


A Fordulat



ÁLLAMISÁG NÉLKÜLI NEMZETEK ÉS NÉPEK AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓBAN KONFERENCIA

Konferenciaelnök: Nelly Maes és Patrubány Miklós

Program

2008. augusztus 18.

A régi Parlament (Olasz Kultúrintézet), Bródy Sándor u. 8.

- 8:00 – 9:00 Regisztráció**
- 9:00 A konferencia megnyitása – Patrubány Miklós és Nelly Maes**
- 9:30 Köszöntések ismertetése**
- 10:00 1. beszélgetés: Intézményi konfliktusok**
Harry Jansson /Aland szigetek, Finnország/
Hogyan védjük meg az autonómiát? Intézményi konfliktus Aland és Finnország között
Nelly Maes /Flandria, Belgium/
A föderatív Belgiumtól a konföderatív országig: egy flamand megközelítés
Mihályi Molnár László, Fuksz Sándor /Felvidék, Szlovákia/
A magyar nyelv Szlovákiában
Pásztor István, Rácz Szabó László /Délvidék, Szerbia/
Magyarok Szerbiában
- 11:00 Szünet**
- 11:20 2. beszélgetés: Nyelvi és kulturális politikák**
Douve Bijlsma /Frízia, Hollandia/
A fríz azonosság erősítése Hollandiában
Joan Bellin /Wales, Nagy-Britannia/
Új Wales-i program: Avagy, miként változtatja meg a nemzetet a Plaid Cymru párt – mint a Wales-i egységkormány tagja – a Wales-i Nemzetgyűlésben
Gaél Briand /Bretagne, Franciaország/
Bretagne és a jakobinizmus
- 13:10 Ebédszünet / Lunch break**

- 14:40** **3. beszélgetés: Azonosság és emancipáció**
Camilo Nogueira /Galícia, Spanyolország/
Galícia egy európai nemzet
Tatyana Zdanoka /orosz, Litvánia/
Idegenként kezelt orosz származású polgárok Litvániában
A Dél-tiroli kérdés
Borsos Géza /Székelyföld, Erdély/
A székely nemzet időben és térben
- 16:30** **4. beszélgetés: Kitekintés: Államiság nélküli népek az Eu-n**
kívül
Űmit Hamit /emigráns ujjur, Németország/
Az ujjur nemzet törekvései
Üzenet Tibet-ből
- 17:30** **Kiértékelés**
- 18:00** **70 éves a Magyarok Világszövetsége**

Harry Jansson

Member of the Åland Parliament

How to defend Autonomy - Institutional conflicts between Finland and the Åland Islands

To be presented at the Conference

Stateless Nations and Peoples in the European Union

18th August 2008, Senate, Budapest, Hungary

I Introduction

Almost ten years ago an Italian scholar, Jur.D. Claudio Scarpullo, wrote the following statement as a result of an ambitious survey of the Åland Autonomy:

"In any case, it will be up to Ålanders to choose whether to insist on the path of European integration or defend their autonomy and Swedish character. So far they have succeeded in combining the two possibilities. In the near future other stringent choices might again be at stake. But the real success of a form of autonomy stands with its ability to renew in harmony with the outside developments."

By his final remarks, Mr. Scarpulla made a statement that has come true in every aspect. His wording has therefor inspired me to the title of my contribution to this conference. Also the very title of the conference, *Stateless Nations and Peoples in the European Union*, is inspiring for an Ålander since we regard ourselves as a nation although not being a state of our own.

For minorities and individuals throughout the world, living under severe conditions where the State concerned, for example, does not accept the very existence of minorities or take every possible action to suppress its own people, the Åland Case might appear to be a problem of the "spoilt child". This is at least how some Finnish officials tend to describe the situation connected to the Ålands Islands in discussions abroad.

As "evidence" for this exaggeration they present statistical material showing the audience the fact that the Åland Islands in many ways are a prosperous society. I hope my presentation will show that even autonomy solutions applied in states governed by the Rule of law need frequent attention and to be protected whenever the central governments tend to abuse the powers conferred on the autonomous entity, or by purpose neglect the autonomy on the international arena.

Let me also underline a few unique characteristics connected with the Åland Islands:

- The Åland Islands are today the sole example in the world of an autonomous territory which also is both demilitarized and neutralized.
- The Autonomy solution for the Åland Islands was arrived at without force of arms.
- The Åland Islands are so far the only autonomous region - among those autonomies that by Constitutional law have had the option to remain outside the Community - that actually has chosen to adhere to the European Union.

II Background

The Ålands Islands have been placed on the map of Europe on three different occasions during history. The first time was in Paris in 1856 when the Peace Treaty was concluded after the Crimean War, and the so-called Åland Servitude established a basis for the demilitarization of the islands. This decision had no relevance to the inhabitants, the Ålanders were neither the subject nor the object of the settlement. The reason for the demilitarization was the strategic importance of the islands and would have taken place even if the islands had been unpopulated.

In Geneva, in 1921 the Ålands Islands were for the second time of special interest for politicians and diplomats. The League of Nations decided to settle the so-called Ålands Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden by granting the Ålanders an autonomous status within the Republic of Finland. The way the League approached the Åland question attracted considerable attention. Even today scholars find this attention justified because it was the first decision of an international organisation on a matter which, according to the traditional system of International Law, would have previously been considered as a domestic issue for the state concerned. In this respect the settlement of the Åland question represented a first sign of a new interpretation of the very concept of (territorial) sovereignty.

For the Ålanders' the outcome of the dispute was a disaster since their desire to be reunited with Sweden was not met. The problem of Ålands self-preservation was to be solved by autonomy and by an internationally guaranteed protection of the Ålanders' Swedish language and culture (for example by stipulating that the teaching of language in schools has to be Swedish and that also restrictions for the right to own land on the islands should be embodied in the Act of Autonomy).

The Ålands Islands settlement from 1921 also contains a special agreement between Finland and Sweden (connected with the Councils' resolution) and a special Convention, "The Åland Convention", which rules that no military installations could be set up in Åland, no war material could be stored there and no armed forces could be maintained in Åland territory.

There is a general saying about autonomies: an autonomy is "reluctantly offered and ungratefully received". In the Åland case we might also add that a) Finland was forced by an international organisation to accept restrictions con-

cerning its sovereignty and for the protection of the Ålanders, b) the whole solution was contradictory to the will of the people on the islands.

The third time the Ålands Islands were put on the European map was during the negotiations for EU-membership 1992 - 1994. In accordance with the Act on Autonomy of Åland, the Ålanders had the option to remain outside, by not giving their consent when the Accession Treaty was to be passed. Therefore the islands suddenly once again attracted international interest, especially among the EU-members which are also contracting parties to the Åland Convention. In the negotiations the Åland Islands used their international background to the maximum in order to secure vital interests.

The specific solution, negotiated first between Finland and Åland during 20 very intensive months and then processed by the Commission in Brussels in 4 months, takes the shape of a separate protocol, making the islands a member of the EU's customs union, but not of the tax union. In addition, rights pertaining to the Right of Domicile (an indigenous right) remain in force even in cases where they infringe community rules.

The Preamble to the Protocol on Åland makes reference to the special status that the Ålands Islands enjoy under international law. Some scholars consider this reference to be of particular relevance by stating that it entails an obligation incumbent upon the European Union not to engage in any activity, be it legislative or political, which would result in a violation of that special status. Other scholars have criticized this general wording in the Preamble by stating that the mentioned Preamble appears to have been drafted with insufficient care.

The truth is that the Preamble was prepared with great accuracy and without bias, but pertaining to specific facts, without the involvement of Finnish politicians or officials.

IV The need for defence of the Autonomy - four examples

Example no 1

Act of Autonomy

Back in 1919 Finland gave an unconditional promise that Åland should have self-government *to the widest extent practicable short of becoming an independent state*. Today it is a fact that for example the much younger Nordic sister autonomies, the Faeroes and Greenland, long ago passed the Åland Islands as far as the degree of autonomy is concerned. For the Åland Islands the absence of the right to impose taxes, other than some minor taxes, is a question of fundamental importance. Legislative powers tend to lose significance in practice, if they are not combined with a certain economic autonomy.

Still, after nearly 90 years, Åland is only partly autonomous and the history has proven that Finland is not prepared to keep its promise about securing for the Ålanders the opportunity of taking care of their own affairs free from regula-

tions from Finland. Hence the deliberately sweeping and unconditional nature of the promise in 1919 was only to pre-empt any justification for foreign powers to intervene on the Ålanders' behalf. Luckily, that effort turned out to be incorrect.

Finland has been willing to discuss a wider Åland autonomy only when the islanders in 1945 once again tried to seek reunification with Sweden (a second Act on Autonomy passed in 1951) and when general progress in the world has made it impossible to refuse further steps towards a more genuine self-government (the third and present Act of Autonomy was passed in 1991 after nearly 20 years of deliberations).

For the Ålanders the crucial question continues to be the following: is it possible in the long run to separate the Ålanders' native language (Swedish) and cultural identity from political control over our economic activities (including the power to tax), without this state of affairs in time threatening the foundations of the very autonomy?

Conclusion number 1: The Åland Islands' path is troublesome since Finland is reluctant to fulfill its promise of full autonomy and because in order to remain a well-functioning arrangement the specifics of autonomy need regular adjustment.

Example no 2

The Åland Islands in the European Union

We have already concluded that the Finnish policy has been to continue to withhold full and genuine self-government from Åland and that in connection with Finland joining the European Union a so-called Preamble was included in the Åland protocol referring to the special status of Åland Islands under International Law. Finland opposed itself to any such remarks and the Preamble came as a shock to the Finnish representatives. The reaction is perhaps easier to understand if one reads a comment by a Finnish senior official made in 2000: he was unable to find any record of an official Finnish policy towards Åland and if there was a policy it was to keep the Ålanders satisfied and silent.

The reason for the secrecy in Brussels in February 1994 was from my point of view obvious: some of the then present EU-members wanted to secure the international status of the Åland autonomy and succeeded by keeping Finland outside the decisive proceedings on the 18th February 1994.

Reluctantly, Finland had therefore on the 22nd February only to accept the fact that the Åland protocol suddenly represented a further and renewed Finnish recognition of Åland's status under International law.

Why was that important you might wonder and some of you might even think that this was much ado about nothing. Well, my answer is that although the Åland autonomy has international backing, the League of Nations does not exist any more and we have good reasons to be doubtful of the Swedish readiness to inter-

vene in such a situation where Finland uses its capacity to change the status of Åland against the will of the Ålanders by repealing the Constitution and enacting a new Finnish Consitution. This, as long as the rest of the world accepts such a dramatic change. And of course the more the status of Åland is embodied in *International Customary Law*, the harder it will be to breach or to challenge the constitutional entrenchment of the autonomy of the Åland Islands.

Conclusion number 2: An autonomy should not hesitate to use, when possible, the international arena in order to strengthen its position.

Example no 3

Right of Domicile

There is, as already mentioned, a special Åland citizenship called the right of domicile, providing the residents of Åland with special citizen status. Right of domicile is acquired at birth if it is possessed by either parent. Immigrants who have lived in Åland for five years and have an adequate knowledge of Swedish may apply for the status *provided they are Finnish citizens*. The Åland citizenship is a requirement for the right to vote and stand for elections to the Parliament of Åland, for the right to own and hold real estate, without restrictions, and to carry out business in Åland, without restrictions.

The problem and at the same time the specific threat to the survival of the right of domicile, is that the EU-protocol on Åland demands that the same treatment must be afforded to all non-Ålanders citizens of the European Union. In other words, all the European citizens - either enjoying the Finnish citizenship or not - should have equal access to the above mentioned rights.

The present situation may not be considered as non-discriminatory. Since Finland refuses to accept a rewriting of the Act of Autonomy in order to rectify the ongoing discrimination, Åland could at any time face a ruling by the European Court of Justice.

Therefore is the right of domicile at great risk and sooner or later the Åland Islands have to highlight this problem on the European level in order to protect its own interests.

Conclusion number 3: The central state, which an autonomous entity is part of, needs to fulfil its international obligations and/or the State Community must take actions when necessary.

Example no 4

The impact of International Conventions on autonomy

On a world-wide level the status granted to the Åland Islands is often considered to be extraordinary and an example for effective minority protection.

However, the safeguards for the national character of the Åland Islands are under severe pressure, due to the considerable number of multilateral instruments on the protection of minority rights that have been created during the last two decades. *The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*¹ can serve as an example for the impact of the International Human Rights Conventions on Ålands autonomy.

The named Framework Convention is the first binding, multilateral instrument dedicated solely to minority protection. The monitoring process of the last years has revealed that these new obligations are far more stringent and specific than a first reading of the treaty text might evidence. This monitoring activity is carried out by the European Council's Committee of Ministers, adjuvated by the Advisory Committee, a body of 18 independent experts. As far as the Åland Islands are concerned, it was stated in september 2000 that

„According to the Report, the Finnish-speaking population living in province of Åland can be considered a ‘minority-in-a-minority’. Taking into account the level of autonomy enjoyed and/or the nature of the powers exercised by the Province of Åland, the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the Finnish-speaking population there could also be given the possibility to rely on the protection provided by the Framework Convention as far as the issues concerned within the competences of the Province of Åland. The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that Finland should consider this issue in consultation with those concerned.”

The statement made by the Advisory Committee has been considered to be revolutionary as it contains an explicit recognition of the concept of the „minority-in-the-minority“. The statement is also revolutionary because it is the first time an international legal body has indicated that the international agreements specifically aimed at the protection of the Ålandic community could partly be repealed by Human Rights Conventions.

The current trend in minority rights law, which no longer focuses exclusively on the preservation of a certain status quo, is in many ways contradictory to the factual linguistical development on the Åland Islands. Although formally, at least up until recent years, a highly protected area, it cannot be overlooked that the Åland Islands are closely integrated into the Finnish legal and economic system. As a consequence, the protection of the traditional status of the Swedish language has its limits. For well-paid jobs proficiency in Finnish is more and more necessary. This is seen as one of the main reasons why young people from the Åland Islands move to Sweden.

Conclusion number 4: From being considered as a unique blend of international and domestic law in which the international component is specifically aimed at the preservation of the distinctive Swedish character of the Åland Islands, the strong predominance of the Swedish language is today scrutinized by an international monitoring authority of a human rights convention.

¹ Adopted on 10 November 1994 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Opened for signature on 1 February 1995.

Jansson, Harry

Member of the Åland Parliament since 2007 where he is a member of the Committee for Constitutional issues and the Law Committee. Jansson is a representative of the party Ålands Framtid.

