situation, used the railroad regulations. Added to this, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry became informed of the role of the Serbs and their long-term goal, which they were unable to hide from the Hungarians. Not even the governing coalition would take such a responsibility upon itself and it simply ignored the Serbo-Croatian resolutionists.


The better-informed Hungarians were able to pull out their heads from the Serb noose, in time,. The Croatians, however, became more tightly strangled by it.


The Croatian resolutionists, as a result of their early success, increased in numbers but they were now in a bad situation. Not only did they draw upon themselves the wrath of the two states of the Monarchy, but they fell into the situation into which the Serbs had intended to herd them. If they did not want to have the ground taken from under their feet totally, they had to follow the Serbs more and more faithfully. After they had accepted the Serb intentions and mental process, they accepted the arsenal of the Serb philosophy. Unconsciously they allowed the Serbs to put a ring in their nose. Because of the events which took place in May 1907 (the railroad regulations) they came totally under the power of the Serbs and they became the leading element for the Serbs, in the southern part of the Monarchy. This development was aided by the fact that the alliance between the Croatians and Serbs did not fit into the plan of the Hungarians. The Hungarians told the Serbs, indirectly, that they would like them to play the role which they played between 1883 and 1903, in Croatia-Slavonia. This caused the Serb confidence to grow. They knew that whatever they did, they would always fall on their feet, because they were absolutely indispensable to the Hungarians. The Serbs, however, did not relax their politics but they strongly continued to move forward along with the Croatians, to whom they made clear, in the most influential way, the sacrifice which the Serbs had made in the interest of unity. Their slogan was "to make hell as hot as possible for the Hungarians". They intended to punish them for the "treason" which the Hungarians had committed when they ignored the resolutionists. After the Serbo-Croatian coalition's obstruction in the summer of 1907, really became unpleasant for the Hungarians, it again left a deep impression on the Croatians. Among the Croatians a widespread belief developed that only by working together with the Serbs could the Croatians make progress.


Although there was strong opposition in Croatia against the resolutionists and, in spite of the fact, that the Hungarian-Serb-Croatian alliance against Vienna was unsuccessful, even so the Serbs achieved a considerable success. In Croatia, the Serbs had a decisive influence on the resolutionist camp. They succeeded in creating a division among the Croatians, and made them weak and harmless. Since the resolutionists and their opposition were fighting with each other, the power which could have disturbed the Serbs was tied down within the country. In addition to this, in the years that followed, the Serbs again succeeded in creating empathy within the Hungarian Independence Party and other influential Hungarian circles, which especially became effective in Bosnia-Hercegovina and this allowed the influence of the Orthodox Serbs to grow in this country.


"Thus the Serbs", writes Südland, "gathered enough power to begin to become a real threat to the Monarchy's power in the southern part of the Monarchy. The fact that the whole of the Byzantine Empire, in this question, worked on behalf of the Serbs, is proven by the Slav congresses which were held in 1908 in St. Petersburg, Prague, Warsaw, and Reval. From this, it can be seen what enormous power the small Serb people were able engage to reach their goal.


The outlook for the Serbs was very bright. The Hungarians wanted to separate the Serbs from the Croatians, so that they could govern Croatia, as did Khuen-Hédervary and, in order to achieve this, they had to give concessions to the Serbs. The Croatians, on the other hand, had to cling tightly to the Serbs, so that they might prevent this. So the Serbs allowed the Hungarians and the Croatians to be ground between the millstones, while they, with skillful maneuvering, were able to achieve one success after another, and become a power which could not be checked. . ."


The annexation to Hungary somewhat disturbed the Serbo-Croatian alliance but the intervention of the Czechs, especially of Maszaryk, which appeared in the Starcevic Party, was successful in counterbalancing the attempt directed at opposing the alliance. . .


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The Monarchy under the Byzantine spell.


After this, Südland poses the following question: Whose mistake is it that the Monarchy, over the span of several decades, pursued unfortunate, blundering politics in the Southern Slav question, which made it possible for the situation to develop so unfavorably for the Monarchy?


How was all this possible? Südland answers that this caused many sleepless nights for him as, in the course of his research, he slowly discovered the connections which inexorably led to the outbreak of World War I. To the question of who was responsible for all this, the author gives the following answer: "Nobody." Nobody, because, in order for this tragedy to have been avoided, first we should have known how the events connected to each other. Unfortunately it was not so. In the Monarchy, there was total ignorance in this field, especially in regard to the question of Bosnia-Hercegovina.