After completing a Master of Political Science at the Åbo Academy University in 1986, Jansson worked as Managing Director for the Åland Chamber of Commerce 1987-1991. During the period 1992-1994 he was Head of Department for Trade and Industry at the Government of Åland and in that capacity one of the two civil servants in charge of Åland's negotiations about EU-membership.

Between 1994 -2002 Jansson was Editor-in-Chief for the newspaper ÅLAND and worked after that as Municipal Manager for the Community Jomala.

He has contributed to various publications on Autonomy and the Right to Self-Determination and is now working with the bookproject "The Åland path to the European Union 1992-1994".

Nelly Maes

For a Future of Flanders and Wallonia

An Interpretation of the article 35
of the Constitution

NELLY MAES, Flandrin

Progressieven ►►

Belgium= 3 communities and 3
regions

DE GEMEENSCHAPPEN



DE GEWESTEN



From a Federation to a Confederation

- No need for institutional high tech but a decision in principle.
- OPEN Dialogue from community to community.
- Aim to realize a Flemish-Walloon confederation:
 - Signal of confidence to Walloons: no new obstacles
 - It means that in any case certain issues will still be in a common Belgian context.
- How? The interpretation of the Art. 35: *Vlaams progressieven* is the first to have the ambition to activate the article.

►►
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences on the Confederal level

1. The organisation and the control of the common capital Brussels and in particular, respect for the linguistic laws in the Brussels Capital Region (regional and local level)
2. Confederal international relations competences
3. National Defense
4. Monetary and fiscal competences of the Confederation
5. The financement and the principals of income replacing social security payements
6. Confederal transport axes
7. list of specific confederal "smaller" competences"

►►
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (1)

Brussels as shared capital

- Belgium = confederation composed by two big federated entities, de federated small entity of the German speaking community and the bilingual Brussels Capital region.
- Competences attached to persons:
 - Brussels Capital Region: Not competent
 - Managed by the two federated entities
- To respond to demands to improve coherence in the Brussels politics concerning person related issues:
 - Conclusion of co-operation agreements
 - Introduction of the "sub-nationality"

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (1)

Brussels as shared capital

- The confederation, the federated entities, the territory of the German speakers an the European union: possibilities to invest in their plural capital.
- Confederal "Patronage" on Brussels:
 - Linguistic legislation
 - "ordnance": this is an inferior (lower) law.
- The competences of the local communalities are transferred to the Brussels Capital region.


Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (2)

The confederal international relations

- "In foro interno, in foro externo": the right to conclude treaties on competences that are managed by Flanders and Wallonia
- Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU: full presence of the federated entities
 - Diplomatic representatives:
 - In some specific countries and regions: proper representation of the federated entities
 - Elsewhere: confederal representation

▶▶
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (3)

National defence

- Awaiting a common European defence policy: keep our defence on the Confederal level.
- Compensations:
 - Is not an objective as such
 - If it is the case: decision in the confederal framework
- The exemption clause: no obligation of participation from the part of one of the federated entities

▶▶
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (4)

The monetary policy and the confederal taxes

- Starting Point: responsibility of bringing in the funds that one wishes to spend.
- Basic platform for common fiscal policy:
 - What is collectively necessary for the confederal competences
 - The solidarity anchored in a confederal social security.

►►
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (5)

The financment and the basic principles of the income replacing regime of the social security (solidarity pacte of Flemish-Walloons)

- Consolidate the organisation of the solidarity and the common platform of the social security between the federated entities.
- Federated entities:
 - Organisation of a proper share of their social security
 - Distinction between income and expenses.

►►
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (5)

The financing and the basic principles of the income replacing regime of the social security (solidarity pacte of Flemish-Walloons)

- Compensation of the costs: defederalisation (f.i.: allocations to families, remboursement of medical costs,...).
- Regime of income replacement :
 - No competition on the level of social allocations
 - Salary charges linked to replacing income system = common competence
 - Similar situations are dealt with in the same way

»
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (6)

The confederal axes of transport

- The big axes of transport (basically the European ones) = confederal
 - The axes of transport less visible (Internet, our gas and electricity supply) also have to be kept out of conflict zone between the communities
- Nuclear Energy policy: confederal

»
Progressieven

Exclusive Competences of the confederal authority (7)

Other competences

1. Competences of the Constitutional Court
2. International private law
3. acquisition of the nationality
4. Institute of statistics
5. The administration on car license plates
6. the calculation of the price index
7. specific prize regulations
8. institutions dedicated to some specific policy domains

▶▶
Progressieven

Mihályi Molnár László

GYORSJELENTÉS A FELVIDÉKI MAGYARSÁG HELYZETÉRŐL

Már vége volt az első világháborúnak, melyet a vagyonukat és hatalmukat gyarapítani szándékozók szítottak, s ehhez szét kellett zúzniuk, le kellett rombolniuk azokat a közösségeket, melyek még őrizték a Mértéket, a Rendet, a Hitet és az Evangéliumot. Tudták, hogy Európában a magyar nemzet az egyik legnehezebb falat számukra. Ez a nép, mely három évezrede meghatározója Eurázsia szívmérgének, és a szkitákkal, sumérok, médekkel, etruszokkal, hunokkal, törkökkel és avarokkal is rokon, ez a nép nem adja el szabadságát. Kiszabadult a török igréből is, bár közben német járom alá is kényszerült, de szabadságharcos fiai (Rákóczi és Kossuth katonái) nem tűrtek meg zsarnok idegent maguk fölött. Miközben a magát műveltnek nevező Nyugat barbár módon rontott rá a keresztény hagyományokra és a népek nemzeti kincsesházára, hogy átadják a hatalmat a bankok és uzsorakamatok szennyében meggazdagodott pénzügyi arisztokráciának, addig Magyarországon a magyar nemesi réteg önmaga készült átalakítani és működtetni a rendszert. Ezért kellett kivéreztetni az első világháborúban: hogy leigázhassák, feldarabolhassák, kismemizhessék és megalázzák. Területét nagyhatalmi összeesküvés által szétosztották az elmúlt öt-hatszáz évben vendégként bebocsátott és a vendégjoggal visszaélő népségek között. Oláhok, tótok, ruszinok, rácok, bunyevácok marcangolták hazánk testét, elrabolva földjeink kétharmadát. És elkezdődött a rombolás, a fosztogatás, az óslakos magyarság meghurcolása, elűldözése, megszegyenítése, történelmi emlékeinek sárba tiprása, az emlékezők elhallgattatása.

Nemzetünk tagjainak millióit igyekeztek idegen nyelve, idegen szokásokra, idegen kultúrára szoktatni, csábítani, kényszeríteni. Erőszakkal, zsarolással, csalással és hazugságokkal próbáltak mihamarább befolyást nyerni a magyarok lelke felett. Százvezrek buktak el ebben a küzdelemben, hódoltak be az elnyomó sovinszta hatalomnak, mely előbb a fasizmus, majd 1945 után a kommunizmus képmében pöffeszkedett, de akkor is, mint most, egy istentagadó, liberális pénzügyi maffia eszköze volt csupán. EZ A MAFFIA AZÉRT SZÍJTJA AZ INDULTOKAT SAJÁT MAGA ELLEN, HOGY AZ ANTISZEMITIZMUS MEGFÉKEZÉSÉNEK ÜRÜGYÉVEL MEGSZEREZHESSE A TELJES VILÁGURALMAT ! Pénzügyi befolyásával uralja a fegyverkereskedelmet, s ezzel a hadseregeket és kormányokat is. Kezében tartva a tömegtájékoztató stratégiai bázisait (tévék, rádiók, reklám, közvéleménykutatás, újságok) szabályozni tudják a hitükből, hagyományaikból kiforgatott és a napi megélhetési gondok szintjére degradált néptömegek indulatait is. Lázadásokat, háborúkat tudnak elindítani s megfékezni.

1920-ban a győztesnek nyilvánított nagyhatalmak úgy rajzolták meg Magyarország térképét (holott Magyarország az osztrák uralom alá rendelve volt részese az első világháborúnak), hogy elvették területének kétharmadát. Románia többet kapott (110 ezer négyzetkilométert,) mint a maradék ország területe lett (95 ezer), és kb. 5 millió magyar nemzetiségű polgárt vettek el tőle szülőföldjükkel együtt. Csehszlovákiában a csehek után a német nemzetiség kb. 3,5 millió volt második helyen a 2 milliónál kevesebb szlovákság mellett, ezért úgy állították be, hogy a cseh és szlovák egy nemzet, csak nyelvjárási különbség. A magyar nemzetiség 1 millió volt, a mai Szlovákia területén élők közt több mint egyharmadnyi részt alkotott, (jelenleg csak 9,5 %) . És akkor még fél milliónyi volt a rutén nemzet száma.

A második világháború előtt Szlovákia önállósult, de a magyar többségű területet egyezményileg átadta Magyarországnak (ez kb 10 ezer négyzetkilométer, ahol 90% fölötti volt a magyarok aránya).

Az önálló Szlovákia az elsők közt csatlakozott Hitlerhez, Németország oldalán vett részt a szovjetekkel közösen kirobbantott második világháborúban, csatlakozott lengyelország megtámadásához, és az elsők közt vitette el gyűjtőtáborba területéről a zsidókat, Németországnak fizetett az elszállításért. A zsidók elleni törvényt csak az Egyesült Magyar Párt elnöke (gr. Esterházy János nem szavazta meg a Szlovák Állam parlamentjében), 1945-ben mégis őt vitették szovjet fogságba, majd távollétében koncepció perben, hamis vádak alapján halálra ítélték, és a magyarok megfélemlítése céljából akarták kivégezni, de hazahozatala után nemzetközi nyomásra életfogytigra módosították, és egy börtönben halt meg kegyetlen viszonyok közepette. Hamvait csak néhány hónapja adták ki Schwarzenberg cseh külügymin. közbenjárására. A prágai börtönben rejtgettek. Még a holttestétől is félték. Esterházy rehabilitálását a szlovák hatóságok megakadályozták, ennek felvetését is elutasítják a hivatalos körök, vagyis védelmezik a jogtalanság időszakát.

Szlovákia Hitler oldalán vesztes állam volt, de mégis győztes lett azért, hogy újra szövetséget kötött Csehszlovákiával, melyet győztesnek tekintenek, így még a hadikártérítésből is részesülhetett, melyre Magyarországot kötelezték, mely ország a német megszállás után szovjet megszállás alá került. (ezt személyesen Sztálinnak, a XX. század egyik legnagyobb tömeggyilkos rendszer vezetőjének köszönhetjük, aki nem titkolta, hogy a szláv bolsevik érdekeket mindenek elé helyezi).

A hivatalos szlovák történetírás védelmezi azt az álláspontot, hogy mindez a világháború utáni igazságos rendezés eredménye, azzal együtt, hogy Csehszlovákia szabad kezét kapott a németek és magyarok eltávolítására . Kb. 3 millió németet deportáltak, közülük átszállítás közben kb. 50 ezer főt a Sumava mocsaraiba géppuskáztak (teljes szlovák együttműködéssel). A magyarokat egyrészt a németek helyére hurcolták kényszermunkára a műveletlenül maradt földekre rabszolgának, majd Magyarországra toloncoltak tízezreket. Nemzetközi nyomásra úgynevezett lakosságcserét kényszerítettek ki: a Magyarországon élő szlovákok helyére. Magyarországról az önként jelentkezők költözhetettek, Szlovákiában viszont erőszakkal jelölték ki az áttelepülőket: azokat a magyaro-

kat, akik nagyobb birtokkal, földdel, házzal rendelkeztek, illetve az értelmiséget, főleg tanítókat.

Ezeket az intézkedéseket Benes elnök rendeletei (Benesi dekrétumok) alapján tették meg, holott Benes nem lehetett legitim elnök. 1938-ban önként lemondott, a helyébe lépő új elnököt (Hácha) Svájból üdvözölte), közben a háború alatti időben megbízatása amúgy is lejárt. Nem volt parlamenti felhatalmazása ezekre a fasiszta jellegű dekrétumokra, de mégis törvényként kezelték azokat, és a szlovák parlament az elmúlt évben ÉRINTHETETLENNÉ nyilvánította ezeket. (néhány rendelkezés a zsidó törvények átirata volt németre és magyarra is). Ezek a vagyonekbevételek a főleg magyar nemzetiséget tömörítő református egyházat is sújtották, de kárpótlást, a többi egyházzal ellentétben, nem kapnak. Több ezer ember vesztette el vagyonát, házát, s került akarata és beleegyezése nélkül más területre, országba. 1945-től 1949-ig magyar nemzetiség hivatalosan nem létezett, a magyar nyelvhasználat tilos volt a hivatalos érintkezésben és nyilvánosan is. Sem magyar nyelvű oktatás sem vallási szertartás nem lehetett magyar nyelven. A magyar történelmi emlékek, táblák, műemlékek, feliratok többségét megsemmisítették vagy eltávolították, ill. szétrombolták. A könyvtárak magyar anyagát bezúzták. A magyar egyesületek tulajdonát elvették, mai napig vissza nem kaphatják. Megakadályoznak minden kárpótlási kísérletet.

Ezután ugyan megengedtek némi jogokat a kommunista párt hű embereinek irányítása és terrorja alatt. 1950-ben a magyarok alig negyed része merete megvallani nemzetiségét (vannak, akik ma sem merik vállalni az akkori brutalitás miatt). Egy rendszeres és módszeres elnyomás részeként nem engedélyezték a magyar őslakos területeken a magyar települések nevének használatát, a magyar földrajzi nevek használatát, a magyar keresztnévek hivatalos bejegyzését. Szlovákokat telepítettek a szinmagyar területekre, a hivatalokban betöltötték a magyar nyelvet, a két világháború közti 750 magyar iskola helyett már alig 250 maradt. Szennyező ipari létesítményeket telepítettek államilag a magyar vidékekre, ahol ezekhez nem vagy alig képeztek magyar szakembereket, ezért a közép és felső vezetés az északi területekről érkezett. 40 év alatt 10 - 20 km-rel hozták délebbre a magyar-szlovák nyelvhatárt. A háború előtt magyar többségű Kassán jelenleg csak 4 % magyar él. A mostani kormány újra megkezdte a nemzeti sovíniszta programját: a magyar iskolák helyzetét anyagilag és adminisztratív úton is lehetetlen helyzetbe kívánják hozni. A magyar kulturális rendezvények alig kapnak támogatást. A kulturális költségvetés 1 %-át sem, a lakosság 10%-a részére. A közszolgálati televízió napi kb 40 órás adásából csak 10 perc jut a magyar közösségnek, holott a koncesszionális illetéket egyformán fizetik. Hosszú idő után, még az előző kormány ideje alatt engedélyt adtak egy magyar egyetem alapításához (Szlovákiában 22 van), de ennek működését pl. az akreditáció terén és anyagi téren is hátráltatják. Lehetetlenné teszik a magyar intézmények működését, és tiltják az autonómia kérdésének felvetését is.

A kormány egyik pártja nyíltan magyarokat gyalázó kijelentésekkel érvel a közvélemény előtt minden következmény nélkül.

Mindezt azért teszik, hogy kilátástalannak tűnjön a fiatalok előtt a magyar identitás megtartása.

Gyalázzák a magyar oktatást, hogy a magyar szülők ne ezt válasszák.

Gyalázzák a magyar történelmet, hogy a magyarok önbecsülését megtörjék, és a magyarokat megszégyenítsék. Újabban az oktatási törvényben teszik egyre kiszolgáltatottabbá a magyar nyelvű iskolákat, hogy ezzel tovább bomlasszák azt, amit 88 éven át nem tudtak eltiporni.

Hatóságilag leplezik a magyar emberek elleni erőszakot (Malina Hedvig ügy).

Megakadályozzák Esterházy rehabilitálását, mert el kellene ismerniük, hogy a magyarok megfélemlítése céljából, hazug vádak alapján, barbár gyűlölettől szítva ítélték el.

Nem engedélyezik az autonómia meghirdetését, mert az megállítaná a szisztematikus etnikai tisztogatást.

A szlovákiai magyarok legnagyobb vétke, hogy nem lettek szlovákká, mert megőrizték nyelvüket, kultúrájukat, keresztény hitüket (85 % vallja magát katolikusnak, reformátusnak vagy görögkatolikusnak a magyar nemzetiségűek közt), vagyis nem hódoltak be az államhatalom erőszakos és burkolt manipulációjának. Illetve a demográfiai fejlődésből hiányzik 1 millió, vagyis ennyi gyarapítja most főleg ateista liberális és szocialista fertőzőottságban a szlovákok statisztikai arányát. Sajnos ez a tisztulás ára a 88 éves keresztút után.

A szlovákiai magyarokat az indián rezervátumok szintjére kívánják süllyeszteni, ahol az őslakosok csak folklorisztikai érdekességeként jelenhetnének meg. !!!

Amikor nyílt levéllel fordultunk Szlovákia vezetőihez és népéhez, mely levelet több százan írtak alá (sajnálatos módon az MKP parlamenti képviselői nem csatlakoztak, ezzel lemondtak arról, hogy a jövőben támogassuk őket), erre lényegében a szlovák közvélemény nem reagált, illetve reagálása hallgatás volt, viszont a miniszterelnök a legutóbbi megnyilatkozásaiban arra uszítja koalíciós partnerét (hogy ő maga tiszta maradhasson), hogy nyugodtan folytassa magyarellenes programját, Szlovákia magyar többségű területeinek nyelvi, kulturális és gazdasági bekebelezését, leigázását és a magyarok megfélemlítését. Hallgatólágosan pártfogásába veszi a Szlovák Nemzeti Párt vezetőinek magyargyűlölettel és hazugságokkal telített nyilatkozatait. Ennek a pártnak a képviselője irányítja az oktatásügyet, ahol a magyar iskolák elszlovákosítása, illetve a magyar iskolák és magyar oktatásügy lejáratása, tönkretétele és lehetetlen helyzetbe hozása talán fontosabb, mint a szlovák iskolák színvonalának emelése. Ez az a helyzet, amikor valaki nem az érdemeivel akar kiemelkedni, hanem úgy, hogy maga körül másokat letapos!

Mellékelem a levelet, melyet a Magyarok Világszövetsége, annak elnöke is támogatott aláírásával:

Nyílt levél a Szlovák Köztársaság polgáraihoz és vezetőihez !

Tisztelt Polgárok !

Alulírott szlovákiai magyar nemzetiségű állampolgárok aggodalommal szemléljük az elmúlt hetek eseményeit, melyek arra intenek, hogy őrizzük a békességet ebben a térségben. Ez azonban nem jelenti azt, hogy hallgatólagosan el kell fogadnunk minden ellenünk irányuló rágalmat és támadást. Reméljük, hogy azok a diktatúrák már nem térhetnek vissza ide, amelyek az állami szintre emelt terrorral, félelemkeltéssel teremtettek látszólagos békét, rendet, nyugalmat, holott valójában a rettegés fojtotta el a szót, a szabad véleményt, az igazságot. Hazugságokra nem lehet jövőt építeni, erőszakkal nem lehet emberibb viszonyokat kialakítani és egyenlőség nélkül nem lehet demokráciáról beszélni. A XXI. század Európájának kulturált magatartásra van igénye.

Amikor a rendszerváltást követően lehetőség kínálkozott a háború utáni igazságtalanságok jóvátételére vagy enyhítésére, akkor sokan csak a kommunista diktatúra jogtalanságainak következményeit kívánták felszámolni. Kevesen akartak emlékezni arra, hogy Szlovákia is kiszolgáltatott helyzetben került a fasiszta nagyhatalmi önzés csapdájába a háború alatt, és csak a kommunista sztálini manipulációnak köszönhette, hogy a háború után a győztesek oldalán jegyezték be, mint a megújuló csehszlovák állam részét. Beneš elnök - akiről azóta kiderült, hogy a szovjet KGB ügynöke volt, s feladatul kapta, hogy 1948-ban játssza át a hatalmat a kommunistáknak - nem csupán a magyarokat és németeket, hanem a szlovákokat is gyűlölte. A magyaroknak és németeknek pedig a zsidók korábbi sorsát szánta. Ez a gyűlölet fogalmazódott meg a háború utáni törvényerejű rendeleteiben, dekrétumaiban. Ellenséggé bélyegzett minden magyar és német nemzetiségű vagy származású embert, aki nem tudta bizonyítékokkal alátámasztani, hogy fegyveresen harcolt a fasiszták ellen. Így váltak ellenséggé még azok a német és magyar nemzetiségű gyerekek, akik a háború alatt még nem is éltek, nem beszélve az asszonyokról és az öregekről. A dekrétumok következményei többnyire börtönbüntetésben, kényszermunkára hurcolásban, vagyonek Kobzásban, erőszakos Csehországba vagy Magyarországra deportálásban realizálódtak. Vagyis bűnössé nyilvánítottak az országban közel 4 millió polgárt csupán származásuk, nemzetiségük avagy anyanyelvük miatt. Ezek levéltárakban dokumentált tagadhatatlan tények. Ezeket nem lehet semmisé tenni azzal, hogy elhallgatjuk vagy meghamisítjuk. Beneš tetteinek és az akkori gyűlöletből fakadó megtorlásoknak a védelmezése nem méltó korunk Európájához. Mert a következmények máig eleven sebként fájnak nem csupán az akkor meghurcoltak, hanem gyermekeik és örököseik lelkében és emlékezetében is. Ezért kívánt az MKP a megbékélés útját felajánlva, enyhítést keresni erre az elfertőzőtt, és hatvan éve gennyesedő sebre. Az orvosi szaknyelv a seb kitisztítását javasolja, de ha ezt elmulasztják, akkor az nagyon súlyos következményekkel járhat ebben a térségben.

Az Európai Unióban csak a nagykorúan és éretten együttműködni tudó, egymás iránt érzékeny, egymás értékeit tisztelni tudó népeknek van felemelkedése. A Kárpát-medencében már sokszor kihasználták az „oszd meg és uralkodj” politikája szellemében az itt élő népek egymás ellen uszítását azért, hogy idegen érdekeket érvényesítsenek. Ha ez most is sikerül, akkor mind a szlovák mind a magyar nemzet elvesztheti önálló kibontakozásának esélyeit.

Ezért fordulunk Önökhöz, hogy ne a gyűlölet vezérelje indulataikat, hanem a megértés, és próbálják így megfontolni az itt ezerszáz éve szülőföldjén élő nép sorsát, érzéseit és kéréseit.

Ideje már, hogy felnyíljon a világ szeme, megelégedje ezt a manipulációt, aminek elsősorban Közép-Európában kell helyreállítani a kozmikus időt, vagyis ki kell szabadítani a fizikai és szellemi rabságából az 1920-ban túsul ejtett magyarságot. Miközben elvakult és félművelt szerb, orosz, román, szlovák és cseh politikusok jajgatnak a koszovói szerbek sorsa miatt, természetesen sötétben elfeledkeznek arról, hogy ők maguk milyen lopott holmi miatt aggódnak valójában. Az orosz birodalomban a cári idők óta népek tucatjait tartják gyarmati sorban, s ha azok pisszenni is mernek valamiféle önrendelkezés jogáért, akkor a világ legnagyobb hadseregét mozgósítják ellenük. Csecsenek, cseremiszek, karjalai finnek, szibériai néptömegek, kirgizek, türkök milliói sínylódnek kiszolgáltatottan orosz fennhatóság alatt. Most érthető meg, hogy már az 1920-as években miért volt oly sürgető az utódállamokban a magyarok arányszámának megváltoztatása, idegenek betelepítése a magyar vidékekre, a magyar iskolák felszámolása, ortodox templomok építése Erdélyben, a magyar intézmények bezárása, a történelemkönyvek hazug átírása, a magyar helységnévek eltüntetése, feliratok leszedése, szobrok ledöntése...

Hogy amikor netán a nagyhatalmak mégis megengednék az önrendelkezési jogot, akkor legalább papíron ne legyenek itt a magyarok többségben, ahol az előző évezredekben talán még átutazóban sem jártak a most basáskodó népek elődei! Mert ne feledjük: akkor is (Trianonban) a nagyhatalmakon múltott, hogy hol lesz a határ, akkor most mit ugrálnak a fosztogatók, hogy most is a nagyhatalmak döntenek el Székelyföld, a Felvidék és Vajdaság magyarságának önrendelkezését! Ehhez persze nekünk sem szabad csendben maradnunk! És ennek be kell következnie. Ezt már tudják a kormányok felelős emberei, csak rúgnak még néhányat, mint a leszúrt disznó az ólajtőbe. Most már az Unión belül ez még csak nem is határrendezési kérdés, hanem csupán regionális átszerveződésre vár. 1920-ban sokkal kegyetlenebb, sokkal durvább, sokkal nagyobb tömeget érintett Magyarország feldarabolása a mostani Koszovó ügyéhez képest. Koszovóban csupán 7 % szerb él. Magyarországtól 5 millió magyart súlyesztettek gyarmati sorba, területének mindössze egyharmadát hagyták meg, Elorozták ásványi kincseinek nagyobb részét, elvagták vasúti és közúti csomópontjaitól, vidéki kulturális bázisaitól fosztották meg (Pozsony, Kassa, Nagyvár, Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, Szabadka, Ungvár.). Románia nagyobb területet kapott, mint ami megmaradt Magyarországnak!!! A színmagyar ősi Székelyföldön még ma sem akarják engedélyezni az önmegnevező magyar feliratot. Az iskolákban, a nehezen kiharcolt magyar tannyelvű iskolákban hatal-

mi beavatkozásokkal rontják az ott tanulók esélyeit (magasabb óraszám, több erettségű tantárgy stb.)

Az utódállamok, melyeket Kis Antant névvel is illettek, mivel az antant hatalmaktól kapták ajándékba országukat mindenféle néphatalmi akarat nélkül, öszszefogtak a magyar nemzet megfojtására: gazdaságilag elszigetelték, régi gazdasági kapcsolataitól elvágták. Ezért ezek az államok felelősek azért, hogy egyedül Mussolini Olaszországa majd Németország nyújtott csak gazdasági segítséget, mielőtt teljesen kivérzett volna, mint egy cserbenhagyásos gázolás áldozata. Ezt a helyzetet nem Magyarország és nem Horthy Miklós kormányzó választotta, hanem szomszédai és a győztes nagyhatalmak kényszerítették rá. A második világháború után mégis ugyanúgy meghurcolták, mint korábban, amihez a szláv nagyhatalmi góg, a orosz kommunista barbarizmus is hozzájárult. Persze a világ többi nagyhatalmának elnéző mosolya mellett, akiket ezért joggal megillet a cinkosság vádja. És éppen hatvan éve a KGB ügynöke, bizonyos Edvard Beneš átjátszotta Csehszlovákiában is a hatalmat az orosz kommunizmus kiszolgálóinak, akik az internacionalizmus nevében próbálták beolvasztani a magyarságot a nagy szláv tengerbe. De előtte éppen ezért kapott szabad kezét a magyarok és a németek felett, csak azt sajnálta, hogy nem engedték meg neki a haláltáborok felállítását...

Nagy veszteségekkel járt, de nem pusztultunk bele. Igaz, hogy nem vagyunk legalább kétmillióan, mint a demográfiai folyamatok törvényei szerint lennünk kellene, mert a deportáltak hiányzanak, az asszimiláltak pedig a másik nemzet számát gyarapították statisztikában, de nem erkölcsi tartásban. A salak kihullott, a szemét lemorzsolódott (ezért oly alacsony a megszállt területen a szocialista és liberális szimpatizánsok aránya!). És az sem ritka jelenség, hogy sokan beleszerettek túsztartóikba, és már annyira lojálisak irántuk, hogy nemzeti érdekeink elé képesek helyezni ezt a torzult lélekállapotból fakadó érzést...

Maradtunk félmillióan a Felvidéken. És itt kell azt mondani:

ELEG VOLT !

TESSEK RENDEZNI JOGÁLLÁSUNKAT !

DOUVE BIJLSMA
FRISIA, NEDERLAND

HISTORY OF FRYSLÂN

At the start of the Christian era Roman writers speak of the Frisians for the first time. In the Early Middle Ages Frisians inhabit the North Sea coast from Flanders up as far as Denmark. About three quarters of the Netherlands – not existing as a state at that time – belonged to Frisia. At that time Frisia was a kingdom consisting of seven parts separated by the sea. After the Frisians had been converted to Christianity they came under the influence of the Franks. Divided by conflict internally Fryslân lost its independence for the most part around 1500 AD and became part of the German Empire and the Dutch Republic. After the French Revolution in the late 1700's Fryslân lost its independence altogether and has since been part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

FRISIAN MOVEMENT

In Fryslân as a province of the Netherlands movements came into existence that promoted the preservation of Frisian language and culture. These movements tried to influence the ruling Dutch political parties by their actions. This was not very succesful though and in 1962 for some Frisians that was the last straw.