As a result of the "corrupt mentality" of the Compromise, one might say that everything happened contrary to the interest of the Monarchy. This is only one explanation, and it is not enough. In order to understand the events fully, we have to consider a phenomenon, best expressed in the following way: "the Byzantine spell", which was able to divert the politics of the Monarchy in the direction which is favorable for its enemy, that is the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire employed its power of suggestion on the individual and the masses as it was already mentioned earlier. Many writers have dealt with this question, especially Vladan Georgevic, former Serb Prime Minister, who popularized the expression "Russian hypnosis".


During the War, a brochure appeared which talked of "Serb hypnosis". One can say the following about this phenomenon: The Byzantine power of suggestion is unique and has the same affect on the believers of Orthodoxy as it has on the believers of other religions. It is a refined, deceitful idea-system that serves the expansion of its own regime. It confuses its enemies in such a way that they finally no longer recognize themselves, their will is taken away and they allow themselves to be led by the will of the perfidious, power-seeking regime. Since the expansion of power is the life-goal of every Orthodox believer, and this is the essence of his religion, he believes cheating and deception to be his duty, as long as it advances this goal. As a further consequence of this, the Orthodox Christian believes with religious fervor in this Byzantine cheating and deception, and this religious belief and intensive faith in the distortion and fabrication is the source of the power of suggestion, because every powerful will is compelling and the power of suggestion is contagious.


To demonstrate the power of suggestion and the fire of the strength of will, Südland mentions the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which was never a possession of the Serbs. Yet we read earlier what Spalajkovic writes about these two states. Georgovic simply describes them as "the two most authentic Serb states". He calls them "the ethnographic heart of the whole Serb nation". The Serbs needed a religious philosophy in order for the Patriarchate of Ipek to possess Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the Serbs to grow in power they need to believe this philosophy.
This is why the Serbs believe that Bosnia-Hercegovina belongs to them. They believe this fervently and they repeat their lies so often that finally others believe them too. The same situation occurs in Dalmatia and Slavonia. The imperceptible Byzantine spell is the source of all this.


After this, Südland gives several different examples and then he states that not only the Monarchy but the whole world is under the Byzantine spell. "This spell had a deep influence on the history of the Croatians and was probably a deciding factor in their development from 1830 on. . . With the help of scholars who were under this spell, the Serbs made their aspirations acceptable to the whole world. . ." Südland illustrates how some of the scholars and politicians of the Monarchy became victims, under this spell: "The Serbs always found somebody in the Monarchy who would support their goal, irrespective of his nationality, religion or profession. Even the Jews were included. We have to admit that we recognize the political instinct that the Jews were born with and that they always look out a little for their own interest too and we should not resent this too much. However, an amazingly large percentage of these Jewish politicians, blessed with this healthy, inborn instinct for politics, fall under the spell of the Serbs and, not only do they allow themselves to be led astray by the Serbs, but very often feel drawn to them. We have never been able to understand this fully. . ."


Beginning with the popes, and continuing for 400 years throughout the Hapsburg rule, it was a Sisyphean task to try to pacify the Byzantines and gain their friendship Endless treasures were sacrificed and poured into the jar of the daughters of Danaüs without the slightest result. We absolutely did not want to recognize that the Catholic Austria-Hungary would never be able to win the friendship of the Orthodox Church, whereas the cunning Byzantines, with the aid of their unerring instinct, recognized the mistaken direction of our ambition and at every opportunity they whispered into our ears: "You have not been forthcoming enough. Sacrifice more and then we will be one with you. . ."


* * * * *



The true face of the Serbs



Südland states: "The true face of the Serbs is Orthodoxy. We can even say that the Serbs are the personified imperialistic ambition of the Eastern Orthodox Church, whose sole goal is expansion. In the course of history, the Serbs were servants in the Byzantine Empire and they adopted the practical philosophy and political methods of the Byzantines. They made these so perfectly their own that, in the end, they made the Byzantine Empire uncomfortable. In 1204, when the Byzantine Empire collapsed, they obtained the Byzantine stone of wisdom, the State Church.