FROM MOVEMENT TO POLITICAL PARTY

Thus the Frisian National Party was founded in 1962. Its founding met a lot of protest in the Netherlands at first. Some political parties even wanted to ban the FNP from existing.

They did not succeed however and as time went by the FNP has obtained a firm position for itself in Frisian politics. At the council elections of 2006 FNP succeeded in getting 9,5 % of votes, 54 of 702 local council members. After these local elections FNP also obtained 5 aldermen, while there is one FNP mayor. A milestone after steady growth over the years. In the Frisian Council, the regional parliament of Fryslân, FNP also has been successful. The steady and consistent growth manifests itself here too, to 9,4 % of votes in 2007, 5 members of Parliament and securing a position as fourth largest party after the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Social Democrats (PvdA) and the Liberals (VVD). Furtheron, FNP is represented in the Senate of the National Dutch Parliament trough a combination with other regional parties.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FNP

In 2007 elections took place for the regional parliament of Fryslân. Although results were less than the previous elections FNP was content with consolidating its position after the all-time high of 2003. Of 43 seats 5 are being occupied by FNP now. As a result of the elections outcome FNP succeeded in participating in the formation of a regional government. Negotiations stretched out for two months and the ensuing 'course document' consists of 75% FNP goals, as the former CDA delegate governor Siem Jansen put it. Nevertheless negotiations failed partly by Christian Democrats who stated that FNP supporters could not be trusted. Such statement came after two months of negotiating. The true reason we think is that FNP is too strong. By taking over FNP's political goals the objective was to take the wind out of FNP's sails. After this the ruling parties have reduced the original 'course document' in a coalition document. Thus it works: as FNP turns out stronger in elections other parties take over our political goals. In this way the ruling Dutch political parties try to subdue FNP. A positive outcome of this is that the political goals of FNP are more or less being realised. The regional parliaments elect the members of the Dutch Senate. In this way, co-operating with other regional parties FNP has succeeded for the second time in getting its Senator in the First Chamber of national Dutch parliament.

FRYSLAN IN EUROPE

In 1981 FNP was one of the founding members of the European Free Alliance.

Since several resolutions have been adopted and treaties signed that protect the rights of minorities and regions especially in the realm of culture and language. EU has thereby established itself as an important factor in the interest of minorities and regions in Europe.

That position however has not been strengthened by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by some member states, among which the Netherlands.

Governments of these member states have been spoiling the social climate by the referenda on the Treaty and by their everyday politics. Moreover, EU is often blamed for constraining regulations that ministers of these member states themselves have approved of.

To put it simply: hypocritical and not fair. EU as a punchball and as a distraction of attention from national political problems.

In this way a movement has been set in motion that is shifting power back to national member states again. A movement that is no good for EU and also no good for minorities and regions. We will have to formulate a good answer to that in order to regain our position. The answer is contained as far as I am concerned in taking up political action towards a Europe servicable and closer to its citizens. A more direct influence of citizens on European politics is needed to

provide EU with a stable basis. In other words a Europe that has the support of its inhabitants.

CONCLUSION

To finish I return to my starting point. Frisians from Kingdom to Provinces, spread out over two member states. Frisians in the Netherlands and Germany are being re-united by EFA. FNP from the Netherlands as founding member in 1981 and Die Friezen from Germany admitted as observing member of EFA in 2008. Let's hope the North Frisians with their SSW from Germany's Sleswyk-Holstein will join in. Our dream and goal is either one united EFA-list in all EU member states for the elections of European Parliament or a directly elected Committee of the Regions (which in the Netherlands now still consists of appointed governors) as a Senate of Europe for minorities and regions. In this way we can build a stable Europe supported by its inhabitants. The alternative consists of further renationalization of Europa with more power to the member states, and the pursuit of more autonomy by minorities and regions or even a new member state of their own as in Scotland. That is an understandable option that can lead to less stability however and to less power of EU towards other political forces like China / Asia and the USA. As far FNP is concerned the answer lies in a Europe of the Regions that can rely on public support, stability and less power for the member states.

FNP,
Douwe Bylsma.

Joan Bellin

Wales, GB

Wales: How Plaid Cymru in Government is Making a Difference

Friends, it is a pleasure to be here today

Gyfeillion, mae'n braf bod yma heddiw,

Those words in my native language now have co-official status in the European Union thanks to the hard work of Jill Evans MEP and the One Wales government. Another example of how Plaid Cymru in government is making a difference.

The decision for Welsh to have co-official status was formalised last month in Brussels when the UK Government reached agreement with the EU Council of Ministers. Jill Evans MEP worked with the One Wales Government for the move, and negotiations were then taken forward by the member state government.

It is a tribute to Jill Evans - who has been campaigned for many years to improve the status of Welsh in the EU. Former Heritage Minister Rhodri Glyn Thomas and the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales Dafydd Elis Thomas can also take credit thanks to their unfailing support. It shows how important it is to have Plaid Cymru MEPs who fight to preserve Wales' distinct political identity and make sure our communal voice is heard loud and clear abroad.

Whilst initially co-official status will apply to the Council of Ministers, the intention is to extend this so that people and organisations in Wales will be able to correspond and communicate with the EU institutions in either of our two official languages. There will also be limited interpretation from Welsh available at some official EU meetings.

The European Union affects our daily lives more and more and it's only right that people should be able to choose Welsh to deal with the EU institutions if they so wish.

Eight three years since our formation, Plaid is governing Wales for the first time in our history. We are delivering in government and succeeding as a party. The Plaid driven One Wales government has inspired a new Welsh agenda for a modern, just and prosperous nation.

Plaid Cymru is now a mainstream party of government in national government but also in councils across the country. In May's local government's elec-

tions Plaid Cymru matched our best ever result. We have 205 councillors the second party in local government in terms of councillors. The elections confirmed our status as a party for the whole of Wales, making gains all over the country. We made major progress in the Valleys, our cities and our rural communities, along with breakthroughs in new areas. Plaid Cymru now lead three councils and are involved in running four more, including governing in our capital city, Cardiff for the first time in our history. There are now far more elected voices in Wales speaking up for Wales' diverse communities.

Friends, last month we celebrated one year of the Plaid driven Government and the creation of a new Welsh agenda.

Some people ask me why we need to support the One Wales Government.

My answer to them is did you support the campaign against the downgrading of hospitals, the One Wales government stopped the proposals...did you want to ensure a fair pay deal for our nurses...we secured this, and are you proud that we finally have a Economic Development Minister who wants to spread prosperity across the nation Plaid Leader Ieuan Wyn Jones is delivering in government.

We have created a new Welsh agenda in government. It is a forward-looking, progressive agenda building a modern, just, and prosperous nation.

Before Plaid Cymru came to power there were no proposals on how to take forward a referendum to create a proper Parliament for Wales; and no intention to legislate on the Welsh language. The new Welsh agenda also means that issues that were once ignored because they weren't devolved are now central to political debate. Plaid's presence in government has ensured that issues like the future of public service broadcasting and the criminal justice system are now being openly debated in Wales. The new Welsh agenda has changed the colour, the debate, the very conduct of Welsh politics. It's grown-up European politics.

I want a more democratic Europe, the result of the Irish Referendum shows that there is a split between the elites of Europe and the people's Europe.

Before Europe can move forward we first have to tear up the Lisbon Treaty. The outdated vision of a Europe dominated by the big member states has failed. Europe's leaders must now aim for a more democratic Europe: a Europe of the peoples. Plaid Cymru believes in a Europe where the people of small nations such as Wales would count just as much as Ireland or France. Size is not an issue here. Six out of the 27 current member states are smaller than Wales.

Wales is excluded from the top table - the Council of Ministers because we are not yet an independent nation. Plaid Cymru Rural Affairs Minister Elin Jones sits behind London's Minister while Latvia and Malta can fight for their corner. As Elin said..."Now at least we are in the room, but our rightful place for Wales is at the table in our own right."

Plaid Cymru has an ultimate goal, a vision for our country. Our vision is of an independent Wales standing shoulder to shoulder with the nations of the world and extending a hand of friendship both within and beyond our country. Our vision of an independent Wales is rooted in the needs of the everyday lives of the people of Wales.

As Jill Evans MEP has pointed out we put forward alternative proposals when the constitution was being written. They are more relevant now more than ever.

We pointed out that since two thirds of European legislation is implemented at the regional and local level, these levels of government should play a part in European decision-making. We proposed mechanisms to make this possible.

The EU is unique in being a multi-state union with shared and divided sovereignty. Much of the scepticism about Europe can be put down to the democratic deficit at its heart. In a democratic society people have the right to know to whom they are allocating which powers and responsibilities. The only way of closing the divide between European citizens and institutions is to recognise the historical, cultural, territorial, political and institutional identities of nations and historic regions. Their political and legislative powers within the member states must be reflected in their executive, legislative and judicial relations with the European Union. Plaid Cymru's and EFA's ideas are back on the agenda now.

Gaël Briand

Bretagne, France

When Jacobinism holds back the rise of regions

There may be people in this room who don't know Brittany, a peninsula in the far west of Europe, facing Cornwall. The current Brittany is, in reality, the 'small Britain' as opposed to the old British island of 'Great Britain', from where the Bretons originally emigrated. It is no surprise then to find some common toponyms from each side of the English Channel. The Breton and Cornish languages are very close and represent two of the three Brythonic Celtic languages, the third one being Welsh. This is no Celtic obsession, however, it needs to be said that the ancient Celtic civilisation has left its mark on all of Europe, especially in central Europe (Hallstatt).

When did the Breton consciousness rise?

It could be said that there have been several nationalist bursts of Breton consciousness in the history of Brittany. It would be anachronistic to speak about the Breton 'nation' at the time of the kings of Brittany, a bit less at the age of the duchess Anne and the Breton State. Brittany lost its independence in 1532, but the turning point came after the French revolution, which I will explain later.

It would be fair to say that Breton nationalism was born at the end of the 18th century at the time of the European Romanticism (Raise of the nationalities in the Europe of the 19th century). At this time, Viscount Hersart de la Villemarqué produced a popular songbook, *Barzaz Breizh* (United Bretons). These 'romantic' people were called 'Liberals', in the political sense of the word. The Breton political and cultural movement developed towards the end of the First World War then in the 1970's with the book called "le cheval d'orgueil", Xavier Grall or Glenmor, Alan Stivell.

As the twentieth century continues, the concept of the French Republic, a truly Parisian phenomena is less and less appreciated. Contrary to nations without state which made them, France has built its identity around the state and has often done this through the use of force. Centralization began with the monarchy, particularly under the reign of Louis XIV, and was reinforced after the French Revolution. The Revolutionaries, under pressure from European monarchies, chose the unity of the state. Bretons won individual rights, but lost collective ones. Brittany is not considered an entity anymore, because the new social contract only gave rights to the people. The French state deprived Brittany of its identity, as it has done with the other French regions/nations.

Today, in France, the debate between the Girondins (ones who are in favour of a decentralized organisation of French Republic) and Jacobins (ones who are in favour of centralization) is still lively. The Jacobine concept is also very "French" and is used to describe the excessive centralization of the territory. For example, the Paris area receives 60% of the French cultural budget whereas this region represents only 18% of the population and 2% of the territory. In contrast, campaigners for the recognition of collective rights for minorities are described as "communautaristes", which means "people who are only interested in their own private group").

French centralization was (and still is) synonymous with a continental politic that has, from a geo-political point of view, has weakened Brittany. Brittany is no longer able to fully profit from the sea although this region harboured one of the main merchant fleets of Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries. This central-peripheral logic is still working at the present time: Brittany is receiving funds from the European Union whose aim is to "open up" the region.

Regarding the linguistic situation, centralization has been led by a strong dogmatism: The abbot Gregoire, in the year 1794, published his "report on the necessity and means to annihilate patois and to universalize the use of the French language". In this report he says that only the language of liberty should be used in France i.e. French.

It wasn't until 1951 that limited permission to teach regional languages in France came about under the « deixonne » law. The idea of one state, one language is still popular in France unfortunately and explains why the French Assembly and Senate refused the integration of regional languages in the French Constitution in May. Since July and the reform of French institutions, there is now a mention of regional languages in Article 75 (but without any rights). People didn't understand why the Senate initially refused the amendment and finally agreed, it is believed, because of mounting pressure. It should be noted that the amendment does not mean that there is now co-officialization between the French language and the regional languages of the French state.

Whereas French unity is not threatened by the rise of regional languages, the French State continues to discriminate against these languages and the Breton linguistic situation is very problematic. If nothing happens, it's possible that the language will disappear in a few decades. In 2004, the administrative region of Brittany - where the UDB makes up part of the ruling power - voted unanimously for an ambitious linguistic policy which aimed to attract 20 000 pupils to Breton/French bilingual education by 2010. This aim however will not be achieved, because the state does not approve of the plans.

The Regional Council of Brittany holds the portfolio for "linguistic policy skills" and has the potential to create new projects related to this aim. Refusal. In spite of a voluntarist regional policy and a high demand from the Breton population, the teaching of the Breton language is stagnating and even being reduced in secondary schools. This is a consequence of French centrality, because the Basques in the state of Spain, with a linguistic efficient tool, have better results (30% of pupils attend bilingual education compared to 2% in Brittany!

In addition, in this current climate of 'liberal' French politics, the French government suppresses thousands of teaching positions and the removal of second academic disciplines (drawing or languages) is accelerated. How can it be possible to save our language when our representation at French Governmental level is so weak that it's impossible even to enter into a discussion? The reality is that the Breton language is only alive in Brittany through the exceptional work of associations like the Diwan organisation, a Breton language school by immersion programme.

France is one of the last states of the European Union that has not ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, whereas its ratification is a condition for new members. Ironically, it should be remembered that the statement in the French Constitution that read that "the language of the Republic is French" was added in 1992 to protect French against the English language! Today, the French Constitutional Council uses this Article against the regional languages of France.

The nation-state is seen as a battleground against globalisation. This state nationalism is coupled by an "identity" tension that has arisen since the Maastricht treaty. The pursuit of cultural uniformity, where only a French identity is recognised, is in stark contrast to the European ideal of 'unity in diversity'; an ideal that is sadly lacking in France. Globalisation has changed our world perception and has moved it from an increased world to a world meeting its limits, to a fragile global village and this is the reason why the ecological fight is important. Each culture should be able to express itself in its own way and the use of the internet is helping them to achieve this.

But the French conception of the world and human rights is still the same: French focused. France, in the European Union, has played a strange role. Even though it was one of the founding fathers of the EU, it is a main opponent of the principal project as the European Community for Defense presented in 1954. In order to show you that I'm correct in this assumption, let me quote to you some sentences from former Presidents of the French Republic

De Gaulle:

This action aims to reach goals which, because there are French, answered to the interest of Humans.

Pompidou: *France should play THE role in Europe* (note that he doesn't say "a role").

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: *the deep biology of the French people is making it a distinct group, different from other people and destined to be elite in the world.*

Mitterrand: *This indefinable spirit that permits France to conceive and explain the deepest needs of the human spirit.*

Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy have also spoken in this sense too.

You should understand that, for the UDB, different identities should not be opposed, because they add value! Regions are essential elements for communication at a local and global level. Unfortunately, France continues to refuse autonomy for its regions, whereas the majority of all European Union states ex-

ercise some form of decentralisation or even have autonomous regions within their states. France however, still believes that power should be exerted from Paris, with one single voice. This vision has its consequences: the destruction of Breton culture and language (and for that matter the Corsican, Basque, Occitan, Flemish, Alsatian, Catalan culture and language too) Is it any wonder that administrative regions manage only 3% of the public money in France?

Centralism strengthens the negative effects of liberalism and this is seen in the Brittany of today. A few months ago, staff from state controlled public services like the law courts and hospitals took to the streets in their thousands, after being called to protest by Christian Troadec, the Mayor of the small Breton town of Carhaix and member of the UDB group on the Breton Regional Council. It did no harm just this once, central power was put off in the face of the growing demonstrations. It may signal "the golden age" of demonstrations in Brittany against central control.

France, with its administrative complexity, slows down the development of its regions in spite of intense political pressure. The will of Michel Rocard to decolonize the provinces will end when regions obtain their autonomy. This idea of an 'efficient' Republic will not occur without some solidarity towards the poorest regions. A Europe of nation-states, as upheld by France, is out of date.

As you can see, France is archaic compared to other EU democracies and holds stubbornly to its Jacobite political traditions. This is the reason why we try to make our voice heard and by providing a democratic alternative. In the name of my party, the UBD, I would like to thank the European Free Alliance for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about my stateless nation of Brittany. Most of all I would like to thank you for your attention and your warm welcome.



Time for Diversity



Camilo Nogueira

GALICIA, Spain

Galicia

AN EUROPEAN NATION

The Stateless nations

The constituted States present themselves as the representation of rationality, modernity and constitutional democracy. They see themselves as political organizations that respond to a determinist aim and its borders as a result of geographic, economic and cultural agreements, forgetting that in great measurement they are a consequence of contingent circumstances of dynastic character or product of war.

In relation to the internal stateless nations they practise confusion in their interest, blaming the aspirations from these nations on self-government due to transitory ambitions of the bourgeoisie or signs of an eagerness for the return to the feudal order. In contrast to this vision, the aspirations of self-determination of European Stateless nations are really integrated in the process of formation of the States and, particularly, the current of conquest of the popular sovereignty that took place in the continent after the French Revolution of 1789, against the absolute monarchies or Empires.

Present Europe cannot be understood without recognizing this reality. Little more than five States: Portugal, Spain, France, Holland and the United Kingdom inherited the monarchic territorial patrimony previous to 1789, if we do not consider their ultramarine patrimony and taking into account the European borders of these States in certain cases have changed.

Nine of the fifteen States EU: Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Greece and Finland, did not count in 1789 in their present state form. Norway and Sweden separated in 1905. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia,

Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus were not independent in that crucial year of XVIII century.

In this context, from Scotland to Galicia, the national movements of the Stateless nations correspond with the process that caused the creation of most of the European States and, in particular, of the States members of the European Union. If each one of the national movement is characterized by a certain ideology, according to historical, cultural and social circumstances of each country and due to the character of the monarchic organization or the State in which it was integrated, the aspirations of the nations State depend, in ultimately and mainly, on their will of self-government and independence.

The Stateless nations and the peoples look for their national freedom, either wanting their statehood and Constitution, or belonging to a plurinational State.

Look for it In the same way, for instance, that Norway in the beginning of XX century, Ireland, in a long process in first half of that century, or Slovenia, recently, conquered its own State.

In certain cases its want to overcome the obstacles that prevent their integration in the historical and cultural nation of which wishes to be part, as it happens with the magiar peoples today integrated in States other than Hungary.

On history, the culture and the political reality of Galicia

Galicia is integrated in the Spanish State, but it is not simply a part of Spain. Its national and cultural personality is not due to it. Its history does not correspond with the official one, based on the identification of the Spanish State with Spain a a unique nation. In the Roman time, the extensive Gallaecia in itself constituted one of the provinces of the Empire. It was how the Galician-swabian kingdom the first constituted independent kingdom within the territory of the Roman Empire. It did not form part of visigotic kingdom, which is considered as the main origin of official idea of Spain.

During the Middle Age, being independent and never islamist, the kingdom of Galicia which extended to the northwest quadrant of the Iberian Peninsula, coexisted for centuries with the Muslim kingdom of Al Andalus or Spania, established in the south and the east. Arriving from the Ural Mountains, and the British Islands, from Scandinavia and Italy, from all Central Europe, the ways of the pilgrimages to Santiago de Compostela in Galicia constituted one of the foundations of European identity.

Portugal, in the atlantic façade of Iberian Peninsula, is the result of the independence of the Galician Portucale county, being originally one of the Galician independent kingdoms. The kingdom of Galicia settled down several centuries before the creation of the kingdom of Castile, which in Spanish historiographic ideology is taken as the foundation of Spain as a unique nation.

Galicia was dominated at the end the XV century by the Spanish monarchy of Catholic Kings (Isabel and Fernando). The church and the Galician

nobility were overruled and later integrated in the European Empire of the Habsburg, but both classes maintained his patrimonial dominion in Galician territory.

(It was the historical time in which Hungary of the Jagellon dynasty was as a king consort the Habsburg Fernando (later emperor) who had as well the Galician origin surname Trastámara).

Far away from their country, the Galician nobility had an important role in the policy of the Habsburg monarchy in Europe. The Church, whose patrimonial dominion extended to 50% of Galician territory, was hispanized and ruled for centuries by foreign bishops.

In 18th century, Galicia like other peninsular kingdoms moved to depend on French origin Borbon dynasty.

The Galician-portuguese language was born in the historical Galicia. Today, due to Portuguese Empire, it is the language of 220 million people in four continents: besides Portugal and Galicia, in Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Moçambique and Timor.

But against this reality and in spite of being spoken by the entire of the Galician population, it was forbidden during five centuries. Even today the Spanish State considers it as a minority language, having in Galicia constitutional status inferior to Spanish. The language continues being spoken by the majority of the population. It is normally used in autonomous institutions, especially in the Galician Parliament.

Portuguese (Galician-portuguese) defines culturally Brazil, the main State of Latin America and one of the emergent States of the planet.

Galicia has almost three million people. There are millions of Galician people living abroad, specially in Latinamérica, as sometimes occurs in others european countries which underwent a massive emigration.

The character of Galicia is not considered in the official definition of Spain. Galician country is not Mediterranean but Atlantic. Taking into account the climate and the landscape, it is not an South European country but a northern one, close in this sense, and certain social and cultural aspects, to Britany, Ireland, Scotland and England. Having a benign temperature, it is the country of water, rain and sun.

The administrative Galicia has 30,000 square kilometers and their cost is more than 1,500 kilometers long, an extraordinary dimension due to fourteen ample and deep Rias (bays/ fiords), with privileged ports and hundreds of internal beaches with a exepcional character.

The country was marginalized historically by the Spanish State, as much economically as in its communication routes. It entered in the European Community under unfavorable conditions in 1986, without its interests being defended neither by the Government of the Spanish State, nor by the autonomous Government of Galicia. Being at that moment a basically agrarian and fishing country, and despite the bad conditions of the entry, today it has urban and industrial character, leading economic sectors in the Spanish State: car factories, shipyards, fashion and clothing industry, wood, milk, fishing, ornamen-

tal stones... It has a income per capita which approaches 90% of the average of the EU.

Together with Portugal, It forms part of the occidental Atlantic façade of the Iberian Peninsula, comprising both nations 14 million people. The common entry in the EU and the consequent disappearance of the borders made it possible for country to be, between the autonomous communities of the Spanish State, the first importer and exporter with Portugal.

The Galician national movement

The Galician national movement was born during the 19th century. It was founded on the history, culture, language and social reality of the country, assuming the economic revindications of each period. It was born in 19th century, when it began the creation of most of the present European States. The centralization of the Spanish State in 1833 with the establishment of 50 provinces (four of them in Galician territory), had provoked the elimination of the governing body (Junta) of the Kingdom of Galicia, and institution that did not maintain an important power, but represented the institutional character of the nation.

The dominion of the territory by the nobility and the Church and the marine isolation of Galicia in the Atlantic, due to the Habsburg and the Borbon wars with the European powers, basically England, France, Netherland and the princes of the Empire, explained why in the 19th century Galicia did not count on civic and political institutions which could join its social and economic interests with the cultural political vindications (taking on the possibility of a Galician kingdom constituting itself a contemporary State or contributing to the transformation of the Spanish State as a plurinational institution). Due to this, in its beginnings the Galician national movement had basically an intellectual character.

Its development before becoming a mass movement specially prevented -as it in the cases of Catalonia and Euzkadi- over all by the democratic deficiency of institutions in the Spanish monarchy. During the 19th and 20th centuries and until 1975, the Spanish political system was ruled by a absolutist monarchy and two Dictatorships. One, of these by general Primo de Rivera in the 1920's and the other by militarist and facist regime of general Franco, between 1939 and 1975, after the Civil War 1936-1939. These circumstances impeded the action of the emergent democratic expressions, and also the creation of institutional and political spheres in the internal nations.

This system was only interrupted by the 1st Republic within the Democratic Six-year period, 1968-1974, and by the 2nd Republic, 1931-1936.

The Galician national movement was represented in the Spanish State Parliament during the 2nd Republic by the Galician Party (PG). With the help of other left and republican democratic parties in 1936 obtained a Statute of Autonomy of Galicia. The PG fought with the Popular Front against fascism and, like other political parties, it suffered a cruel repression.

After the victory of the allies in the II World War, the PG and other democratic parties hoped that the Allies caused the fall of the Dictator Franco, ally of Hitler and Mussolini, and the arrival of a Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the beginning of the Cold War and the partition of Europe motivated the support of U.S.A., United Kingdom and other States for Franco's Dictatorship, making democratic hope impossible.

In the decade of the Fifties the PG was dissolved due to these circumstances. Only in the Sixties was the rebirth of the Galician nationalism possible, as a part of the democratic forces against the Dictatorship.

The national movement was located in the field of the political left. It had two basic tendencies structured through changing organization forms. One, located specifically in the space of anti-imperialism and anticolonialism, advocated the formation of a National Front, incorporating the whole of political and social nationalists forces. In the Cold War this tendency, without integrating in it, was sympathetic to the camp of real socialism and rejected the European Community.

The other tendency, being equally anti-imperialist and anticolonialist, belonged to the field of the European emergent left, which considered the separation of the principle of 20th century between Socialists and Communists overcome, being in favor of an European unit carried out by nations and people.

Both tendencies defended the sovereignty and the national self-determination of Galicia, transforming the Spanish State into a Confederal State. The second tendency was more clearly oriented to the attainment of a singular national State.

It was a time in which moved forward the social, economic and linguistic vindications and fundamental steps for the creation of a Galician workers union. As a result, the present Galician Intersyndical Confederation (CIG), was located as a second union force in Galicia, having an equal representative level as the state ones (CCOO and UGT).

The fall of Franco's Dictatorship opened the possibility for the State Constitution of 1978 and a Galician Statute of Autonomy. In these circumstances, the first nationalistic tendency objected the new situation, considering that did not bring appropriate progress in democracy or in the creation of a Galician national space. Nevertheless, the second tendency, maintaining self-determinist positions, participated directly in the democratic fight for the State Constitución to recognize the Statute of Autonomy, recovering the right gained in the 2nd Republic by Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia. In this constitutional scope defended that the Statute of Autonomy recognize to Galicia a nationality character.

The Statute of Autonomy not yet fulfilled nationalism objectives, but is competent in important matters as health, education (including universities), culture, industrial, agrarian and fishing development, domestic trade and consumption, public works, housing, equality and social welfare and, amongst others, a certain limited fiscal autonomy.

Galician language is coofficial in Galicia, along with the Spanish Castilian language. The Autonomous Budget for 2008 comes near to 12.000 million euros,

a figure that is equivalent to 22% of Galician GIP. In any case, the centralised and unifying character that remains in the Spanish State determine negatively the exercise of the granted competences of Statutes of Autonomy. The Spanish State does not recognize Galicia, Catalonia and Euskadi as nations.

The Galician nationalism today

The fall of Dictatorship with the arrival of the democracy in the Spanish State favoured the expansion of the Galician nationalism. It obtained a representation in the Galician Parliament and, after contradictory experiences, both nationalist tendencies met in the middle of the Nineties in Bloque Nacionalista Galego. The BNG achieve a remarkable presence in the municipalities and accessed to the Spanish State Parliament. In 1997 the BNG managed to locate itself in the Parliament of Galicia as a second Galician political force and as a first left political organization, constituting itself as a Government alternative. In 1999, making a solo appearance, it achieve a representation in the European Parliament.

In 2001 it still remained as first force of the Galician left in Parliament. It obtained government majorities in three of the main cities of the country, as well as in certain municipalities of smaller demographic dimensions. It had three members in the State Congress of Deputies and it was not far from obtaining a Parliamentary Group.

But, after an internal crisis, in 2005 it yielded the seat of second force to the Socialist Party of Galicia, which was integrated in the state PSOE. In the same elections the Peoples Party of Galicia lost the absolute majority which it had had, allowing the formation of a coalition PSOE-BNG Government, under Presidency of that Spanish party.

After the 2007 municipal elections, the BNG governs in coalition with the PSOE in seven main Galician cities (Vigo, A Coruña, Santiago de Compostela, Ourense, Lugo, Ferrol and Pontevedra). Although maintains the mayorship of Pontevedra.

The BNG is a member of the alliance Galeuscat, together with CIU and PNV, nationalistic forces of Catalonia and Euskadi, demanding a plurinacional State. It is also, as you know, one of the six forces of the European Free Alliance that governs in Stateless nations such Scotland, Wales, Flandes, Catalonia, Euskadi as well in Galicia.

In the Galician national movement there still an ideological and strategic division on the meaning of the European Union, as well as in the economic and social system and the strategy to the self-determination of the Stateless nations.