This allowed them to rise quickly and, following their boundless aspiration to power, the servants, the Serbs, intended to swallow up their masters, the Byzantines. After that, they paid homage to the Turks, so successfully that they outlasted them. This demonstrates their progress between 1400 and 1913. They served the Monarchy too, and wished to consume it also. This was one of the reasons for World War I."


"The Serbs always serve in the role of battering-ram. They endeavor to take as much as they can from the both the attacker and the attacked, and they always end up 'the laughing third.' The fact is that every Master has had to pay dearly for the services of the Serbs." (p. 591)


* * * * *


After this we trust the reader to decide how obvious it is that Serbia follows the politics of the Byzantine Empire.

* * * * * *




I must confess that, until I read this Review, I thought of the Serbs as one of the many small, primitive and inconsequential Balkan people who, through a stroke of luck, became the leading power in the now near-defunct Yugoslavia. After reading Südland's review, I have to change my views. It is not that they deserve more respect but they seem to be "anything but" inconsequential.


First, regarding the main theme of the book, it would take at least another book to illustrate the prophetic nature of Südland's book. Since the end of W.W. I., everything has gone according to Südland's expectations, including the success of the Orthodox Church in fooling the Vatican and the popes into trying to placate the Byzantine world, in the hope of some vague ecumenical cooperation.


Under Pope John XXIII, Cardinal Cassaroli made a deal with the Moscow Patriarch that, in exchange for the Patriarch's sending observers to the Vatican II. Synod, the Vatican would refrain from condemning Communism. The envoys came and went home and, so far, it has had no lasting ecumenical effect on the relationship between the two Churches. However, the Patriarch succeeded in compromising the Vatican by preventing a condemnation of atheistic Communism. Since then, including the reign of the current Polish pope, the Vatican seems to have been duped.
This is also typical of the Byzantine system. The main concern of the Byzantine Church was to protect the Orthodox state, even if it was atheist!


One must wonder if it is purely coincidental that the book was published in 1918, the year after the Fatima apparitions. In 1917, The Virgin Mary appeared in Fatima, Portugal, to ask for the Consecration of Russia, to achieve the conversion of Russia. This was before the Bolshevik take-over, therefore "conversion" can mean only abandonment of the Orthodox faith.


Our Lady said to Sister Lucy: "The moment has come in which God asks the Holy Father to make, in union with all the bishops of the world, the consecration of Russia to My Immaculate Heart, [God] promising to save it by this means." The message seems to suggest that human means are insufficient to defeat this enemy. Yet, the consecration has still to be effected. The popes and their advisors, who completely miss the true nature of Orthodoxy, seem to have more faith in their own human efforts and politics than in the Fatima promise of Mary, thus giving a new lease on life to this dangerous enemy of mankind.


The next observation, referring more specifically to the Serbs, concerns Südland's last comment above, where he states that the true face of the Serbs is Orthodoxy. "We can even say that the Serbs are the personified imperialistic ambition of the Eastern Orthodox Church, whose sole goal is expansion," and that the Serbs "obtained the Byzantine stone of wisdom, the State Church."
It seems that the two main antagonists in the modern Western world are not liberalism or conservatism, not nationalism or cosmopolitanism, but Byzantine and Western Christianity. The Byzantine world, beside Serbia, also includes, of course, Russia, Czarist or Communist, under Stalin or Putin. The West includes both the Americas and Europe, the Old World, religious or secular. Secular states like France and state formations like the EU are in no less danger from insidious infiltration, treachery and attack than the religious ones. The secular EU is no more protected against Orthodox take-over attempts than a religious country like Italy or Spain.


Once it has succeeded in infiltrating a country, Orthodoxy is like a cancer cell within the infiltrated state. It is designed for unlimited growth and the destruction of all other cells.
While the mission of Christian churches is, or should be, to help the individual with his/her own salvation, Orthodoxy shows little concern with eternal salvation. For Orthodox Christians, it seems, salvation is achieved by helping the Orthodox state-Church to grow and expand. In other words, whatever super- or preternatural force is behind Orthodoxy, it has succeeded in making the individual lose sight of his individual goal of salvation, in subordinating him/herself to the great goal of conquering the world for the Byzantine state-Church, and in defeating Catholicism, the arch-enemy, from whom it was separated a millennium ago. As Südland said, the Serbs became the "personified imperialistic ambition" of the Byzantine Empire.