The Stateless nations and the European Union

In this sense, I think the self-determination of the Stateless nations is not more difficult within the European Union than in the old situation inside the Member States.

The EU constitutes an historical democratic revolution. It denies the war as a form of relation between the Member States. It eliminates the separating borders. It establishes common democratic institutions. It could be in the world as a civil power. And it particular transforms the absolute sovereignty into shared sovereignty.

It is evident that the EU has still not develop its potential. Member States, having been protagonists of the creation of the Union, frequently became antagonists, making difficult necessary advances. It is not possible to deny , either, the fact that acting as if the EU did not exist, as in the case the U.S.A war in Iraq, certain States members make contrary decisions to the character and the objectives of the Union. However these, and other contradictions, possibly historically inevitable, must be contemplated in the light of the extraordinary dimension of the construction of a Union of peace and solidarity, that is in the origins of this unusual adventure.

This antagonism also appears in relation to Stateless nations. The European Union is defined as a unit in the diversity, but the institutional and political diversity that recognizes directly is only the the State 's one, and not at this moment the Stateless 's nations one.

The acceptance by the UE in their institutions of the nations and the peoples Stateless is pending. However, the Union does not deny, in any case, the presence or the integration of constitutionally plurinational States, nor prohibits in principle the internal creation of new independent States and its integration as Member States. Legally, the new independent States could be the result of self-determination of present nations Stateless.

It does not deny either, absolutely, a privileged relation of cultural and linguistic nations that remain divided by the old borders of the States, as it happens particularly in Hungarian community.

Therefore, in relation to the previous situation, when the centralized and uniformed States, the jacobin States, responded to the idea and the practice of the absolute sovereignty which was applied specially against internal nations and peoples, the existence of the UE does not suppose an added difficulty for the nations Stateless. It constitutes an historical opportunity at the footpath of the self-determination.

As such in conclusion, we can ask ourselves for the reason of no recognition in the Union of nations Stateless with an historical, economic and cultural spread like nations present here in this meeting in Budapest, similar to others nations integrated, legitimately, in the EU as Member States.

Budapest, the 18th August 2008

A GALIZA UMA NAÇÃO EUROPEIA

As nações sem Estado

Os Estados constituídos tendem a apresentar-se a si mesmos como a representação da racionalidade, a modernidade e a democracia constitucional. Enxergam-se como entidades políticas que respondem a um desígnio determinista e consideram as suas fronteiras como um resultado de condicionamentos geográficos, económicos e culturais, esquecendo que em grande medida são consequência de circunstâncias contingentes de carácter dinástico ou de guerras.

Em relação com as nações sem Estado internas praticam uma confusão interessada, acusando as aspirações ao autogoverno destas nações de serem devidas a ambições transitórias da burguesia ou signos de uma ânsia de retorno à ordem feudal.

Face a esta visão, as aspirações à autodeterminação das nações sem Estado europeias integram-se realmente no processo de formação dos Estados e, em especial, na corrente de conquista da soberania popular que se produziu no continente depois da Revolução Francesa face às monarquias absolutas ou aos Impérios.

A Europa actual não se pode compreender sem reconhecer esta realidade. Pouco mais que cinco Estados: Portugal, Espanha, França, Holanda e o Reino Unido herdaram o património territorial monárquico anterior a 1789, e ainda assim sem que o seu património ultramarino ou as fronteiras europeias destes Estados sofressem mudanças determinantes.

Irlanda, Bélgica, Luxemburgo, Alemanha, Itália, Austria, Suécia, Dinamarca, Grécia e Finlândia, nove dos Estados da União Europeia dos 15, não contavam em 1789 com a sua actual forma estatal. Noruega e Suécia separaram-se em 1905. Polónia, Hungria, a República Checa, Eslováquia, Bulgária, Roménia, Eslovénia, Letónia, Estónia, Lituânia, Malta e Chipre não eram independentes naquele ano crucial do século XVIII.

Neste contexto, da Escócia à Galiza, os movimentos nacionais das nações sem Estado correspondem-se com o processo que provocou a criação da maioria dos Estados europeus e, em particular, dos Estados membros da União Europeia. Se cada um dos movimentos nacionais se caracteriza por uma certa ideologia, de acordo com as circunstâncias históricas, culturais e sociais do país e com o carácter da entidade monárquica ou do Estado em que resultou integrado, em última instância e maioritariamente as aspirações das nações sem Estado evidenciam fundamentalmente uma vontade de autogoverno e independência.

As nações e os povos sem Estado pretendem a sua liberdade nacional, quer procurando uma instituição estatal e uma Constituição própria, quer fazendo parte de um Estado de carácter plurinacional. Pretendem-no da mesma forma que, por exemplo, Noruega a princípio do século XX, Irlanda, num longo processo na primeira metade do século XX, ou Eslovénia, recentemente, conquistaram um Estado próprio.

Em determinados casos querem a superação dos obstáculos que impedem a integração na nação histórica e cultural da que sentem parte, como ocorre com os povos de cultura magiar integrados hoje em Estados que têm fronteiras com Hungria.

Sobre a história, a cultura e a realidade da Galiza

A Galiza está integrada no Estado Espanhol, mas não é simplesmente uma parte de Espanha nem lhe deve a sua personalidade nacional e cultural. A sua história não se corresponde com a oficial, fundamentada na identificação do Estado Espanhol com Espanha como nação única. No tempo romano, a extensa Gallaecia constituía por si mesma uma das províncias do império. A Galiza foi como galaico-suevo o primeiro reino independente constituído no território do império romano. Não fez parte do reino visigodo, reino cujo território também se estendeu pela actual França, que se tem como origem da ideia oficial de Espanha.

Durante a Idade Média, sendo independente e nunca islamizado, o reino da Galiza que se estendia pelo quadrante noroeste da Península Ibérica conviveu durante séculos com o reino muçulmano de Al Andalus ou *Spania*, estabelecido no sul e no leste. Os caminhos das peregrinações a Santiago de Compostela constituíram um dos fundamentos da identidade europeia. Chegavam à capital da Galiza desde os Montes Urales, Ilhas Britânicas, Escandinávia, Itália e toda a Centroeuropa.

Portugal, na fachada atlântica da Península Ibérica, é o resultado da independência do condado galego de Portucale. O reino português foi nas suas origens uma das duas Galizas independentes. O reino da Galiza existia vários séculos antes de ser criado o reino de Castela que na ideologia historiográfica espanhola se tem como o fundamento de Espanha como nação única.

A Galiza foi dominada no fim do século XV pela monarquia dos Reis Católicos (Isabel e Fernando). A Igreja e a nobreza galega foram submetidas e integradas depois no Império dos Habsburgo, mas ambas as classes mantiveram os seus domínios patrimoniais no território galego.

(Foi o tempo histórico em que a Hungria da dinastia Jagellon passou a ter como rei consorte o futuro imperador romano-germânico Fernando I, que junto ao apelido dos Habsburgo levava o de Trastâmara, de origem galega.)

Longe do seu país, a nobreza galega teve um papel relevante na política da monarquia Habsburgo em Europa. A Igreja, cujo domínio patrimonial se estendia pelo [por] 50% do território galego, foi espanholizada e governada durante séculos por bispos alheios à Galiza.

No século XVIII, a Galiza como os outros reinos da monarquia Habsburgo peninsular passou a depender da dinastia Bourbon, de origem francesa.

Foi na Galiza histórica onde nasceu a língua galego-portuguesa. Hoje, devido ao grande Império português, tem 220 milhões de falantes, estendendo-se por quatro continentes: admais de Portugal e a Galiza, no Brasil, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, Angola, Moçambique e Timor Leste.

Mas, contra esta realidade e a pesar de ser falada pela totalidade da população, na Galiza foi negada durante séculos. No Estado espanhol consideram-na como uma das línguas minoritárias, tendo na própria Galiza um *status* constitucional inferior ao do castelhano. O galego é falado pela maioria da população, sendo a língua de uso normal pelas instituições autónomas e especialmente no Parlamento do país. Como português (galego-português) define a identidade cultural do Brasil, o principal Estado de Latinoamérica e um dos Estados emergentes do planeta.

A Galiza tem perto de três milhões de habitantes. Como ocorre noutros países europeus que sofreram a emigração, conta com vários milhões de pessoas de origem galega que habitam fora, especialmente em Latinoamérica.

O carácter da Galiza não está considerado na definição oficial de Espanha. O país galego não é mediterrânico mas atlântico. Por clima e paisagem não é um país do sul de Europa mas do norte, próximo neste sentido, e em determinados aspectos sociais e culturais, à Irlanda, Escócia, Inglaterra ou Bretanha. Dispondo de uma temperatura benigna, é o território da água, o vento e o sol. A Galiza administrativa tem 30.000 quilómetros quadrados de superfície e umas costas de mais de 1.500 quilómetros, uma extraordinária dimensão devida às catorze amplas e profundas Rias (baías ou fiordes) que a configuram, com portos privilegiados e centos de praias internas de carácter excepcional.

O país foi marginalizado historicamente pelo Estado Espanhol, tanto economicamente como nas vias de comunicação. Ingressou na Comunidade Europeia em condições desfavoráveis em 1986, sem que os seus interesses fossem defendidos nem pelo Governo do Estado Espanhol, nem pelo Governo Autónomo da Galiza. Sendo nesse momento um país basicamente agrário e piscatório, e apesar das más condições da entrada, hoje tem um carácter urbano e industrial, liderando importantes sectores económicos do Estado Espanhol: automóvel, construção naval, produção eléctrica, e agora a energia eólica, moda e confecção, madeira, leite, pesca, rochas ornamentais.

A renda por habitante aproxima-se de 90% da média da UE.

Junto com Portugal faz parte da fachada atlântica ocidental da Península Ibérica somando as duas nações 14 milhões de habitantes. A entrada comum na UE e o consequente desaparecimento das fronteiras fez possível que Galiza seja, entre as Comunidades Autónomas do Estado Espanhol, a primeira importadora e exportadora em relação com o Estado português.

O movimento nacional galego

O movimento nacional galego nasceu durante o século XIX. Fundamentou-se na história, a cultura e a língua do Reino da Galiza, assumindo as reivindicações económicas e sociais de cada época. Emergiu, quando começavam a estabelecer-se a maioria dos actuais Estados europeus.

A centralização do Estado Espanhol em 1833 com o estabelecimento de 50 províncias -quatro delas galegas- governadas desde Madrid, provocara a eliminação da Junta (Governo) do Reino da Galiza, instituição que não conservava um poder relevante, mas representava o carácter institucional da nação.

O domínio sobre a terra pela nobreza e a Igreja e o isolamento marítimo da Galiza no Atlântico por causa das guerras dos Habsburgo e dos Bourbon com as potências europeias, basicamente Inglaterra, França, Holanda e os príncipes do Império, motivou que no século XIX a Galiza também não contasse com instituições cívicas e económicas que, manifestando os seus interesses e unindo-os às reivindicações culturais, potenciasses a possibilidade de que o Reino se constituísse como um Estado contemporâneo ou contribuisse à estruturação plurinacional do Estado Espanhol.

Desta forma, nos seus inícios o movimento nacional galego teve um carácter basicamente intelectual.

O seu desenvolvimento até converter-se num movimento de massas foi especialmente obstaculizado, como ocorreu nos casos de Catalunha e Euskadi, pela carência de instituições democráticas na monarquia espanhola. Durante os séculos XIX e XX e até 1975, o sistema político espanhol esteve dominado por uma monarquia absolutista e por duas Ditaduras. Uma militar nos anos vinte do século XX, a do general Primo de Rivera. E a outra a militarista e fascista do general Franco, entre 1939 e 1975, depois da Guerra Civil 1936-1939. Estas circunstâncias impediram a acção das expressões democráticas emergentes, e também a criação de esferas institucionais e políticas nas nações internas.

Este sistema não foi interrompido mais que pela I República dentro do Sexénio Democrático, 1968-1974, e pela II República, 1931-1936.

O movimento nacional galego esteve representado no Parlamento do Estado Espanhol da II República pelo Partido Galeguista (PG). Com o apoio de outras forças de esquerda e republicanas em 1936 conseguiu um Estatuto de Autonomia para a Galiza. Na guerra 1936-1939 o PG lutou com a Frente Popular contra o fascismo e, igual que os outros partidos políticos democráticos, sofreu uma cruel repressão.

Depois da vitória dos aliados na II Guerra Mundial, o PG e outras forças democráticas esperavam que os Aliados causassem a queda de Franco -que fora aliado de Hitler e Mussolini- e a chegada de uma República Federal. Contudo, o começo da Guerra Fria e a partição de Europa motivou o apoio dos EEUU, o Reino Unido e outros Estados à Ditadura de Franco, acabando com a esperança democrática.

Nestas circunstâncias o PG foi dissolvido na década dos anos cinquenta. Só nos anos sessenta foi possível o renascimento do nacionalismo galego, fazendo parte das forças democráticas contra a Ditadura. O movimento nacional galego pertencia ao campo da esquerda política, manifestando-se no seu interior desde o principio duas tendências políticas básicas, que se estruturariam através de formas organizativas cambiantes.

Uma das tendências, situada especialmente no marco do antiimperialismo e o anticolonialismo, propugnou a formação de uma Frente Nacional, na qual se agrupariam todas as forças políticas e sociais nacionalistas. Na Guerra Fria esta tendência, sem integrar-se organizativamente no campo do socialismo real tomou partido pelos Estados que o configuravam e em contra da Comunidade Europeia.

A outra tendência pertencia ao campo da nova esquerda, considerando superada a separação de principio do século XX entre socialistas e comunistas, sendo partidária de uma unidade europeia protagonizada pelas nações e os povos.

Ambas as tendências defendiam a soberania e a autodeterminação nacional da Galiza, querendo transformar o Estado Espanhol num Estado Confederal. A segunda tendência estava mais nitidamente orientada à consecução de um Estado nacional próprio.

Foi o tempo em que avançaram as reivindicações sociais, económicas e linguísticas e deram-se passos fundamentais para a criação de sindicatos galegos de trabalhadores. Como resultado, a actual Confederação Intersindical Galega (CIG) é a segunda força sindical em [na] Galiza, tendo um nível representativo semelhante aos sindicatos de âmbito estatal (CCOO e UGT).

A queda da Ditadura permitiu a instauração da Constituição estatal de 1978 e a conquista de um Estatuto de Autonomia. A primeira tendência nacionalista não considerou isto

como um passo adiante na democracia e na criação de um espaço nacional galego. Porém, a segunda tendência, mantendo as posições autodeterministas, participou directamente na luta democrática para conseguir que a Constituição do Estado reconhecesse os Estatutos de Autonomia logrados na II República por Catalunha, Euskadi e Galiza, e na elaboração aprovação de um novo Estatuto de nacionalidade, nesse âmbito constitucional.

O Estatuto de Autonomia da Galiza, como os de Catalunha e Euskadi, ainda não cumprindo os objectivos nacionais do BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego), outorga amplas competências em âmbitos como a educação, incluída a universitária, a sanidade, a cultura, o desenvolvimento industrial, agrícola e da pesca, o comércio interior e consumo, as obras públicas, a vivenda, a igualdade e o bem-estar social e, entre outras, uma determinada e limitada autonomia fiscal. O Orçamento autonómico para o exercício 2008 chega-se a 12.000 milhões de euros, uma cifra que equivale ao 22% do PIB de [da] Galiza.

O galego é língua cooficial, junto com o castelhano, sendo o seu uso o normal nas instituições autonómicas, especialmente no Parlamento da Galiza.

O carácter centralizador e uniformizador que permanece no Estado Espanhol determina negativamente, de todas as formas, o exercício das competências outorgadas pelos Estatutos de Autonomia.

O nacionalismo galego hoje

A chegada da democracia no Estado Espanhol favoreceu a expansão do nacionalismo galego. As duas tendências nacionalistas obtiveram representação no Parlamento da Galiza e nos municípios.

Depois de experiências contraditórias em meados dos anos noventa reuniram-se no Bloque Nacionalista Galego. O BNG conseguiu uma notável presença nos municípios e entrou no Parlamento do Estado (Cortes). Em 1997 logrou situar-se no Parlamento da Galiza como a segunda força política galega e a primeira no âmbito da esquerda, constituindo-se como alternativa de Governo. Apresentando-se em solitário, em 1999 conseguiu uma representação no Parlamento Europeu.

Em 2001 ainda se manteve como primeira força da esquerda galega no Parlamento da Galiza. Chegou a conseguir as presidências das câmaras de três das principais cidades do país, além de fazê-lo em determinados municípios de menor dimensão demográfica. Teve três deputados no Parlamento estatal e não ficou longe de conseguir um Grupo Parlamentar próprio. Mas, depois de uma crise interna em 2005 cedeu a posição de segunda força ao Partido Socialista da Galiza, integrado no PSOE. Nas mesmas eleições o Partido Popular da Galiza perdeu a maioria absoluta de que dispusera, permitindo isto a formação de um Governo de coligação PSOE-BNG, sob a Presidência desse partido espanhol.

Depois das últimas eleições autonómicas de 2007 o BNG governa em coligação com o PSOE nas sete principais cidades galegas (Vigo, A Corunha, Santiago de Compostela, Ourense, Lugo, Ferrol e Pontevedra), ainda que só mantenha a presidência da câmara de Pontevedra.

Na demanda de um Estado plurinacional, o BNG faz parte da aliança Galeuscat com CIU e PNV, forças nacionalistas de Catalunha e Euskadi.

O BNG é também, como sabem, uma das forças políticas da Aliança Livre Europeia que governam em nações sem Estado como Escócia, Gales, Flandres, Catalunha, Euskadi e Galiza.

No movimento nacional galego mantém-se ainda uma divisão ideológica e estratégica sobre o significado da União Europeia, tanto no referente ao sistema económico e social como no que respeita à autodeterminação das nações sem Estado.

A União Europeia e as nações sem Estado

A UE constitui uma revolução democrática histórica. Nega a guerra como forma de relação entre os Estados. Elimina as fronteiras separadoras. Estabelece instituições democráticas comuns. Pode estar no mundo como uma potência civil. Transforma a soberania absoluta em soberania compartilhada e reconhece a diversidade nacional.

Porém, resulta evidente que a UE ainda não desenvolveu todo o seu potencial.

Os Estados Membros, sendo protagonistas da criação da União agem frequentemente como antagonistas, obstaculizando o seu avanço. Determinados Estados Membros chegam a tomar decisões contrárias ao espírito e aos objectivos da União. Assim ocorreu com o Reino Unido e o Estado Espanhol na guerra dos EEU no Iraque; com Alemanha, França, o Reino Unido, Áustria, Suécia e Holanda, limitando o alcance do Orçamento da UE precisamente quando ingressavam Estados do Leste necessitados desse apoio; com o Reino Unido, Polónia e a República Checa no momento do Tratado Constitucional, pondo em causa a Carta de Direitos Fundamentais e a Política Internacional ou uma boa parte dos Estados - e do próprio Parlamento Europeu - na deriva retrógrada no modelo social denotada pelas directivas das sessenta e cinco horas e do tratamento dos imigrantes sem papéis. Todas estas e outras contradições, possivelmente inevitáveis, devem ser contempladas à luz da dimensão extraordinária da construção de uma União pela paz e a solidariedade que está na origem desta insólita aventura.

O antagonismo aparece igualmente em relação com as nações sem Estado. A União Europeia define-se como uma unidade na diversidade, mas a diversidade institucional e política que reconhece directamente é a dos Estados e não ainda a das nações sem Estado.

A aceitação pela UE nas suas instituições das nações sem Estado continua a ser um problema à espera de solução.

Contudo a União não nega a presença ou a integração de Estados constitucionalmente plurinacionais, nem proíbe por princípio a criação interna de novos Estados independentes e a sua integração como Estados membros. Legalmente, os novos Estados independentes podem ser o resultado da autodeterminação de actuais nações sem Estado. Também não nega, em absoluto, uma relação privilegiada de nações culturais e linguísticas que estão ainda separadas pelas antigas fronteiras dos Estados, como ocorre em especial na comunidade húngara.

Em todo o caso, com respeito à situação anterior, quando os Estados centralizados e uniformizados, os Estados jacobinos, respondiam à ideia e a prática da soberania absoluta que se aplicava especialmente contra as nações e os povos internos, a existência da UE não supõe para as nações sem Estado uma dificuldade agregada, mas constitui uma oportunidade histórica na senda da autodeterminação.

Como conclusão, podemos perguntar-nos pela razão da ausência na União Europeia, como tais, de nações sem Estado com uma envergadura histórica, económica e cultural como as que estão presentes aqui em Budapeste, ao passo que outras nações semelhantes formam, legitimamente, parte da UE sendo reconhecidas como Estados membros.

Budapeste, 18 agosto 2008

Tatjana Zdanoka

Representatives of Russian minority treated as aliens in Latvia

Seventeen years have passed since the USSR dissolved giving rise to either new or restored independent states. In 13 out of 15 former USSR Republics (Lithuania amongst them), registration of residence served as a sufficient basis for receiving the citizenship of the independent state automatically - by so called "zero option". But it was not the case of Latvia. The local Russian-speaking minority was chosen as a target group for avenging historic grievances. Those of them, who had arrived in Latvia during Soviet times became stateless, those Russians who were the descendants of citizens of the pre-war Latvian Republic (up to 25% of the registered citizens of Latvia in 1993) were excluded from the decision-making process by unwritten laws of ethnic discrimination.

How did the aliens of Latvia come to be?

In the late eighties the leaders of Latvia's independence movement promised citizenship to every permanent resident who wishes to be a Latvian citizen (para. 2.4. of the pre-election program of the "Popular Front", adopted in October, 1989). Many persons belonging to ethnic minorities believed this promise and voted in favour of an independent democratic Latvia at the referendum in 1991. However, these people were deceived.

On October 15, 1991, a month after the recognition of Latvia by most of the UN Member States, on the same day that the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Latvia signed the 1975 Helsinki act, the Supreme Council adopted the resolution entitled "On the Renewal of the Republic of Latvia Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization". By this act, citizenship of Latvia was granted only to those residents who were citizens up to 17 June 1940 as well as their descendants.

One third of the population of Latvia were deprived of all political rights in spite of possessing these rights at the time of the previous elections. This is a unique case in parliamentary history: a parliament deprived its own voters of citizenship and, thus, voting rights.

The status of those residents who were not granted citizenship of Latvia after an adoption of the resolution mentioned above was not certain for a long time.

In June 1992 the Law "On Entry into and Residence in the Republic of Latvia of Aliens and Stateless Persons", regulating the procedure for acquiring resi-

dence permits by its subjects was adopted by the Supreme Council. Only skilful work by MPs from the opposition group "For Equal Rights" stopped attempts to make all residents not granted Latvian citizenship subject to this law. The Supreme Council announced that the status of those who prior to this law taking effect (namely, 1 July 1992) would have acquired permanent registration of residence would be subject to a special law.

The law in question entitled "On the Status of Former USSR Citizens, Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State" was adopted on 25 April 1995. Subjects of this law called "non-citizens of Latvia" were issued special Latvian alien's passports.

What kind of legal status do non-citizens of Latvia have?

The Constitutional Court of Latvia in its judgment of 7 March 2005 declares: *"After passing of the Non-Citizen Law appeared a new, up to that time unknown category of persons – Latvian non-citizens. Latvian non-citizens cannot be compared with any other status of a physical entity, which has been determined in international legal acts, as the rate of rights, established for non-citizens, does not comply with any other status... The status of a non-citizen is not and cannot be regarded as a variety of Latvian citizenship"*.

On the other hand, Constitutional Court declares *"However, the rights and international liabilities, determined for the non-citizens testify that the legal ties of non-citizens with Latvia are to a certain extent recognized and mutual obligations and rights have been created on the basis of the above. It follows from Article 98 of the Satversme (Constitution of Latvia), which inter alia establishes that everyone having a Latvian passport shall be protected by the State and has the right to freely return to Latvia"*.

But are protection by the State and the right to freely return to this state not essential characteristics of nationals? It is evident that judges of the Constitutional Court had to ask themselves this logical question. And they did give the answer in their judgment: *"the fact, whether the Latvian non-citizens can be regarded as the nationals in the understanding of the international law is not only a juridical but mainly a political issue, which shall be reviewed within the framework of the democratically political process of the state"*.

What is the political issue for creation of "non-citizens of Latvia"?

Some theoretical background for the concept of turning those Latvian residents who had arrived during Soviet times into second class people can be found in the thinking behind the restoration of the pre-war Latvian Republic. Though *de facto* non-existent, the state is presented as if in *de jure* existence during this period, and now it makes retrospective claims regarding those generations of people who have lived on its territory for 60 years. It does so whilst ignoring

the logic that these people found themselves *de facto* living in the Soviet Union rather than in a Latvian state which was not able to have supplied them with entrance visas and residents permits.

Inventors of the "specific" status of non-citizens established in the title of the Law regulating their status make use of the odd notion of "phantom" citizenship of a non-existent state - the USSR. By stating that non-citizens are not stateless persons they aimed to help Latvia evade fulfilment of a number of international obligations, in particular, under the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) as well as under the European Convention on Nationality (1997). But in reality they have created nothing more than the entity of second-category citizens of the country.

It is clear that the rights of persons to be protected by the state and to freely return to Latvia which non-citizens enjoy by Law are essential characteristics of citizens. On the other hand, Latvian non-citizens do not have the rights to participate either in national or local elections. Restrictions relating to more than sixty professions are still in force for Latvian non-citizens. Even when some of these restrictions are abolished, new ones appear, and the total has remained almost the same for past 12 years.

The Latvian invention of non-citizen status provided for the exclusion of the Russian-speaking minority from sharing in power. The Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia became more active in politics, but their position is still not taken into consideration relating to issues of minority education or the use of languages.

How can the problem of mass statelessness in Latvia be resolved?

About 400,000 non-citizens of Latvia form 17% of whole population and 40% of those belonging to ethnic minorities.

The problem of mass statelessness will remain an issue even in 2040, since the number of non-citizens will even by that date only have halved.

Latvian citizenship law is based on the same principles as similar laws in many other European countries (five year residency qualification, examinations in the state language and history, anthem and oath). But this law is not adapted to the specific conditions of modern Latvia where the main target group - the non-citizens clearly remember the time they had full citizen rights and participated in the democratic elections of 1989 and 1990. The majority of non-citizens do not see themselves to be real foreigners in Latvia for whom examinations and oath would be the appropriate way of integration. The older non-citizens are alienated from the state because of a combination of factors including age, health and poverty. A significant portion of non-citizens have problems with the Latvian language because they have spent their working lives in predominantly Russian-speaking workplaces and are living in a Russian-language environment. In such circumstances only small part of recent non-citizens are going to pass through the naturalization process.

A number of international recommendations concerning non-citizens in Latvia, including one to grant them rights to participate in local elections have been completely ignored. For how long will the international community close its eyes to such complete rejection of such proposals?

Time is running out for the non-citizens of Latvia. In Latvia our appeals have fallen on deaf ears - the clock is ticking but Latvia's political masters prefer to keep their heads buried in the sand. Such an approach is unsustainable and is not in keeping with a modern Latvia's duty and responsibility as a member of the European Union.

Borsos Géza

A Székely Nemzet időben és térben (Az önrendelkezésre ítéltetett Nép)

Engedjek meg, hogy előre bocsássam, nem történelmi kutatómunka eredménye, még csak nem is szakdolgozat, amit a kezemben tartok, hisz nem vagyok történész. Egy székely ember elmélkedése népének múltjáról, jelenéről és várható, lehetséges jövőjéről.

„Székely vagyok, annak a népnek a fia, amely Urunk születése után a negyedik században az ősi Dácia területén telepedett meg, és amely ma az Erdélyi Fejedelemségben él”, írta Kőrösi Csoma Sándor a világhírű székely tudós 1825 január 28-án, Kennedy századoshoz, a brit alakulatok parancsnokhoz írt bemutatkozó levelében.

A mai elfogulatlan kutatások szerint is beigazolódni látszik, hogy a székely népi emlékezet, krónikásaink és nagy tudósaink állításai egybehangzóan igazolják, hogy a székelyek a magyar honfoglalás előtt már a Kárpát-medencében laktak, tehát őstelepes nép vagyunk.

A székelyek a honfoglaló magyarok előtt vették fel a kereszténységet (ezért őrizhették meg a rovásírást) és ennek a ténynek meghatározó jellege volt további történelmükben.

A székely nép történelme a járó folyamatos harc az megmaradásért és hihetlen véraldozattal járó küzdelem a szálláshely a szabadság megtartásáért, a mindenkori központosító hatalommal és idegen hódítókkal szemben.

Közösségi és önazonosság tudata ősiségének és honalapítói szerepének ismeretén alapszik.