It is also helpful to recall another distinction Südland makes: the different attitudes toward members of other churches. Western Christianity teaches us to love all, including our enemies. The Byzantine, on the other hand, is told to hate even fellow Christians, if they are not Orthodox. Thus, if one accepts that God is Love, the Byzantine beliefs and attitudes cannot come from God!
In fact, Südland's statement about the Byzantine promise: "The Orthodox Church spoke to the Slav people in this way: 'Pay homage to me and I will give you rule of the world'," reminds one of Satan tempting Jesus in the wilderness, showing him the entire world: "I'll give it all to you, if you will only kneel and worship me" (Mt. 4:9), but while Jesus chased away Satan, according to Südland, "the majority of the Slav people concluded the bargain. "They sold their Aryan-Slav soul for political power." Who was the purchaser? Who spoke in the name of Byzantium? Südland is silent about it.


Südland's picture is also reminiscent of the horror movies, where alien zombies try to take over the world and turn everybody else into a zombie. The ideal Byzantine leader is the Serb Milosevic, who is sitting in the Hague, awaiting his trial. Without any doubt, he is individually and personally responsible for the most heinous crimes against his own subjects but, from another perspective, he only carried out what his Byzantine upbringing taught him to do! The non-Serb, non-Byzantine populations are second-class citizens that have to be either converted or eliminated. The ultimate responsibility for his crimes, as for the similar crimes of thousands of others who mercilessly murder or beat up ethnic or religious minorities who happen to be unfortunate enough to be born in Serb communities, or communities that the Serbs claim as their own, is the carefully cultivated and handed-down Byzantine imperialistic political culture that turns people into cruel zombies.


Before any Byzantine state is admitted into the EU, it would be wise for the EU to pay attention to Südland's warnings. To permit an Orthodox Trojan Horse into the Union, be it Serbia, Rumania, or Russia itself, would be to seal the future of Europe as part of Western culture. Südland quotes a French writer who predicted, over 150 years ago, that "Anatolia's policy, from year to year, throws darker and darker clouds over the West and now we are all feeling that a new order is forming in Europe." Now, that Europe tends to exclude remnants of Western Christianity from its future, it is creating a vacuum that Orthodoxy will have an opportunity to fill.


Thus, the "new Byzantinum" will have an opportunity to accomplish peacefully, without a shot being fired or a soldier being killed, what the Cold War could not accomplish: the take-over of Europe!


In the meantime, the world should be careful not to believe any Byzantine propaganda about democracy and democratic goals. A state that explicitly considers some of her citizens second-class citizens, because of their religious or ethnic orientation, cannot be democratic. Moreover, where these "second-class" citizens lack adequate police protection, like the Albanians in Kosovo, or the Hungarians in Vojvodina, those countries are oppressive totalitarian systems, rather than democracies. Yet, so far, they have been able to violate the basic values of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, with impunity. Even the Kosovo War could not teach them respect for human rights.


Of course, one should not over-generalize. Not every individual Orthodox believer, Serb or other, is equally guilty of actually practicing the above Byzantine mentality. Some individuals are able to resist the combined community pressure and Byzantine teachings, but they are very few. It is the influential ones who are imbued with the Byzantine spirit of cruelty, cheating and hatred, or perhaps more accurately, only those can rise to levels of influence in Serb communities. It is the Byzantine collective influence over the group that makes the Slavs dangerous.


Moreover, it is only the Orthodox variety of the Byzantine culture that is dangerous, because of the accompanying caesaro-papism. The Byzantine Catholics do not have this disease. Unlike the Orthodox Christians, they can be, and for the most part are, loyal subjects of the states in which they find themselves.


In conclusion, the best evidence that Südland was on the right track is that his predictions are all coming true. The last 85 years demonstrate the record of aggressive Orthodoxy, either in the disguise of Communism, or without it. From the Balkans to the Baltic, Orthodoxy is a force that is capable of eventually taking over the western world.




With the destruction of the book, the murder of Südland, and the delay of Russia's consecration, as requested in Fatima, the Serbs have succeeded in gaining time for almost three generations and, during these 85 years, they have brought untold misery to the peoples of the Balkans. However, we cannot afford to sweep this book under the rug for another three generations because, by then, it will be too late! Fortunately, in the age of the Internet, book-burning is no longer possible, and even if they could or would murder a few of us for spreading the truth, they cannot murder or silence every one of us! This is the 21st Century!