Társadalomszervező és kultúrateremtő képessége által a közösségi érdekeknek alárendelt erkölcsi értékrendet, erre alapozott sajátos jogrendet, igazgatási és gazdálkodási rendszert és ehhez kapcsolódó védelmi, katonai szervezetet hozott létre.

(Csak példaként említjük Bolyai Jánost, aki évszázaddal előzte meg korát és alkotta meg a tér valódi elméletét, Kőrösi Csoma Sándort a több mint harminc nyelvet beszélő nyelvészt, aki egész tudását a magyarok ősi rokonainak felkutatására szentelte és csak melléktermékként alkotta meg a tibeti–angol szótárt, vagy Szentkátolnai Bálint Gábort, a több mint húsz nyelven beszélő nyelvészt, a magyar őstörténet kutatóját, aki a távol Napkeleten kutatta – Kőrösi nyomdokaiiban járva – a magyarság eredetét.)

A mai Székelyföld 10. 000 négyzetkilométer kiterjedésű területén a 808.739 lakosból 609.739 magyar nemzetiségű (75. 33%) és 175.787 román nemzetiségű (21.73%).

A székelyek, mint első honfoglalók, nemek és ágak szerint telepedtek meg Erdély keleti részén, azon a földön, amelyet azóta történelmi Székelyföldnek (Terra Siculorum) neveznek.

A székelyek jogi intézményei régebbiek, mint a magyar királyság Alkotmánya.

Ez a rend a székelyek között tovább is fennállott, s a hivatalok viselése még a XVI. század folyamán is nemek és ágak szerint váltakozott – amiként azt Werbőczy Törvénykönyve is említi. E Törvénykönyv szerint „*a székelyek kiváltképpen való nemesek... és ezeknek mindenestől fogva külön törvények és szokásuk legyen, hadi dolgokban bölcssek, kik örökségeket és tisztet nemzetségre és nemzetiségeknek ágazatjára osztnak köztek*”¹

A székely szék hatásköre katonai, bíraskodási-törvénykezési, közigazgatási (önkormányzati, adózási, közgazdasági, egészségügyi, stb.) ügyekre terjedt ki, s lényegében mindenre, ami a szék lakosait érintelte.

A Szék volt a közhatalóság. Hatásköre lényegében ugyanaz, mint a magyar vármegyéké (comunitatus).

A székely szék, a történelmi Székelyföldön – Terra Siculorum –, magyar közjogi értelemben együttesen alkottak egy megyét – comunitatust –, amelynek élén a székelyek ispánja (comes siculorum) állott.

A székek mindegyike külön törvényhatóság volt. Legfőbb hatásköre volt a *törvénykezés* peres ügyekben. Az 1555. évi perrendtartás elrendelte, hogy először mindenkit csak saját székén perelhetnek, s onnan apellálhatnak a felsőbb fórumokhoz. Az 1562-i székely felkelés után a Segesvári Országgyűlés úgy intézkedett, hogy a fellebbezés a székekről ne a Nemzetgyűlés, hanem a Fejedelem elé kerüljön. Az idők folyamán a fiú-, vagy viceszékek is létrehozhattak törvényszéket (vicesedria), amelyen valamelyik királybíró, vagy alkirálybíró elnökölt. 1763-ban Mária Terézia az anyaszékekben állandó törvényszékeket (continua tabula) hozott létre.

A székek hatásköre kiterjedt a politikai ügyekre is. A székek küldöttei részt vettek az Országgyűlésben.

A székek hatásköre volt az adóügyek intézése, a gazdasági ügyek rendezése. A szék vagyona felett a szék rendelkezett és beleszólt a községi gazdálkodásba is.

A szék rendőri és közbiztonsági hatáskört, közegészségügyi szolgálatot is ellátott, tehát tulajdonképpen minden közérdekű területen jogszerű hatóság volt.

Szervezeti felépítés tekintetében a székek közös főtisztje a székelyek ispánja (comes Siculorum) volt, akit képviselőként a királyi hatalom nevezett ki, néha pedig a székelyek főkapitánya (generalis capitaneus).

A székely szék tisztségviselőit székely fő- és viceszteknek nevezték. Székelyek főtisztjei voltak a hadnagy vagy a kapitány (capitaneus sedis), s a főkirálybíró (iudex regius). Vicesztek voltak az alkapitány (vicecapitaneus), a szék-, vagy alkirálybírák (viceiudices), a dulló (szolgabíró), a székülők (accessores), a jegyző (notarius sedis), a számvevő (perceptor).

Személyével minden székely szabadon rendelkezett, szabadon költözhetett. *A székely, bírói ítélet nélkül, nem volt letartóztatható.* Birtokjoga még a magyar nemességnél is erősebb volt, birtoka akkor is a családé vagy a nemzetséggé maradt, ha nem volt utóda, vagy rokona, esetleg a szomszédra szállott – a vérrokonság vételeme okán!

1 (Sebestyén György, Ethnographia VIII. 349. Id. Ugron Gábor a csíki nemzettől származtatta, B. Hírlap, 1910. június 28).

A székelyek adót sem a királynak, sem másnak nem fizettek, kivéve a király koronázásakor, lakodalmakor és fia születésekor, amikor fejenként egy-egy ökröt adtak. Ökørsütésnek pedig azt nevezték, amikor az ökorádó behajtásakor az ökörre bélyeget sütöttek.

A székelység (siculitas) különleges jogalanyiség volt, amely a székely vérből származást és az azzal járó jogok összességét jelentette. A veleszületett nemzeti jogot bárhol, szülőföldjén kívül is élvezhette, a magyar korona területén a székely jogokat bárhol gyakorolhatta.

A székelység tehát vérségi jog volt, amely a születéssel járt.

A székelyeknek ez a sajátos jogrendje eredményezte, hogy a székely egyrészt arisztokráta volt, azaz, büszke az ő nemességére, másrészt demokrata, mert nem túrt maga felett urat, - jogilag a közrendű egyenlőnek tartotta magát a lófővel vagy a primorral.

Törvényalkotói jogait a Székely Nemzetgyűlések alkalmával gyakorolta. Példának álljon itt az 1505 november 23-án, Udvarhelyt (ma Székelyudvarhely) tartott nemzetgyűlés határozatának egy része, ami a bírói magatartásra vonatkozott.

„Ha a bírák közül valamelyik Istenét elfelejtve és a maga idvösségét is hátra hagyván, vagy könyörgésért, vagy ajándékért, vagy pedig a maga hasznáért az igaz útból valamely felé kitérve, az olyan mindjárt örök számkivetésre sentenciáztassék, amellet minden ingó-bingó marhát és örökségét elveszíttesse és annak utána, mint olyan, hamishitű és lelki üsmeretbéli és vávleki személy Székely Országunkban nem maradhasson és lakhassék. Az olyan is pedig valaki, az olyan hamishitű, számkivetettnék haza jövésében vagy megmaradásában fáradozva és munkálkodnék, hasonló számkivetésre mint olyan embernek oltalmazója ítéltessek és kárhóztassék.”

A székely nép államszervező képességét mutatják a sajátos, mai szemmel is demokratikus jogrend, igazságszolgáltatás saját írásbeliség (rovásírás), katonai és adminisztratív, területi szervezettség.

A székely népnek van himnusza, vannak jelképei és több mint 500 éves ősi alkotmánya.

„Keserűség fogja el a székely embert, ha az elmúlt 1000 év együttélési tapasztalataira gondol és próbálja számba venni a kölcsönösség alapján az egymást, segítő gesztusokat. A Székely Nép az elmúlt ezer esztendő során mérhetetlen áldozatokat hozott a magyar állam védelme és fenntartása érdekében. Ezzel szemben magyar részről nemhogy semmit nem kapott, hanem úgy bántak vele, mint a mostohagyerekekkel, teljesen megfélelvezve arról, hogy a székely nép a magyar államnak talán legfőbb tartóoszlopa volt, és ha ez elsovrad, annak kárát az egész ország megérzi”^{2,3}

2 Orbán Dezső: Székely Gesta

3 Urmánczy Nándor székelyföldi parlamenti képviselőt öngyilkossági kísérletbe hajszolták képviselőtársai a parlamentben a székely kérdéssel kapcsolatban megnyilvánuló közömbösségükkel.

A „székely kérdés” ma.

A „székely kérdés” megoldásának titka nem más, mint a székely nép önrendelkezési jogának elismerése és érvényre juttatása.

Nem véletlen tehát, hogy a „székely kérdés” nemkívánatos témának minősül mind az un. Erdélyi magyar, mind a román politizálásban, mind pedig a magyarországi politikai osztály tematikájában. Részükről a megoldás az, hogy ne legyen „székely ügy”, ne legyen székely kérdés.

Ennek megfelelően találták ki az „erdélyi magyarság”, erdélyi magyar kisebbség, erdélyi magyar nemzeti közösség stb. mondvacsinált kifejezéseket, leplezni azt, hogy egy önrendelkezésre jogosult népet fednek és bújtatnak e semmitmondó és megalázó, méltatlan kifejezések.

Ennek a törekvésnek a következménye az RMDSZ egypárti, kommunista jellegű diktatúrájának kialakulása. Ezt a diktatúrát a megalakult MPP sem képes lényegében megtörni, hisz szerkezetében hasonmása az RMDSZ-nek. Meggyőződésem, hogy minden olyan szervezet, mely az un. „erdélyi magyarságra „szerveződik” törvényszerűen „székelyidegen” és előbb-utóbb, csak idő kérdése székegyellenessé is válik, vagyis az RMDSZ sorsára jut!

Indoklásába most nem bocsátkozom bele, de alapját a székely nép és az erdélyi magyarság többi része közti közösségi igények elvárások, és lehetőségek különbözősége adja. (minden rendszer a legkisebb energiaszintre törekszik)

Semmilyen megoldást nem kínál tehát a székely kérdés tekintetében újabb erdélyi szervezkedések létrejötte. Megoldást csak a székely nép önszerveződése hozhat.

Erdélyben ezt az RMDSZ volt és ma is hivatott megoldani. Csakis így válik érthetővé magatartása, melynek lényege, megakadályozni, felszámolni minden, a székely népen, székelyföldön induló szervezkedést. Ezekre már csirájukban az „egységbontó-egységbontás” bélyegét sütik rá, Magyarországon meg felerősítik ezt a hangot, Bukarest meg politikai alamizsnával honorálja.

Jó példa erre az 1990-ben megalakult Székely Ifjak Szövetségének sorsa, akit magyarelleneseknek, irredentáknak és őskori képződménynek titulálva, a magyarországi segítséggel szervezett osztúzzal söpörtek le a társadalmi élet porondjáról gúnyt űzve az általuk kitett első rovásírásos helységtáblából is. Ugyanerre a sorsra jutott a Katona Ádám által meghirdetett 1991-es Agyagfalvi Székely Nemzetgyűlés, az RMDSZ keretein belül elindított székely székek összefogását megpróbáló szervezkedés.

Össztűzet kapott a Székely Nemzeti Tanács megalakulása, mely máig az egyetlen, a közvetlen népképviselőre épülő köztestület, mely a székely nép autonómtörekvését képviselendő jött létre. Akkor 2004-ben, még létezett a külső nyomásgyakorlás lehetősége, hisz Románia még csak jelölti státussal rendelkezett az Európai Unióban. 2006 szeptember 26-án, a magyar politikai osztály nyílt árulása által ennek utolsó lehetősége is megszűnt. Ezzel a Székely Nemzeti Tanács is új kihívás elé került. A 2006. június 18-án, Ditróba összehívott Székely Nemzetgyűlés már, belátva a helyzet tragikumát, nevezetese, hogy nem számíthat a magyar politika támogatására, kimondta, hogy amennyiben a Román

Kormány nem kezdi meg a tárgyalásokat az autonómia statutum törvénybe iktatását illetően, akkor megbízza a SzNT-ot, hogy újabb székely nemzetgyűlést hívjon össze, mely „**dönteni fog a székely nép önrendelkezésének módjáról**”.

A magyarországi közéletben és politikai kurzusban a „Székely kérdés” ugyanolyan politikai-közéleti tabunak bizonyult, mint a Trianon, vagy a tudományos életben a hun eredetkutatás.

A néprajzi vonatkozásait leszámítva, még ma sem ildomos emlegetni a székely nép önrendelkezési törekvéseit, (ne add Isten, azonosulni azokkal), államszervezési, hadászati, jogalkotói értékeit.

Legfennebb néprajzi doktorátusi dolgozatok és politikusi kinyilatkoztatások tárgya és színhelye a mai Székelyföld és annak lakói.

Sajnos a magyarországi magyar politikai és közgondolkodás minden eddigi tragédia ellenére ma sem változott a „székely kérdéshez” való viszonyulása. (lásd 2004. december 5-ét, 2006. szeptember 26-át, az SzNT fogadtatását, elismerését, törekvéseinek felkarolását 2004-ben.)

Elmondhatjuk tehát, hogy Közép Európa Keleti Kárpátok övezte részén, a Székelyföldön él, egy, a területen őshonos, ma is 700000-es lélekszámú nép, mely ezer éve rendelkezik az államiság minden feltételével, megteremtve az államszervezés minden eszközét. Sajat hadseregével és vérével védett ősi területe, maga teremtette alkotmányos jogrendje, kultúrája, ősi írása, himnusza és identitás jelképei, zászlaja, címere van.

Hadserege mindég komoly erőt képezett a Magyar Királyságban (40-60 ezer fő) és Közép Európában egyaránt. Hadseregét soha nem használta hódításra, idegen népek leigázására, új területek szerzésére. És ma, ettől a néptől nagyhatalmi rábólintással tagadják meg, nem csak az önigazgatáshoz, de még az önazonosság megőrzéséhez való jogot is!

Kiszolgáltatottságban és veszélyeztetettségben él, a felmorzsolódás és erőszakos beolvasztás fenyegeti.

Ez a nép ma idegen elnyomás alatt, egy olyan, magát „nemzetállamnak” tituláló állam keretében él, mely megtagad tőle minden, a közösségi fennmaradást biztosító önigazgatási lehetőséget.

Népem, a Székely Nép önrendelkezésre van ítélve!

Választania kell: vagy élni fog a népeket megillető önrendelkezési jogával és önigazgatási hagyományaihoz visszatérve saját kezébe veszi sorsának irányítását, vagy a lassú felszámolás útjára lép és szétszóratik a nagyvilágban.

Adjon kellő erőt és bölcsességet a Gondviselő és kísérjen utunkon a Csíksomlyói Szűzanya, minden székelyek Babba Máriája.

Gyergyócsomafalva, 2008-08-12